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Abstract
This thesis is composed of three stand-alone essays interlinked within the context of bank-
ing markets in sub-Saharan Africa. This research is motivated by the lack of comparative
research on North-South and South-South foreign direct investment (FDI), especially on
the service sector and on the African context, despite the rapid expansion of multination-
als from developing and emerging countries over the last two decades. Theoretically, this
thesis builds on strategy, corporate finance and organizational economics theories. The
first chapter compares the financial performance of the foreign affiliates of global banks to
that of regional African banks in sub-Saharan Africa over a 10-year period. The results
suggest that affiliates of regional African banks are significantly less profitable (lower re-
turn on equity and higher cost income ratio) than those of global banks. Furthermore,
the performance differentials are not strongly related to the quality and sectoral allocation
of banks’ loan portfolio but to differences in their access to funding. The second chapter
examines the benefits and drawbacks of being part of a large banking group by analyzing
the flows of internal capital between foreign affiliates located in an emerging economy,
South Africa, and their global headquarters. It provides evidence for a support motive to
internal funding, as foreign affiliates receive on average more internal group funding when
their solvency ratio declines. However, using the event of the East Asian Crisis, I show
that foreign affiliates’ balance sheet are not immune to “reversal of fortune” when other
members of their banking group need large amounts of internal capital to cushion capi-
tal losses, leading to abrupt reallocation of internal capital. Finally, using an instrument
variable technique I find a positive impact of the volume of internal funding received by a
foreign affiliate on its credit supply in the mortgage market. In the third chapter I examine
how environmental and firm factors influence the organizational structure of multinational
banks relying on survey data on commercial banks located in 14 sub-Saharan African coun-
tries. I find evidence of a positive and significant association between several indicators
of environmental distance between host and home countries (institutional, economic and
cultural distance) and centralization of operational processes inside multinationals. In
addition, I find that lower quantity of “hard” information available on borrowers in the
host markets and higher reliance on qualitative or “soft” information by bank managers
is negatively and significantly associated with centralization.
To my parents, Jean-Claude and Dominique.
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Introduction
“They call it Africa. We call it home.”
Standard Bank marketing campaign, 2013-2014
The slogan of the marketing campaign of the South African bank Standard Bank
appearing on the billboards in the business districts of Nairobi, Dar es Salaam or
Accra provides an excellent illustration to the area of research of this thesis and its
core hypotheses. What the South African giant advocates, implicitly, is that it has a
“home market advantage” in operating in Africa, enabling the group to understand
well the particularity of the region’s institutional and economic context, which may
constitute an advantage over other foreign banks from developed countries. Con-
ducting banking activities in sub-Saharan Africa poses several challenges, especially
for banks accustomed to operate in wealthier and less volatile environments. A
bank manager appointed by his multinational bank from London to head a newly
opened subsidiary in Nairobi may ponder the following questions: How to operate
in an environment where less than 20 percent of households have access to formal
financial services1, only 5 countries have credit reference bureaus2 and 4 countries
have deposit insurance schemes3, and yet there may be up to 50 banks compet-
ing for the same customers in a given market? Are the size of your balance sheet
and technical support from your group the key to unlock firm performance in these
markets, or is ability to manage environments characterized by weak governance,
lack of infrastructure and low GDP per capita the main driver of success? For the
global headquarters the question of the best organizational form to operate in such
environments poses itself: How much autonomy should they give to the subsidiary
managers in Nairobi or Lagos with respect to strategic decisions such as opening new
branches, or launching new banking products? Furthermore, should they provide
1Source: Making Finance Work For Africa, http://www.mfw4a.org/access-to-finance/
access-to-finance.html
2These are Botswana (2006), Kenya (2007), Namibia (2006), South Africa (2007) and Swaziland
(2006). Source: Triki and Gajigo (2012).
3Kenya (since 1988), Nigeria (1988-1989), Tanzania (1994), Zimbabwe (2003). Interestingly,
South Africa has no explicit depositors’ insurance scheme.
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them with financial support through internal deposit or loans at favorable terms,
and, if so, in which conditions?
These are important questions with practical applications that this thesis aims
to answer.
Area of research and motivation
This research is motivated by the emergence over the last two decades of South-
South foreign direct investment (FDI), from developing countries to other developing
countries. After a “first wave” documented by scholars such as Kumar and Mc Leod
(1981), Lall (1983) and Wells (1983), who focused on multinationals from South
America and South and Southeast Asia, a “second wave” of developing country
multinational enterprises (MNEs) has emerged from economies as diverse as China,
Malaysia, Nigeria or Russia. Some of these multinationals have become household
names, such as the conglomerate Tata, which has made acquisitions in different parts
of the world, venturing from India to developed countries. Other, smaller groups,
have embarked on an internationalization process over the last decade by focusing
on their region, looking first for opportunities in their neighboring countries. This
research analyzes the new phenomenon of developing multinationals by focusing on
a specific sector, the banking industry, and a specific geography, sub-Saharan Africa.
As the internationalization of multinationals from developing countries and their
implantation in other developing countries is gathering momentum, scholar research
has started to re-examine South-South FDI, concentrating primarily on the man-
ufacturing sectors and in particular the pharmaceutical and automotive industries
(Bartlett and Ghoshal, 2000; Bhaumik, Driffield and Pal, 2010) and the white good
(or home appliance) industry (Bonaglia, Goldstein and Mathews, 2007). It has often
relied on case study methods (Ramamurti and Singh, 2009) examining strategies of
multinationals from selected emerging countries, in particular India (Garg and De-
lios, 2007; Elango and Pattnaik, 2011), China (Child and Rodrigues, 2005; Li, 2007)
and Brazil and Mexico (Casanova, 2009; Ramsey, Resende and Almeida, 2009), with
only a few focused on Africa, essentially examining Chinese firms’ investments in the
region (Kaplinsky and Morris, 2006; Broadman, 2007). Furthermore, most of the
literature on South-South FDI has focused on motives for internationalization, en-
try mode and location (Filatotchev, Strange, Piesse and Lien, 2007; Luo and Tung,
2007; Rui and Yip, 2008), or on the role of home country effects on internation-
alization and firms’ capabilities (Yiu, Lau and Bruton, 2007; Cuervo-Cazurra and
Genc, 2008; Khanna and Palepu, 2006, 2010; Gammeltoft, Pradhan and Goldstein,
2010), without directly comparing the performance and strategies of developed and
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developing multinationals in a third country. As such, the literature in international
business and strategy, which is the field of research that has been most vividly in-
terested in developing and emerging multinationals, has neglected both the African
region and the banking sector, the body of research being focused mostly on large
manufacturing firms from emerging economies. In addition, scholars have tended to
either adopt a very micro approach, focusing on one country or one firm, which limits
external validity and generalizability of findings, or a very macro approach, analyz-
ing aggregate FDI to developing countries, which makes difficult the examination of
potentially important industrial and regional effects.
As mentioned above, service firms, and especially banks, which have different
production and consumption characteristics from manufacturing firms, have seldom
been studied from a South-South perspective. The literature on banking multi-
nationals, which tends to be distinct from that of the international business and
strategy literature, being more grounded in the fields of international economics and
finance, has focused on the internationalization of banks from industrialized coun-
tries (Guillén and Tschoegl, 1999; Engwall and Wallenstål, 1988; Slager, 2005), and
on the impact of foreign banks on competition in host countries’ financial services
from a developed country perspective (de Carmoy, 1990). Furthermore, academic
research on the banking sector in developing countries has mainly focused on the
impact of developed foreign banks on small and medium enterprise (SMEs) financing
(Clarke, Cull, Martinez Peria and Sanchez, 2005; Detragiache, Tressel and Gupta,
2008; Gormley, 2007).
The gaps in the literature on South-South banking are very significant. Only a
handful of economic studies have analyzed this phenomenon. The main questions
addressed by these studies concern the motivations and determinants of develop-
ing country banks’ entry into other developing countries (The World Bank, 2006;
Van Horen, 2007; Petrou, 2007). For example, Van Horen (2007) and the Global
Development Finance 2006 report of the World Bank both use Bureau Van Dijk’s
BankScope database to test the differences in the determinants of foreign entry
into developing countries between banks from developing countries and banks from
developed countries. Both studies find that banks from developing countries are
more likely to invest in developing countries with weak institutions, where devel-
oped countries’ banks are reluctant to go. In addition, Van Horen (2007) shows
that foreign banks from developing countries are less profitable than foreign banks
from high-income countries. Petrou (2007) uses a different approach by measur-
ing managers’ international strategic motivations using a survey of 112 new foreign
venture banks worldwide. He finds that multinational banks from developing coun-
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tries are more likely to follow clients from home, whereas multinational banks from
developed countries tend to enter developing countries in search of foreign market
opportunities.
While these first empirical studies are important in that they offer glimpses into
the locational determinants and performance of South-South banking, they do not
adequately address the question of the cause of the performance differential observed
between foreign affiliates of developed and developing multinationals, neither do they
examine the related questions of the corporate and organizational strategies of these
developing banks when they enter foreign markets. This present research aims to
do so by adopting an industrial and regional (meso-level) lens, with a comparative
approach. More specifically, it explores empirically the financial performance as well
as the corporate and organizational strategies of multinational banks with foreign
affiliates in sub-Saharan Africa. It compares practices of global multinational banks
from developed countries to that of multinational banks from Africa and from other
emerging countries. In so doing, this research recognizes that foreign firms are an
heterogeneous group and explores how the capabilities of multinational banks are
related to their country of origin and international experience.
Objectives of the research and research questions
As this research aims to examine banks with different levels of firms’ capabilities in
sub-Saharan Africa I define three different categories of foreign banks based on their
country of origin and degree of internationalization: global multinational banks from
developed countries (Global MNB), multinational banks from emerging countries
(Emerging MNB) and regional multinational banks operating in only one region,
here sub-Saharan Africa (regional African MNB). Three sets of questions will be
addressed.
Firstly, the question of the capabilities of these multinational banks. Compared
to large global groups, on which types of firm capabilities do (regional) African MNB
rely on to start and expand their international operations? Do these capabilities
translate into sustainable competitive advantages?
Secondly, the question of the performance of these groups. How do African
MNB compete with larger groups from developed countries? Do they compete in
the same economies? Or do they internationalize at the geographic peripheries, in
economies relatively shielded from global competition? And inside these markets,
do they adopt a niche strategy or do they compete in the same segments as domestic
banks and Global MNB? Finally, which group of banks obtains superior financial
performance in sub-Saharan African markets?
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Thirdly, the question of the internal organization of these multinationals. To
what extent do foreign affiliates of the different categories of banks rely on the
internal knowledge and financial resources of their banking group? What type of
organizational structures do multinationals put in place? First, to what extent are
foreign affiliates of multinational banks financially integrated to their group through
internal capital markets? Are the flows of internal capital from headquarters to
foreign affiliates primarily determined by support motives, prompting transfers of
capital when the affiliates face funding constraints, or by investment opportunities
in the host country? Second, do multinationals have centralized operational systems
or do they tend to decentralize their organization so that subsidiaries managers, who
are closer to the local information, have more control over decisions? What is the
role of the institutional and economic environment in shaping the organizational
structure that these multinationals adopt abroad?
Not only do these questions require a rigorous empirical analysis, with the col-
lection of new data, they also call for the construction of a theoretical framework
which incorporates firms’ capabilities in a developing environment.
Theoretical framework
The emergence of multinationals from developing countries undertaking FDI in
other developing countries poses a theoretical challenge as most researchers have
studied multinational enterprises without differentiating between developing and
developed countries MNEs (Dunning, 1977; Caves, 1996). According to the eclectic
paradigm of Dunning (1977), multinationals are associated with three types of ad-
vantages: ownership-specific, location-specific and internalization-specific (“O.L.I.”
advantages). These “O.L.I.” are the three conditions that must be met in order for
firms to have a strong incentive to undertake foreign direct investments.4 The O
and L explain the reasons of the foreign activity of the enterprise. The I explains
its form: internalizing the foreign activity in fully-owned subsidiaries or carrying it
out through arm’s length agreements in the market. The literature on MNEs has
identified three types of ownership advantages (see Dunning, 2000):
1. Those related to the possession and exploitation of monopoly power, studied
4The Ownership and Location advantages must be considered together: first, the specific own-
ership of this firm compared to the ownership advantages of the other firms in the host L, and
second, how the host L matches with the O of the firm: “Only if both of the right dispositions of
resource endowments exist between countries and firms of different nationalities will international
production take place [...] There is one final strand to the eclectic theory of international pro-
duction. The possession of ownership advantages determines which firms will supply a particular
foreign market, whereas the pattern of location endowments explains whether the firm will supply
that market by exports (trade) or by local production (non-trade).” (Dunning, 1980:11).
5
by the industrial organization scholars (Bain, 1956; Caves, 1971; Porter, 1980,
1985).
2. Those related to the possession of a bundle of scarce resources and capabilities
that are valuable, rare, inimitable and non-substitutable, such as presented
in the resource based view of the firm (Barney, 1991) and the evolutionary
theories of the firm (Nelson and Winter, 1982).
3. Those related to the competencies of the managers of the firms to identify,
evaluate and coordinate resources and capabilities in the most efficient way.
These advantages, that are more management than firm specific, are stressed
out by organizational scholars such as Prahalad (1987).
However, as Bonaglia, Goldstein and Matthews (2007) observe, “the striking
feature of internationalization by latecomer MNEs from emerging economies is that
they do not have these O.L.I. advantages to start with” (2007:371). Recently, two
explanations have emerged as an attempt to explain the increase of South-South
FDI, which can both be included within the O-L part of the eclectic paradigm.
These explanations are outlined below:
Ability to manage “institutional voids” as an ownership advantage. The idea that
multinationals from developing countries have an “institutional voids” advantage has
been initially developed by Khanna and Palepu (2006, 2010). Multinationals from
emerging or developing countries are better able to navigate business environments
characterized by institutional voids, defined as the absence of specialized intermedi-
aries, regulatory systems and contract-enforcing mechanisms. Because multination-
als from developed countries are used to operating in economies with well-developed
institutional infrastructures, they find it difficult to deploy their business models
in developing countries. By contrast, managers of multinationals from developing
countries are more familiar with the context of institutional voids and are better
able to identify and meet customers’ needs. International business and strategy
scholars such as Cuervo-Cazurra and Genc (2008) have provided econometric tests
of the hypothesis that the disadvantage of dealing with poor governance at home can
turn into an advantage when making FDI. Their findings indicate that multination-
als from developing countries are more prevalent among the largest foreign firms in
least developed countries that have weaker regulatory quality and more corruption.
The “similar demand composition” argument. The second explanation for South-
South FDI goes back to the Linder hypothesis (Linder, 1961) in international trade
according to which countries will trade intensively with others that share similar
consumption patterns. In a recent paper Fajgelbaum et al. (2011) develop a theo-
retical model to show that given that countries tend to specialize in goods with large
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domestic markets and that these are likely to be higher quality goods in countries
with many high-income consumers and lower quality goods in countries with many
low-income consumers, firms serve destinations that have a similar demand compo-
sition to their home market via FDI and destinations that have a different demand
composition from their home market via export sales. Using data for a broad sample
of countries, they show that both the volume of subsidiary sales and the stock of
FDI originating in a country and destined for another are negatively related to the
difference in per capita income between the pair, after controlling for fixed effects
in the origin and destination countries and the geographic distance between them.
Both concepts can be easily integrated in an O.L.I. framework where firms with
firm-specific ownership advantages (“O”) decide to locate their production in coun-
tries (“L”) where they will be better able to exploit this advantage. However, these
two strands of research while useful to examine and explain the emergence of South-
South FDI are less relevant when one analyzes the co-presence of multinationals
from developed and developing countries in a third host developing country. More
specifically, while they explain why multinationals from developing countries may
have an advantage over those from developed countries in operating in other devel-
oping countries, either related to an ability to navigate institutional voids or to the
similarity of the demand, and in so doing provide an explanation for the observed
South-South FDI pattern in some industries, they do not explain the specific pat-
tern that we observe in the banking industry in sub-Saharan Africa, which is the
coexistence of North-South and South-South FDI.
Furthermore, theories of multinational enterprises (MNEs) and their empirical
examinations have traditionally been based on FDI between industrialised countries
in the manufacturing sector (cf. “OLI” framework of Dunning, 1977; Markusen and
Venables, 1998; Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple, 2004), and as such may be ill-adapted
to the analysis of multinational banks in sub-Saharan Africa.
In a way, focusing on the banking sector adds a layer of difficulty over the devel-
oping context: banks do not behave as manufacturing firms. Firstly, the trade-off
between trade and FDI is not very relevant for retail and commercial banks given
that most of their banking products (consumer loans, demand deposits, etc.) are
generally not tradable across borders. In addition the banking industry is charac-
terized by the typically low costs of establishing a presence in a new foreign market
relative to the resources of the organization (Gray and Gray, 1981), while this cost is
an important factor in the trade versus FDI decision for manufacturing firms. Sec-
ondly, multinational banking firms are characterized by a second type of asymmetry
of information, that between bank managers and their clients, on top of the infor-
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mational asymmetry issues and principal-agent conflicts between headquarters and
subsidiaries that multinational firms from all sectors have to deal with. Thirdly, un-
like the manufacturing sector, product differentiation in banking only offers a short-
term competitive edge because new banking products are easy to imitate (Gray and
Gray, 1981:42-43). The lack of opportunities for product differentiation is however
mitigated by the fact that consumer switching costs are high.
These characteristics specific to the banking sector will modify or alter the factors
influencing the internationalization decision. Despite posing theoretical challenges,
the banking sector offers advantages for empirical research given the large availability
of data. Indeed, contrary to manufacturing firms, most commercial banks are large
firms with financial information that is available publicly.
This research builds on this previous literature both in the field of international
economics, international business and strategy to construct a theoretical framework
in order to make predictions on the performance and organizational strategies of
foreign banks from developed and developing countries in sub-Saharan Africa. More
specifically, this research rests on the idea that firms are heterogeneous in their
possession of capabilities, and that the possession of higher capabilities translates
into superior performance. While we owe to an extensive literature in strategy
the concept of capabilities (Penrose, 1959, 1960; Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1991;
Teece, Pisano and Shuen, 1997; Winter, 2003), papers in this tradition lack an
operational definition of capabilities with which one could formulate predictions.
To this end I rely on Sutton (2012) theoretical framework, which defines firms’
capability as a combination of quality and productivity and which integrates the fact
that capabilities are clustered geographically. Sutton (2012) postulates that some
firms are more productive than others, and this tends to be observed at a geographic
level, for instance along the traditional divide developing countries (firms)/developed
countries (firms). I incorporate both the “institutional voids advantage” and the
“similar demand” arguments to the concept of capabilities by hypothesizing that
originating from a developing country mitigates the sunk cost of adaptation into a
new host country for developing country firms engaging in South-South FDI.
More specifically, I define two types of capabilities. I label vertical capabilities
those that enhance firms’ productivity and product quality. Firms can be ranked by
their level of vertical capabilities. I label horizontal capabilities those that reduce
adaptation costs related to entry into a new foreign country due to prior experience
in operating in a similar environment. The possession of horizontal capabilities de-
pends on firms’ international experience and the characteristics of the institutions
and of the demand in their home countries. The exploitation of horizontal capabil-
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ities is context-specific. While vertical capabilities affect prices and marginal cost,
horizontal capabilities affect the sunk adaptation cost of FDI incurred at entry.
Finally, this research uses the literature on internal capital markets (Stein, 1997
and Morgan, Rime and Strahan, 2004) to examine internal capital allocation inside
multinational banks with foreign affiliates in Africa. It also relies on the organiza-
tional economics literature concerned with decision-making and transfer of authority
in organizations (Aghion and Tirole, 1997, Dessein, 2002, Stein, 2002, Alonso, Des-
sein and Matouschek, 2008) to explore the roles of (external) environmental and
(internal) firm factors on centralization of authority inside multinationals.
Table 1 below summarizes the theoretical space this research uses.
Table 1: Theoretical space
Chapter 1 Chapter 2 Chapter 3
Firms’ capabilities Internal capital allocation Organizational Structure:
and performance inside multinationals (de-)centralization
Sutton (2012)
Khanna and Palepu (2006,
2010)
Winter (2003)
Teece, Pisano and Shuen
(1997)
Amit and Schoemaker
(1993)
Barney (1991)
Wernerfelt (1984)
Penrose (1959)
Morgan, Bertrand and Stra-
han (2004)
Stein (1997, 2002)
Williamson (1970)
Dessein and Santos (2006)
Dessein (2002)
Baker, Gibbons and Mur-
phy (1999)
Stein (1997, 2002)
Aghion and Tirole (1997)
Hypotheses
The central hypothesis of this research is that banks from developed countries op-
erating in developing countries have a productivity advantage derived from scale
economies, automated processes and large access to bank funding, while banks from
developing countries have a local information and managerial advantage, related to
their ability to navigate “institutional voids” (Khanna and Palepu, 2006) which fa-
cilitates their adaptation in other developing countries. This will have consequences
both for the financial performance of foreign affiliates of multinational firms in host
countries and for the organizational strategies of multinational firms. In terms of
performance, institutional voids advantage should reduce the adaptation cost of for-
eign affiliates of banks from developing countries when they enter other developing
markets. However, once foreign affiliates of developed country firms have incurred
this cost and managed to adapt their products and processes to the host developing
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environment, they should record higher financial performance than foreign affiliates
from developing countries, related to their productivity advantage. Furthermore, the
fact that the possession of capabilities is heterogeneous among firms will have impli-
cations for their organization. As will be further detailed in the following chapters,
I hypothesize that foreign affiliates of banks from developing countries have more
autonomy from their headquarters over operational processes and rely less on in-
ternal funding, while foreign affiliates of banks from developed countries have less
autonomy and rely more on parent bank funding.
Data sources
I rely on four different sources of data. The first one is the Bureau Van Dijk’s
BankScope database, from which banks’ financial and ownership information is col-
lected. I obtain a panel of 657 banks (foreign and domestic) operating in sub-Saharan
Africa over a 10-year period. In addition, I complement this data with loan data
obtained directly from banks’ annual reports on sectoral loan portfolio allocation,
for a sample of 106 banks publishing this information.
Two other databases are constructed to examine banks’ internal processes and
organizational structure. First, to analyze internal capital markets inside multina-
tional banks, on which data is rarely available, I rely on quarterly data of internal
funding flows between foreign affiliates located in South Africa and their group.
This data is available on the South Africa’s Central Bank (Resbank) website, for
the 82 banks operating in South Africa during the sample period of 1993q1-2007q4.
In addition, to further examine the relations between headquarters and their for-
eign affiliates in Africa, especially the degree of autonomy of affiliates vis-à-vis their
headquarters, I use proprietary bank survey data. Most of this data was collected
during fieldworks in Kenya, Tanzania and Ghana, which are among the countries
with the highest number of foreign banks in sub-Saharan Africa. 59 banks were
surveyed during these three fieldworks, representing on average over 65% of the
banks in these three countries. This fieldwork data is completed by data from 18
banks in 11 other sub-Saharan African countries to which I distributed the survey
questionnaire by email. In total, I obtain a sample of 77 banks in 14 countries.
Banking markets in sub-Saharan Africa
The research is focused on the context of banking in sub-Saharan Africa. As will be
further explained in Chapter 1, this region is an ideal setting to test the research hy-
potheses. First, Africa is often described as the “last frontier market”, transitioning
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from very low levels of developments through rapid economic growth, with a fast-
changing private sector and a rising middle class. As such, it provides an extreme
variation in institutional and economic environments, between host African coun-
tries and home (developed) countries. This variation, coupled with intra-regional
differences in growth and development between African economies allows me to ex-
amine how the local context influences the exploitation of capabilities and as such,
the performance and internal organization of foreign affiliates.
Second, acquisition of information is at the core of the banking activity. This
requires a good knowledge of the local context, especially of customers and local
practices. This is a particularly strong challenge in Africa where information on
borrowers often lacks transparency, especially for organizations used to operating in
developed markets, with well-established information agencies such as credit refer-
ence bureaus or credit rating agencies. In this sector, experience of the local envi-
ronment should confer strong advantages. As an illustration, when asked about the
possibility to expand their lending activities into the micro and small entrepreneurs
segment, the CEO of the Kenyan subsidiary a large Anglo-Saxon bank interviewed
for this research replied: “Banks that are able to do it well are doing it [micro-SME
lending], but you need to be on the ground. They have good Monitoring and In-
formation Systems. If we were to do it here, we would need to do it as well “on
the ground”. The worst we could do would be to hire a bunch of MBAs and to put
them in charge of the job.” In other words, being able to understand the local con-
text, to navigate “institutional voids” and to understand the characteristics of the
local demand should constitute key capabilities, even more salient than in developed
environments where information is more transparent and readily accessible to all.
Furthermore, the choice of this geographic and sectoral context is also based
on the fact that sub-Saharan Africa is the developing region of the world that has
the largest proportion of foreign-owned banks (Claessens and Van Horen, 2012) and
that many African banks have started their international expansion in their home
region over the last decade. The co-existence of foreign affiliates of global banks,
emerging banks and regional African banks in the region provides the variation
in foreign firms’ capabilities necessary for the research. Banking markets in Africa
have evolved rapidly over the last decades, with financial innovations and regulatory
changes, and they have become stronger and more competitive (see Chapter 1). As
a result, banks’ performance should be more tightly linked to their capabilities than
in markets where a handful of participant banks enjoy monopoly advantages.
As mentioned above, this research has a regional focus. Sub-Saharan Africa is
admittedly a highly diverse region and the presence of foreign banks in sub-Saharan
11
Africa is heterogeneous and depends on factors such as banking regulations and
strength of the local economy (see Chapter 1). Managing a bank in Liberia is not
the same as managing it in Kenya. However, despite important legal, cultural and
institutional differences between East, West or Central Africa, these countries face
common challenges with regards to their banking markets, among which highly
concentrated banking markets, low levels of intermediation and the small size of
banks’ balance sheet, as will be further detailed in Chapter 1. In addition to these
commonalities, a regional level of analysis is adopted in this research given that
African banks tend to expand regionally across the continent and that global and
emerging banks tend to administer their operations on a regional basis.
As evoked above, it is a particularly interesting time to examine banking markets
in sub-Saharan Africa. The combination of financial innovation, banking reforms
aimed at consolidating the sector and increasing information on borrowers via licens-
ing of credit reference bureaus, and more generally bank competition, is changing
the banking landscape by helping to close the financing gap for Small and Medium
Enterprises (SMEs) and increasing the offering of banking products to retail cus-
tomers (Lhonneur; 2013). While it is true that banking markets in Africa are still
relatively underdeveloped, with only four countries having explicit depositors in-
surance scheme5, significant efforts have been made to improve the quality of the
banking sector and regulations have been developed to reinforce the financial sec-
tor’s stability, especially through increases in minimum capital requirements (see
Chapter 1). An important movement of privatization has taken place in the 1990s
to improve banks’ efficiency (Allen, Otchere and Senbet, 2010) and new opportuni-
ties have opened up for foreign banks as important barriers to investment have been
removed.
However, banks are still facing many constraints. Competition and access to
customer deposits were the two top challenges most often cited by bank managers
surveyed for this research. 87% of the banks interviewed perceived competition in
the deposit segment to be strong or intense, while in the corporate segment 82%
of the bank managers evaluated the competition as strong or intense. Banking
regulations are generally not perceived as creating obstacles for banks’ activities
(62% of the banks considered that banking regulations were not or were only a minor
obstacle to their business operations) and neither are employment laws (79% of
respondents considered that they did not constitute an obstacle or only constituted
a minor obstacle to their operations). However, the court system was often cited
as an obstacle by bank managers due to its bureaucratic procedures and the overall
5Kenya, Tanzania, Nigeria, Zimbabwe.
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slowness of the judiciary process. Indeed, 62% of the respondents considered that
the court system was an important or extreme obstacle for their activities. In terms
of skills, most of the respondents indicated that there is a large pool of skilled people,
especially in Kenya, but that retention of talent could be challenging, as there is a
strong competition for skills, especially in key sectors such as risk management. In
total, 32% of the bank managers interviewed considered that the difficulty to hire
managers with the right skills was an important or extreme obstacle to their business,
while 25% considered that it was a moderate obstacle. Finally, the views expressed
by the bank managers interviewed may give hope for the future of SME financing
and the general deepening of the sector. 70% of the respondents considered that
SMEs offered good financing opportunities. In fact, despite obstacles such as the
lack of collateral, the lack of information or the lack of strong SME management,
some respondents mentioned that their bank was disengaging from the corporate
segment, due to the toughness of its competition, to reallocate their loan portfolio
towards the SME segment which offers higher returns.
Contributions
The main contributions of this research are the following:
Firstly, it is, to the best of my knowledge, the first comparative analysis of the
performance of North-South and South-South FDI in the banking sector in sub-
Saharan Africa. It offers an in-depth empirical analysis of the drivers of banks’
performance. Theoretically, it poses the question of the source of capabilities, and
proposes a new way to analyze capabilities in relation to foreign direct investments,
distinguishing between capabilities that increase productivity and capabilities that
decrease the sunk cost of adaptation when operating in a new (foreign) economic
environment. Secondly, this research analyzes the relation between headquarters
and their foreign affiliates relying on direct observations. First, by tracking net
internal capital flows from headquarters to their foreign affiliates, thanks to rarely
available internal capital data, it analyzes financial relations that take place inside
multinationals. Second, it examines the transfer of authority from headquarters and
subsidiaries, relying on unique survey data on banks located in 14 countries in sub-
Saharan Africa. While a very rich theoretical literature exists on these aspects, it is
one of the first empirical analysis of (de-)centralization between headquarters and
their foreign affiliates in developing countries. Finally, one of the overall contribution
of this research with respect to the literature on banking and finance in developing
countries is precisely its focus on the supply-side of bank financing, on which evidence
has been limited especially concerning Africa, while the demand side of bank finance
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is much better known, especially concerning the obstacles faced by firms to access
capital (Schiffer and Weder, 2001; Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Maksimovic, 2005;
and Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, Laeven, and Maksimovic, 2006).
Structure of the thesis and overview of the main findings
While the first chapter examines the impact of ownership on banks’ revealed capa-
bilities as measured by different indicators of banks’ performance one has to look
“inside the firm” to examine corporate strategies. This task is carried out in the
second and third chapters. The second chapter focuses on the allocation of a spe-
cific resource, internal capital, inside multinational banks and examines how parent
bank support can effectively constitute a source of advantage, by reducing interest
expenses for the foreign affiliate, and constituting a source of extra capital in times
of crisis. The third chapter focuses on the organizational structure of multination-
als, examining the transfer of decision-making from headquarters to subsidiaries in
sub-Saharan Africa.
Findings from these three chapters highlight the fact that developing multina-
tionals do not necessarily have per se an institutional voids’ advantage, defined as the
ability to operate in weak institutional environment. Global banks from developed
countries, which have been operating in Africa for several decades, are well-equipped
to overcome institutional voids problems. On a regional scale, controlling for time
and host country effects, the foreign affiliates of Global MNB consistently outper-
form those of regional African MNB, along several financial performance measures
(especially return on equity and cost income ratio). Furthermore, I find little evi-
dence of market segmentation along customer niches. Although foreign affiliates of
African MNB tend to offer relatively more loans to the SME segment than Global
MNB, the difference is not significant. I find evidence of self-selection into host
countries, with African MNB more likely to operate in countries with weaker bank-
ing regulations, and Global MNB being more present in countries with higher GDP
growth, but these differences in geographic prevalence explain only a small part of
the performance differences between these two groups of banks. Overall, I find that
the performance differences between Global and African MNB do not lie in quality
differences of their loan portfolio but in their differential access to low cost sources
of funding, in particular customer demand deposits.
Evidence from South Africa indicates that foreign affiliates of Global MNB tend
to receive more funding from their parent bank than Emerging MNB6, which might
6Note that there are unfortunately no affiliate of regional African banks in South Africa during
the sample period.
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also be another source of strength for foreign affiliates of Global MNB. Concerning
the organizational structure that these multinationals adopt, the empirical results
indicate that when institutional distance (or asymmetry) between host and home
countries is high multinationals tend to opt for a more centralized organization,
with control over operational processes and decisions retained at the top of the
hierarchy. As such, Global MNB have a much more centralized organization than
Emerging MNB and regional African MNB. Furthermore, Global MNB also tend to
establish intermediate regional headquarters, often located in South Africa, which
allows headquarters to retain enough control, while making sure that the decision-
maker is sufficiently close to the local information.
Finally, while this thesis focuses on questions of firm performance, organizational
structure and internal capital market, in other words focuses on firms, it has also im-
plications for the financial development of host countries. The banking sector is often
the most important element of financial system in developing economies, as stock
markets tend to be underdeveloped. Financial development and economic growth
are robustly correlated, although the question of causality is difficult to approach
empirically (see Levine, 1997 for a discussion). In any case, to which sector banks
lend to, how they screen and monitor borrowers will affect the economies, especially
in developing countries where the SME sector is the backbone of the economy and
a large purveyor of formal (and informal) jobs (see research by Ayyagari, Beck, and
Demirgüç-Kunt, 2007). This thesis, by examining the locational, loan portfolio and
organizational strategies of different groups of multinational banks provides some
guidance for policy-making which will be detailed in each of the three chapters.
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Chapter 1
Financial performance of foreign
banks in developing countries
Evidence from sub-Saharan African banking markets
1.1 Introduction
The last two decades have been marked by the steady rise in foreign direct invest-
ment (FDI) flows from developing countries to other developing countries (UNC-
TAD, 2011)1. These FDI flows between developing countries (South-South FDI)
challenge traditional theories of multinational enterprises (MNEs) based on FDI
between developed countries (North-North FDI) in the manufacturing sector (Dun-
ning, 1977; Markusen and Venables, 1998). Studies both in the field of international
business and economics have highlighted the link between firms’ productivity and
their FDI activities (Dunning (1977); Melitz (2003); Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple
(2004)). These analyses suggest that firms engaged in foreign activities (and espe-
cially firms undertaking foreign direct investments) are more productive than purely
domestic firms in their home country (Helpman et al., 2004). In addition, according
to the OLI paradigm (Dunning, 1977; 2000), the greater the competitive advantages
of the foreign investing firms, ceteris paribus, relative to those of other firms Ů and
particularly those domiciled in the country in which they are seeking to make their
foreign investments Ů the more they are likely to be able to engage in, or increase,
their foreign production.
1“In 2010, for the first time, developing economies absorbed close to half of global FDI inflows.
They also generated record levels of FDI outflows, much of it directed to other countries in the
South. This further demonstrates the growing importance of developing economies to the world
economy, and of South-South cooperation and investment for sustainable development” (UNCTAD,
2011:2).
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However, the coexistence of South-South FDI and North-South FDI2 in a same
developing market is not well explained by these theories if we consider that MNEs
from developing countries should have lower levels of firm’s capabilities than MNEs
from developed countries (Sutton, 2012), and therefore should find the competition
of these developed-country MNEs in developing host countries very challenging.
Indeed, the recent literature on developing-country MNEs has shown that these
multinationals face various additional firm-specific obstacles when going abroad:
they lack experienced international executives (Ghemawat and Hout, 2008; Luo and
Tung, 2007; Ramsey, Resende and Almeida, 2009) due to their position of late-
movers compared to developed-country MNEs (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 2000), they
have weak corporate governance systems (Luo and Tung, 2007; Sauvant, Mendoza
and Ince, 2008) and they lack firm-specific advantages such as technology and in-
novation (Luo and Tung, 2007). These perceived relative disadvantages are evident
in the low prevalence of developing-country MNEs among the largest firms in the
world listed in the Fortune Global 500 (Cuervo-Cazurra and Genc, 2008).
However, an alternative view, reflected in the “institutional voids’ advantage”
hypothesis (Khanna and Palepu, 2006, 2010), is that MNEs from developing coun-
tries undertaking South-South FDI have an adaptation advantage over MNEs from
developed countries undertaking North-South FDI. This advantage comes from their
ability to deal with difficult institutional environments, characterized by “institu-
tional voids” defined by Khanna and Palepu (2006) as the absence of specialized
intermediaries, regulatory systems and contract-enforcing mechanisms; ability that
they have developed in their home (developing) country. In addition to an institu-
tional voids’ advantage related to specific managerial abilities, MNEs from devel-
oping countries operating in other developing countries could also benefit from an
advantage related to the similarity of the demand (determined by per capita income
levels) between their home and their host countries3. This should make them better
able to offer products that are well-adapted to the characteristics of the demand in
their host countries.
By contrast, multinationals from developed country tend to focus exclusively on
the smaller top market segment in host developing countries, finding it difficult to
serve the middle or bottom segment, composed of customers only able to afford less
2Multinational firms from developed countries undertaking direct investments in developing
countries.
3This is similar to the Linder hypothesis (Linder, 1961) in international trade according to
which countries will trade intensively with others that share similar demand or consumption pat-
terns. Recently, Fajgelbaum, Grossman and Helpman (2011) have shown both empirically and
theoretically that FDI is more likely to occur between countries with similar per capita income
levels.
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sophisticated and expensive products (Khanna and Palepu, 2006). Furthermore,
expatriate managers of developed multinationals are more used to operating in mar-
kets with stronger governance. However, this potential adaptation disadvantage
which affects developed MNEs could be mitigated by previous experience in similar
developing markets, or by the passage of time. High sunk adaptation costs incurred
in the first operating years to learn how to circumvent institutional voids and to
adapt their products to the local demand could progressively be offset by the cost
advantages offered by scale and efficiency that characterize high productivity firms.
These two opposite forces, adaptation costs versus productivity level, and how they
interact with environmental experience to impact firms’ performance is the focus of
this chapter.
This research will examine the following questions: Can experience in operating
in environments with weak institutions and low GDP per capita compensate for
lower levels of productivity when operating in other developing environments? If
so, is it sustainable? How does the possession of specific capabilities translate into
particular foreign strategies? In particular, do developing MNEs self-select into
specific host countries and, within these countries, into specific market segments?
This chapter aims to answer these questions by focusing on the banking sector in
sub-Saharan Africa and by comparing the financial performance of foreign affiliates
of multinational banks from different home countries and with different degrees of
internationalization.
Building on the capabilities literature (Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1991; Teece,
Pisano and Shuen, 1997) and on recent theoretical development in the economics
literature integrating the management concept of capabilities to analyze competi-
tion between firms (Sutton, 2012), I develop a theoretical framework to analyze and
compare the performance of foreign-owned affiliates of multinationals from develop-
ing and developed countries. More specifically, I define two types of capabilities. I
label vertical capabilities those that enhance firms’ productivity and product qual-
ity. I label horizontal capabilities those that lower adaptation costs related to entry
into a new foreign country due to prior experience in operating in a similar envi-
ronment. The possession of horizontal capabilities depends on firms’ international
experience and the characteristics of the institutions and of the demand (determined
by the level of income) in their home countries. While vertical capabilities affect
prices and marginal cost, horizontal capabilities affect the sunk adaptation cost of
FDI incurred at entry. I then formulate two sets of hypotheses, predicting (1) the
higher operational performance of multinational firms with higher vertical capabili-
ties, controlling for their horizontal capabilities in a given host country, and (2) the
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negative (positive) effect of institutional and demand difference (similarity) between
host and home country on foreign affiliates’ performance.
As this research focuses on comparing the performance of foreign affiliates of de-
veloped and developing MNEs in a same developing market, the sub-Saharan African
region is a particularly good setting to test the hypotheses. First, this context of-
fers an “extreme case study” (Gerring, 2007). African economies are often at the
bottom of the world rankings of countries in terms of GDP per capita, human devel-
opment or governance (see World Bank, World Development Indicators). Given that
“concepts are often defined by their extremes” (Gerring, 2007:101), the exacerbated
environmental asymmetry between host and home countries for developed MNEs in
sub-Saharan Africa facilitates the empirical examination of the theory. In addition,
while African countries face many similar economic and institutional issues, they
are also at different stages of development. This intra-regional heterogeneity offers
variation in host environment, which allows for an examination of the relative ad-
vantage conferred by experience of the local environment. In particular, developing
MNEs’ ability to manage institutional voids should manifest itself more clearly in
countries where governance is extremely weak.
In addition, I adopt a sectoral lens to increase the homogeneity of the sample
given that the exploitation of vertical capabilities and horizontal capabilities are
sector-specific. The banking sector is an interesting and appropriate industry to
test the hypotheses. First, contrary to sectors such as the extractive industry or
the telecommunication industry, barriers to entry are relatively low. As such, there
is a relatively high number of participant firms in the market, with different levels
of capabilities. In particular, the financial sector is an important recipient of FDI
in Africa, representing 80% of total cross-border M&A purchases in the region in
2010 and 7% of total greenfield FDI projects in 2011 (UNCTAD, 2012:40). Sub-
Saharan Africa is the developing region of the world that has the largest proportion
of foreign-owned banks.4 More importantly, African banking markets over the last
10 to 15 years have been characterized by the increased presence of foreign banks
from the African region itself, often prompted by privatization programs targeting
state-owned banks. As a result of these new flows of FDI, several types of banks
now co-exist in sub-Saharan African markets, possessing varying levels of vertical
capabilities and horizontal capabilities: global multinational banks from developed
countries, emerging banks from Asia or the Middle East, regional African banks and
4In 2009, 54% of banks in sub-Saharan Africa were foreign banks (from 32% in 1995), while
this percentage was only 25% in East Asia and Pacific (from 20% in 1995), 14% in South Asia
(from 7% in 1995), 42% in Latin America and the Caribbean (from 28% in 1995) (Claessens and
Van Horen, 2012).
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domestic African banks (Table A.1 in the Appendix). This provides the variation in
firms’ capabilities necessary to test the research hypotheses. In addition, the core
of the banking activity deals with gathering and assessing information on borrowers
to mitigate risk. In this sector, knowledge of the local environment and ability to
negotiate institutional voids is crucial, especially, as is the case for Africa, in low-
transparency economies with a large informal sector and limited or non-existent
formal documentation (Beck, Maimbo, Faye and Triki, 2011). As a consequence, in
this sector the advantages conferred by local experience (“horizontal capabilities”)
should be particularly salient.
Finally, given the low level of development of stock and bond markets in sub-
Saharan Africa, banks play a crucial intermediation role, and represent the main
source of external capital for companies. The region is characterized by a large
unbanked population, partly related to the difficulty to access banking services, es-
pecially in rural areas, and to the cost of these services. If regional African banks are
better able to operate in these markets, and in particular to cater to low-income pop-
ulations, entry of this group of foreign banks may alleviate local credit constraints.
By comparing the financial performance of foreign banks in sub-Saharan Africa, this
research hopes to shed light on the implication of the competition between banks
with different levels of capabilities for the financial development of the host banking
markets. As such, sub-Saharan Africa may offer lessons for other regions of the
world with respect to foreign banks’ entry and financial deepening.
I use panel data from the Bureau Van Dijk’s BankScope database to obtain
financial information on banks located in sub-Saharan Africa over the 2003-2012 pe-
riod. Comparing the performance of the subsidiaries of global banks from developed
countries to that of the subsidiaries of regional African banks I find that the former
perform significantly better than the latter, using return on equity as the dependent
variable, even after controlling for entry and exit of banks, and including a set of firm
and host country controls as well as time and host country fixed effects. This result
supports the first hypothesis. Furthermore, and consistent with expectations, I find
that the lower financial performance of regional African banks is related to lower
operational efficiency, as measured by the cost income ratio. However, contrary to
the second hypothesis, I find that regional African banks do not perform relatively
better than global banks in sub-Saharan African countries with weaker institutional
environment and lower levels of per capita income. As such, for regional African
banks, the “institutional voids’ advantage” hypothesis (Khanna and Palepu, 2006,
2010) does not seem to hold. Examining separately banks’ income and expenses, I
find that the differences between global banks and regional African banks in profit
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before tax is primarily related to differences in their ability to control expenses,
while I find no significant differences in their ability to generate interest revenue.
Differences in interest expenses (as a percentage of interest-bearing liabilities) are
driven by a different composition of the liability mix: global banks have better access
to low-interest bearing short term funds. I further investigate alternative reasons
that might drive the results, more specifically composition effects related to the geo-
graphic location of banks across the region and the allocation of their loan portfolio.
I find evidence of self-selection of banks into host countries, regional African banks
having higher market shares in countries with weaker banking regulation, and global
banks being more present in countries with higher GDP growth. However I find that
characteristics of the host countries in which these two groups of banks are located
explain only about 10% of the performance difference between these two groups. Fi-
nally, comparing the loan portfolio allocation of the different groups of banks along
three dimensions (maturity of loans, business segment or type of customers, and
economic sectors) I do not find any strong evidence of market segmentation.
This chapter offers three contributions to two different fields. First it contributes
theoretically to the strategic management literature by offering a new approach to
examine multinational firms’ capabilities, differentiating between capabilities affect-
ing firms’ productivity, and capabilities affecting their adaptation cost when oper-
ating abroad. This distinction is relevant as these two types of capabilities, which
I have labeled vertical and horizontal capabilities, are unequally distributed across
firms and the possession of one type of capabilities may, to a certain extent, com-
pensate for the lack of another type of capabilities, with consequences for the growth
of firms.
Second, it contributes empirically to the international banking literature. More
specifically, this chapter offers a first analysis of the performance of foreign multina-
tional banks in sub-Saharan Africa. So far the literature on banking in sub-Saharan
Africa has been very limited, despite the rapid evolution and recent dynamism of
the banking sector in the region. Studies have often focused on a specific country,
such as Uganda (Beck and Hesse, 2009), Kenya (Beck and Fuchs, 2004) or Nigeria
(Beck, Cull and Jerome, 2005) or on the demand side of the banking market in
sub-Saharan Africa, especially through the World Bank’s Enterprise Surveys5. This
research offers a regional perspective on the performance of banks which have a
presence across the continent.
Third, it also contributes to the international banking literature by offering a
comparison of the performance, as well as of the lending and location strategies (in
5http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/
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terms of loan portfolio allocation and geographic location) of different categories
of foreign banks, especially comparing the performance of global banks to that of
the more recently expanding regional African banks. Empirical research on the
banking sector in developing countries has mainly focused on the impact of foreign
banks from developed countries on small and medium enterprise (SMEs) financing
in host developing countries (Clarke, Cull, Martinez Peria and Sanchez, 2002; De-
tragiache, Tressel, and Gupta, 2008; Giannetti and Ongena, 2009), and very few
studies have compared the performance of different types of foreign banks as those
have traditionally been examined as a homogeneous group, without distinguishing
between developing and developed MNEs. However, this comparison matters as the
strategies and performance of foreign banks have implications for the development
of host banking markets, and both elements may differ between developing and de-
veloped foreign banks. Recently, economists such as Van Horen (2007), Claessens,
Van Horen, Gurcanlar and Mercado (2008) and Claessens and Van Horen (2012)
have used the BankScope database from Bureau van Dijk to examine the issue of
foreign banks’ entry in a more refined manner, by looking at the origin of foreign
banks in developing countries. The present research contributes to this recent strand
in the banking literature by focusing on sub-Saharan African banking groups and
by providing a detailed examination of the drivers of bank performance.
The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 introduces the theo-
retical framework and develops the hypotheses to be tested. Section 1.3 describes
the sample and presents summary statistics of the data. In Section 1.4 I test the
hypotheses in the context of banking in sub-Saharan Africa. In Section 1.5 I fur-
ther examine the channels of bank performance by decomposing the profit measure
into its accounting components. Section 1.6 investigates alternative explanations,
investigating whether banks’ performance is driven by composition effects related to
differences in the geographic presence of banks across the region and to segmentation
in the loan market. Section 1.7 discusses the results and Section 1.8 concludes.
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1.2 Theoretical framework and hypotheses devel-
opment
1.2.1 Vertical and horizontal firms’ capabilities
At the root of this research lies the idea that firms are heterogeneous in their pos-
session of resources and capabilities6 and that the possession of better capabilities
translates into superior performance, which explains empirical evidence of persistent
performance differences between firms within the same industry (Rumelt, 1991).
The vast literature on the resource based view of the firm (Penrose, 1959, 1960;
Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1991) and theories of organizational knowledge, learning
and capabilities (Teece, Pisano and Shuen, 1997; Winter, 2003) have posited that
performance differences arise from firm-specific capabilities that cannot be easily
diffused to other firms. According to the resource-based view, the superior perfor-
mance enjoyed by some firms does not rely on the building up of barriers to entry
or other strategic investments as elaborated in the Strategy-Conduct-Performance
paradigm (Bain, 1956), but on the possession of resources or capabilities that are
firm-specific and scarce. The broad definitions offered by the resource-based view
literature hints at the difficulty to identify them in the first place. According to
Wernerfelt, (1984:172) by resource is meant “anything which could be thought of
as a strength or weakness of a given firm”. Barney, in a subsequent paper, refines
slightly the concept by defining resources as “all assets, capabilities, organizational
processes, firm attributes, information, knowledge, etc. controlled by a firm that
enable the firm to conceive of and implement strategies that improve its efficiency
and effectivenes” (1991:101). Despite the broadness of these definitions, a key ele-
ment for the analysis of firms’ performance is that these resources are difficult to
imitate and that they confer firm-specific advantages that are sustainable.
Vertical capabilities and productivity. I follow Sutton’s theoretical frame-
work on firms’ capabilities (2012), as it examines firms’ capabilities in an interna-
tional setting, and offers a simple way to modelize the fuzzy concept of capabilities.
In this framework, the level of capability achieved by a firm is determined by the
pair (u, c) formed by the quality of its products, labeled u, and its cost, with c rep-
6In this research, I follow Amit and Shoemaker (1993:35) definition of resources as the stock
of available factors that the firm owns and of capabilities as the firm’s capacity to deploy these
resources: “The firm’s Resources will be defined as stocks of available factors that are owned
or controlled by the firm. [...] Capabilities, in contrast, refer to a firm’s capacity to deploy Re-
sources, usually in combination, using organizational processes, to effect a desired end. They are
information-based, tangible or intangible processes that are firm specific and are developed over
time through complex interactions among the firm’s Resources.”.
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resenting the number of units of labour per unit of output. There is a lower curve
in the quality-productivity space (u, 1/c) which determines the minimum threshold
a firm must pass to be active. Furthermore, the capabilities can be ranked, with
the firm at the top having the highest capability pair (u, c). For the purpose of the
present research, I label these capabilities vertical capabilities as they can be (ver-
tically) ranked. If the ratio of price to quality pi/ui, with i being a firm subscript,
is constant across firms, as customers would not want to buy for the same price a
product of lower quality, and if the level of unit cost (the productivity parameter
c) is the same for all firms, the firm with the highest quality level u will be able
to enjoy a price greater than the common level of marginal cost, and therefore be
able to enjoy higher profits, even if its rivals sell at their unit marginal cost (Sutton,
2012).
Following Sutton (2012) in assuming that capabilities are clustered geographi-
cally, with some firms located in specific regions or countries having higher levels of
capabilities than other firms, the coexistence of firms with different capability levels
(coming from countries with different levels of capabilities) selling internationally
a similar type of product, can be explained by differences in labor costs7 and the
existence of a quality range. In other words, firms with lower levels of capabilities,
that is, with lower productivity levels and lower product quality, will be able to
offset their capability disadvantage to the extent that they can benefit from lower
wages in their home countries. These firms compensate lower productivity 1/c by
lower wage unit level w so as to reduce their marginal cost wc for a given quality
of product u. As shown in the example presented in Figure 1 below, a firm from
a developing country should have a lower level of vertical capabilities than a firm
from a developed country, while a firm from an emerging country should occupy an
intermediate level.
— Figure 1 insert here —
Now, what happens if these firms with different levels of vertical capabilities under-
take market-seeking foreign direct investment in the same host country and therefore
face the same local wage? I am especially referring to the service sector and par-
ticularly the fact that in certain industries, such as banking, some services can only
be produced locally (and therefore there is no export versus FDI trade-off). For
a given level of quality u, the foreign multinational firm with the highest level of
capability, coming from a developed country, and which I label firm A will produce
7Assuming that the cost of material is internationally fixed and the same for everyone.
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goods (services) at a lower cost than firm B, a multinational firm coming from a
developing country. Firm A should then enjoy higher profits than firm B through
higher productivity levels. However, it does not necessarily drive firm B out of the
market as long as firm B has at least the minimum productivity-quality combination
required to satisfy the demand in the host country, represented in Figure 1 by the
bottom capability curve.
Horizontal capabilities and adaptation costs in a new environment. So
far I have examined capabilities corresponding to the quality and productivity de-
terminants of the firm, which I have labeled vertical capabilities. The other factors
to take into account when examining the performance of multinational firms un-
dertaking foreign activities correspond to the external environment, how it shapes
the competition between firms and how it affects firms’ use of their operational
capabilities. What is argued here, and suggested by the institutional voids’ ad-
vantage hypothesis, is that the institutional environment and the characteristics of
the demand in the host market will influence the exploitation of vertical capabili-
ties. Experience of a certain environment confers a specific type of capabilities that
are adapted to this particular milieu and which, by definition, have limited use in
another environment. These capabilities correspond to firms’ ability to navigate a
specific institutional environment and to offer products that are adapted to local
tastes or demand. I label these capabilities horizontal capabilities. I use the term
“horizontal” because I consider that there are not per se capabilities that are better
than others, only capabilities that correspond better to the specific preferences of
each environment8.
Firms have horizontal capabilities that are adapted to the requirements of their
home country. When operating in a new foreign country, multinational firms will
incur an adaptation cost9 to adjust their operational and managerial methods to
the requirements of the new environment. The first cost is incurred by the firm
when adapting its production to the characteristics of the host country’s demand,
as determined by its average per capita income level (technological adaptation cost);
the second cost is related to the need to adapt to the host country’s institutional
environment (managerial adaptation cost)10.
8To use Rugman and Verbeke (2001) concept, they fall into the category of “location-bound
firm specific advantage”.
9This cost is similar to the notion of “liability of foreignness” (Zaheer, 1995), which describes the
additional costs that firms operating outside their home countries experience above those incurred
by local firms.
10These two costs correspond to those referred to by Dixit (2011) as the costs of “coping with
the bad governance” and the cost of “adapting the technology to the local condition”, when the
firm has a level of technology that is in excess of what is used in the host country.
25
Concerning the technological adaptation cost (adaptation to local demand), if
the characteristics of the host country’s demand are such that only lower quality
products with cheaper price will be bought due to a higher budget constraint of the
host population compared to that of the home population, then developed country
firm A will need to adjust its production technology to produce goods of lower
quality and cheaper price than those that it produces in its home country. This is
the situation faced by a developed country MNE operating in a developing country.
Firm A can thus produce goods requiring a lower vertical capability level, but it
has to incur a sunk cost to “adapt down” its technology to produce goods of lower
quality.11 The goods that the lower vertical capability firm, which I have labeled
firm B, can produce is a subset of the goods that firm A can produce. Considering
that firm B does not need to adapt down its technology because its home demand is
similar to the host demand, in other words, because it possesses adapted horizontal
capabilities, it will not incur this cost. However, if the productivity of firm A is
strictly superior to that of firm B for a similar quality, and the labour cost is the
same for all firms in a given host country, then once this sunk cost is paid, firm A
should enjoy higher profit than firm B12.
I now turn to the second adaptation cost related to managerial knowledge of
the host country institutional environment (adaptation to local institutions). Be-
cause the ranking of countries in terms of vertical capabilities of firms also tends to
correspond to the ranking of countries in terms of the strength of the institutional
environment, then there might be an advantage of coming from a developing coun-
try when operating in another developing country, which might (partially) offset
productivity disadvantages due to a lower level of vertical capabilities. As suggested
in the introduction, firms from developing countries may find it easier to operate in
other developing countries as they also face a difficult institutional environment at
home. They have experience in operating in environments where regulatory quality
is low, or where corruption is omnipresent in business activities. As is the case for
the adaptation of the technology to host country demand, this managerial adapta-
tion cost can be thought of as a sunk cost: once “learned” (or incurred), firm A
should be able to enjoy the profit corresponding to its vertical capability level.
The central problem, as hinted in the capability literature is that this managerial
11This is the idea suggested by Dixit (2011) who models the excess of the level of technology
used by the multinational firm in its home country over the appropriate technology level in the
host country as directly entering the production cost function with a positive parameter.
12Note: This is similar to what Dunning argues in his 1980 empirical test of the OLI paradigm:
“Similarly, the advantages of size, of being part of a larger organization, and of being able to inter-
nalize external economies will affect a firm’s competitive situation independently of the location
of its activities.” (Dunning, 1980:15)
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know-how is not easily identified. One could argue that by favoring local manage-
ment over expatriate management a foreign multinational could quickly adapt to
local circumstances. However, the organizational capital literature has shown the
importance of organizational routines within the firm (Nelson and Winter, 1982)
and relational contracts (Gibbons and Henderson, 2011) which make it challenging
for firms to copy and adopt new practices. As a consequence, it should be relatively
more difficult for higher vertical capabilities firms to understand what to do when
operating in developing countries and dealing with weak governance frameworks.
Building horizontal capabilities through environmental experience. The
possibility to exploit horizontal capabilities is linked to the existence of incomplete
markets, with assets that are non-appropriable, as is the case with vertical capa-
bilities, but maybe even more so due to their absolutely intangible nature, often
embodied in human capital. If these assets are not tradeable, firms will have no
choice but to build them, which may take a considerable amount of time13 (Dier-
ickx and Cool, 1989). Firms can build horizontal capabilities through international
experience, and a firm’s portfolio of horizontal capabilities is determined by the va-
riety of environments in which the firms operate. As a consequence, a multinational
firm should have a larger portfolio of horizontal capabilities than a purely domes-
tic firm. A large portfolio of horizontal capabilities does not ensure the possession
of the necessary managerial skills and appropriate products when entering a new
country. What matters is the relevance of the firm’s prior international experience
to a potential new host country. Building horizontal capabilities through (relevant)
international experience will thus contribute to the reduction of the adaptation costs
mentioned above. The firms which do not possess these specific horizontal capabili-
ties may still be able to build them, and how fast they manage to adapt their “bundle
of resources” to the new host market will depend on their dynamic capabilities, de-
fined by Teece, Pisano and Shuen (1997:516) as “the firm’s ability to integrate, build,
and reconfigure internal and external competences to address rapidly changing en-
vironments”. As such I posit that horizontal capabilities are associated with higher
order horizontal dynamic capabilities. The notion of dynamic capabilities builds a
bridge between the internal environment of the firm and its external environment,
as they determine how fast firms can adapt to changes in the external environment
by renewing their competences14.
13“[..] a firm which does not own a non tradeable asset which it requires for the implementation
of its product market strategy is constrained to ‘building’ this asset”, Dierickx and Cool (1989
:1506).
14This change may not necessarily have a temporal dimension but may as well be, as it is the
case in this research, spatial.
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I posit that these dynamic horizontal capabilities are determined by the size of
the portfolio of horizontal capabilities, given by the number of countries in which
a firm already operates, and the variance of the portfolio of horizontal capabilities,
which reflects the heterogeneity of the countries in which it operates in terms of
institutional development and characteristics of the demand. The importance of the
variance of the portfolio of horizontal capabilities in explaining firm performance
abroad goes back to research by Ghoshal (1987) and Kim, Hwang, and Burgers
(1989), Barkema and Vermeulen (1998) who have shown how the diversity of the
international experience, by exposing a firm to a rich array of countries with dif-
ferent demand and institutional characteristics, allows it to develop more diverse
capabilities, to achieve higher innovation levels than a purely domestic firm and to
facilitate new ventures in a foreign country.15 It will take less time for a multina-
tional firm with a portfolio of horizontal capabilities of higher size and variance to
learn to operate in a new country. Finally, a last point to consider is that horizontal
capabilities offer a time advantage, which is sustained until other firms build these
capabilities. Crucially, the sustainability of the competitive advantage offered by
horizontal capabilities depends on the speed of learning of other firms, itself deter-
mined by their dynamic horizontal capabilities. Once these horizontal capabilities
are acquired, firms with higher levels of vertical capabilities should out-perform their
rivals with lower vertical capabilities but a better initial fit of horizontal capabilities.
In other words, the horizontal capability advantage of firm B over firm A is short
lived and is essentially a time advantage. However, it also means that as long as
the wealth of the host country and consequently its average technology level and
the characteristics of the demand do not evolve, and therefore do not require higher
quality product, firm B may enjoy time advantages to build its vertical capabilities
and improve its productivity.
1.2.2 Predictions on the performance of foreign affiliates
The implication of horizontal capabilities for firm performance is that the adaptation
cost that multinational firms face when entering a new country, which, in fine,
corresponds to a sunk entry cost, is endogenous and depends on its international
experience, as well as on the institutional environment and characteristics of the
demand in the firm’s home country. While vertical capabilities affect the quality
of the products and the productivity of the firm (its price and its marginal cost),
15As Ghoshal(1987:431) points out, “the enhanced organizational learning that results from the
diversity internalized by the multinational may be a key explanator of its ongoing success, while
its initial stock of knowledge may well be the strength that allows it to create such organizational
diversity in the first place.”
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horizontal capabilities affect the sunk cost it incurs when entering a new country. To
further analyze theoretically the implications of vertical and horizontal capabilities
for the performance of multinational firms, I model the sunk adaptation cost that
multinational firms incur when entering a new host country as follows:
dciδ(Hi) (1.1)
dci represents the institutional and economic (per capita income level) distance be-
tween multinational firm i’s home country and host country c. It determines by
how much a multinational firm needs to adapt (down) its technology and business
practices, and therefore incur an adaptation cost16. δ is an attenuation factor which
is a function of the portfolio of horizontal capabilities of firm i, Hi. Crucially, it
is assumed that δ gets closer to zero as the fit between the horizontal capabilities
in the portfolio Hi and the requirements of the new host country increases and as
the level of horizontal dynamic capabilities (determined by the size and the variance
of Hi) increases. Now, I can rewrite the total profit P ci the foreign affiliate of a
multinational firm i in a host country c as follows:
P ci = pici (Vi)− [F c0 + dciδ(Hi)] (1.2)
The vertical capabilities level Vi determines the operating profit of the foreign affil-
iate. F c0 represents the fixed cost of setting up a plant abroad, which is assumed to
be the same for all firms in a given host country c. The second term in bracket is
the adaptation cost detailed above.
From this follows the first set of hypotheses related to the influence of vertical
capabilities on the performance of firms in a given host environment.
Hypothesis 1a The higher the level of a multinational firm’s vertical capabili-
ties Vi, the higher the total profit P ci of its foreign affiliate, con-
trolling for the adequacy of the multinational firm’s portfolio of
horizontal capabilities with its host environment dciδ(Hi).
More specifically, I hypothesize that this higher total profit is related to operational
efficiency advantages offered by the possession of higher levels of vertical capabili-
ties17:
16Note that I assume that a firm will not enter a country for which its productive capabilities
are below that country’s threshold.
17By opposition, for instance, to advantages offered by monopoly power.
29
Hypothesis 1b The higher the level of a multinational firm’s vertical capabili-
ties (Vi), the higher the operational efficiency of its foreign af-
filiate pici (Vi), controlling for the adequacy of the multinational
firm’s portfolio of horizontal capabilities with its host environ-
ment dciδ(Hi).
Of particular interest is the parameter dci , which captures the institutional voids’
advantage enjoyed by firms from developing countries undertaking foreign direct
investments in other developing countries as well as the advantages related to the
similar composition of the demand. This parameter should be relatively lower for
developing countries’ multinational firms than for developed countries’ multinational
firms when they operate in a host developing country. Controlling for their portfolio
of horizontal capabilities Hi, the adaptation cost should be higher for developed
countries multinationals. As a consequence, I formulate the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2 The institutional and economic distance (proximity) (dci) be-
tween the home and the host country of a multinational firm
exerts a negative (positive) effect on the performance of its for-
eign affiliate.
In the following sections, I test the hypotheses in the context of banking in
sub-Saharan Africa. As mentioned in the introduction, this sector is particularly
appropriate for this research given the high number and heterogeneity of foreign
banks in African economies, which provides variation both in horizontal and vertical
capabilities. In addition, experience in operating in markets with low transparency,
and in particular in dealing with credit risk when information on borrowers is limited,
is crucial to conduct banking activities in Africa. This context should reinforce the
advantages provided by the possession of horizontal capabilities adapted to the local
(host) environment.
1.3 Empirical methodology and data description
1.3.1 Capabilities in the banking sector
To illustrate the concepts and before turning to the econometric tests, I first ex-
amine vertical and horizontal capabilities in the banking sector. The production of
loan services entails screening, monitoring and funding activities18. The first two
types of activities relate to the asset side of banks’ balance sheet: better screening
18See Freixas and Rochet (1997) for a detailed literature review and presentation of models of
banks’ production functions.
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and monitoring should decrease the proportion of non-performing loans, while the
third type of activity relates to the liability side of the balance sheet and supposes
imperfect competition in input markets: getting funding to finance loans through
deposit, wholesale markets or internal markets for corporate groups. The perfor-
mance of these activities is based on the possession of vertical capabilities: the
ability to accurately assess loan applicants’ risks by reducing the asymmetry of in-
formation between them and the bank, the ability to process financial information
effectively inside the bank, and the ability to secure funding in sufficient quantity
and at low cost. The possession of vertical capabilities impacts the efficiency with
which screening and monitoring is performed, in other words, it impacts the quality
of the loan portfolio and the cost of performing these activities and, more generally,
of extending loans. The possession of horizontal capabilities affects the way these
activities are performed by the bank in different environments and the adaptation
cost it incurs to build new horizontal capabilities to fit into a new environment.
With relation to developing countries, a key horizontal capability in the banking
sector is the ability to screen and monitor borrowers with very limited information.
Sophisticated credit scoring methods may not be useful in the absence of credit reg-
istries or audited financial statements. As a consequence, foreign banks may need to
adapt their screening technology to these new local conditions. Relationship lending,
which refers to the investment in “providing financial services that will allow dealing
repeatedly with the same customer in a more efficient way” (Freixas and Rochet,
1997:99), may prove a more appropriate method of dealing with asymmetry of infor-
mation than the use of systematised lending based on credit scoring. Relationship
lending involves the acquisition of soft information, which is of a qualitative nature
and which includes opinions, ideas and rumours19. The ability to engage effectively
in relationship lending to screen and monitor borrowers constitutes an horizontal
capability.
1.3.2 Banking markets in sub-Saharan Africa
As mentioned in the introduction, the geographical choice is motivated by the fact
that sub-Saharan Africa is the developing region of the world that has the largest pro-
portion of foreign-owned banks (Table A.1 in the Appendix). Indeed, a closer look
at the data reveals that many of these “South” foreign banks are regional African
banks, with large groups such as First Bank (Nigeria) or Ecobank Transnational
19Contrary to hard information, such as financial statements, stock returns, soft information is
difficult to summarize in a numeric score, and therefore more difficult to communicate and transmit
(Petersen, 2004).
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(Togo) (Table A.2 in the Appendix). Undeniably, sub-Saharan African countries
are very diverse and the challenges they face may differ importantly. Differences in
terms of population density, economic development, legal institutions20, and abun-
dance of natural resources make the situation of each country unique. However,
there are important similarities which make the case for a regional view of banking
markets. Sub-Saharan African banking systems are characterized by their small
size21, high concentration22 and high degrees of foreign ownership. Banks operat-
ing in these markets tend to have high levels of capitalization and liquidity, which
helped them withstand the 2007-08 financial crisis, but low levels of intermediation,
as characterized by low deposit to loan ratios and high interest rate margins23.
In addition to the common characteristics of sub-Saharan Africa banking mar-
kets, the regional perspective is motivated by the fact that most of the multinationals
have primarily a regional scope (Rugman and Verbeke, 2005)24. Therefore the port-
folio of horizontal capabilities of banks has a highly regional component, implying
higher adaptation costs for operating outside the home region than inside. While
global banks are still very important players in the region, the emergence of regional
African banks, with a clear pan-African ambition (United Bank for Africa vision
statement is “To be the undisputed leading and dominant financial services insti-
tution in Africa”; Intercontinental Bank ambitions to be “To be the Number One
Financial Institution in Nigeria, Number One in Africa and among the top 100 in the
world, with Strong Global Presence”25) have modified the banking landscape. Some
regional African banks enjoy a significant presence in a large number of countries,
such as Ecobank Transnational (from Togo) which has operations in thirty coun-
tries, in West Africa, Central Africa and East Africa. The largest banking groups in
South Africa have also started to invest outside the region, setting up branches or
20La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) have shown that the legal rules and
their enforcement matters for the development of capital markets. In addition, Beck, Maimbo, Faye
and Triki (2011) also emphasize the relevance of the distinction between common law countries
(all former British colonies) and civil law countries in Africa, as common law countries typically
have a more flexible legal and regulatory framework than civil code countries and enjoy on average
a higher level of financial development.
21According to Beck, Maimbo, Faye and Triki (2011:37), the total assets of African banks is on
average US$220 million, while for an average non-African bank it almost reaches US$1 billion.
22Beck et al. (2011: 43-44) found that 50 per cent of the countries with a Herfindahl index above
2,000 are in Africa, while only a fifth of the countries with a Herfindahl index below 2,000 are in
Africa.
23Beck et al. (2011:51) found that the interest margin of banks in Africa was 482 basis points
on average, against 334 basis points on average for banks in the rest of the world.
24Rugman and Verbeke (2005) show that the vast majority of the world’s 500 largest MNEs
operate on an intra-regional basis.
25From their websites: http://www.ubagroup.com/group/; http://www.
intercontinentalbankplc.com.
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subsidiaries in developed countries and in other emerging countries: Standard Bank
has operations in Asia, the U.S. and Europe and has made important acquisitions
in Argentina and Turkey.
1.3.3 Sample selection and descriptive statistics
Testing the research hypotheses requires data providing financial information on
banks with variation across home and host environments. I use panel data from
BankScope database to obtain financial and ownership information on foreign and
domestic banks operating in sub-Saharan Africa. The sample consists of annual
financial data for the 10-year period 2003-2012 for all the banks active at some point
during this period, included in BankScope database in 47 sub-Saharan countries (all
African countries excluding Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt and Sudan).
The sample contains 657 banks in total, and includes banks that became inactive
during the period. In 2012, 76% of the banks in the sample were active, 16% were
dissolved (of which 10% due to mergers or take over), 0.15% were bankrupt, 3%
were in liquidation and, for 5% of them, their situation was unknown. I address the
problem caused by endogenous entry and exit of firms in the next section. Banks
included in the sample are commercial banks (97%), cooperative banks (1%) and
savings banks (2%)26.
1.3.4 Variables of interest: bank ownership dummies
Considering that multinational firms’ capabilities are determined in large part by
their home market and their exposure to other foreign markets, and that for a given
home country only the most productive firms self-select themselves as candidates
to internationalization (Melitz, 2003), I then consider that the level of development
of the home country is a good proxy for firms’ level of vertical capabilities. The
degree and diversity of internationalization are proxies for the size and variance of
the portfolio of horizontal capabilities that the firms possess and which determines
their dynamic horizontal capabilities. Based on these two characteristics (home
country’s level of development and multinational firm’s international experience), I
define three different categories of foreign banks operating in developing countries
as follows: Global banks are banks founded in a developed country and have foreign
activities both in their home region and outside their home region. Emerging banks
26To reduce the heterogeneity of the sample, I have excluded from the sample of banks all in-
vestment banks, Islamic banks, micro-finance institutions, private banks, real estate and mortgage
banks, and development banks given that they operate in different market segments than those of
commercial banks.
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originate from an emerging country and have foreign activities both in their home
region and outside their home region. Regional developing banks are banks founded
in a developing country and with foreign activities only in their home region. The
group composed of domestic banks can be further subdivided into two sub-groups:
Domestic multinational banks with operations abroad and purely domestic banks
only operating in their home country. These four categories of banks define different
configurations of capabilities, as shown in Table 1 below.
— Table 1 insert here —
Banks’ ownership is defined as follow: I use the Global Ultimate Owner indicator of
BankScope database and update it using the same definition by looking on banks’
website when the information is missing in BankScope. A company is a Global Ulti-
mate Owner (GUO) if it controls at least 50.01% of the entity and has no identified
shareholders or if its shareholder’s percentages are not known. For banks which
have a dispersed ownership and for which there is no ultimate owner controlling at
least 50.01% of the company, I determine the country of origin of the bank by aggre-
gating the shares of the owners by country of origin and attribute bank ownership
based on the nationality of the owners with the highest total percentage of shares27.
Given that ownership information is only available for the most recent year in the
Bankscope database I take into account changes of ownership which have taken
place during the sample period through mergers or acquisitions by tracking each
bank’s Bureau Van Dijk’s ID number (BVD ID) in the Zephyr database of Bureau
Van Dijk, which records M&As. The ownership indicator changes over the sample
period for 8% of the banks in the sample. In addition, to avoid double counting I
checked all the mergers and acquisition that occurred during the sample period to
ensure that only the merged entity or the acquiring bank remained in the sample
27Note that I differ slightly from Claessens et al. (2008) who first attributed foreign ownership to
banks for which at least 50% of the shares were held by foreigners and then, summed the percentages
of shares held by foreigners by country of residence, with the country with the highest percentage
of shares considered the source country. For instance, if a bank is held at 60% by 3 foreigners and
the highest percentage of shares owned by one of the 3 foreigners is 39%, and the remaining shares
are domestically-owned, then Claessens et al. (2008) attribute the ownership of the bank to this
foreigner, while I would consider that the bank is a domestic bank. This methodology was chosen
given that for many banks with dispersed ownership in sub-Saharan Africa, while it was relatively
easy to identify the nationality of the largest owner through cross-checking online sources, it was
much more difficult to accurately identify all the minority owners, even for large ones, especially
when they were individuals. However, this difference in methodology only affects 5 banks in the
sample, which I have classified as domestic, whereas they would have been classified as foreign
following Claessens et al. (2008) methodology. Given that this study focuses on foreign banks,
this classification difference is unlikely to affect results.
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after the take-over.
The dummy Global MNB equals 1 if the bank is from a developed country with
operations on a global scale. The dummy Regional African MNB equals 1 if the
bank is either owned by a sub-Saharan African group, excluding South Africa, or
a North African group28 with foreign operations only on a regional (African) scale.
I also include a dummy Emerging MNB which equals 1 if the country of origin of
the bank is an emerging country and if this bank has also operations outside of its
home region. I group together South African multinational banks and banks from
other emerging countries with foreign operations on a global scale, both inside and
outside their home region. I first included a separate category for South African
multinational banks, but the differences in terms of financial performance between
South African multinational banks and other emerging banks were not statistically
significant, therefore I grouped them in the same category.29 Finally, the dummy
Domestic bank equals 1 if the bank is from the host country of interest.30
— Figure 2 insert here —
Figure 2 indicates that 50% of the banks fall in the category Domestic banks, 16%
in the category Global MNB, 25% in the category Regional African banks (African
MNB ex-South Africa), and 9% in the category Emerging MNB (including South
African banks). Among global multinational banks, 34% are from the U.K., 25%
from France and 16% from Portugal (Figure A.1 in the Appendix). Concerning
emerging multinational banks, 42% are from South Africa, 20% from India and
15% are from Malaysia (Figure A.2 in the Appendix). Most of the foreign affiliates
of regional African banks belong to Nigerian banking groups (25%), followed by
28From Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt and Sudan.
29Including South African banks in the regional African MNB group (and excluding them from
the Emerging MNB group) does not change qualitatively the results: the coefficients on the regional
African MNB dummy have the same level of significance and sign than when South African banks
are excluded from this category, although the size of the coefficient of the regional African MNB
dummy is slightly smaller. Similarly, excluding North African banks from the regional African
MNB category does not change qualitatively the results, but the size of the coefficient of the
regional African MNB dummy becomes slightly larger.
3019% of these domestic banks are also multinational banks and as such are not purely domestic
players. Regrouping purely domestic players and multinational (domestic) banks should, in theory,
move the average productivity of this group up, compared to a group only composed of purely
domestic players (Melitz, 2003). Given that this research is focused on comparing foreign banks, I
look at domestic banks as a group without distinguishing between purely local and domestic banks.
I have also run regressions with separate dummies for purely domestic banks and domestic banks
that are multinational. The latter perform better than the former, with slightly higher return on
equity, higher cost efficiency and lower level of bad loans. I do not report these regressions as the
ranking of banks according to their performance is not affected by whether or not I distinguish
between purely domestic banks and multinational domestic banks.
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Togolese banks31 (20%) and Moroccan banks (19%) (Figure A.3. in the Appendix).
Global banks are the largest by assets (average assets of US$2.91 billions over 2003-
2012), followed by domestic banks (US$983 millions excluding South Africa, US$2.32
billions including it) and emerging banks (US$466 millions), while regional African
banks have the lowest amount of total assets (US$262 millions). Most of the foreign
banks have expanded throughout sub-Saharan Africa in the form of subsidiaries.
Only 7 banks in the sample are operating under the form of branch. As Beck et al.
(2011) point out, setting up a subsidiary implies higher cost than a branch, but it is
also easier for the supervisor to overview as a subsidiary is organized and regulated
according to the laws of the host country (see also Casu, Girardone and Molyneux,
2006). As such, according to the World Bank’s Bank Regulation and Supervision
2008 database32, a third of the host African countries in the sample prohibited
entry via branches in 2008, which might explain the prevalence of subsidiaries as an
organizational form.
1.4 Banks’ ownership and financial performance
1.4.1 Econometric specification
Testing H1a and H1b. I use an OLS regression model to estimate the impact
of banks’ ownership on several indicators of financial performance. The baseline
equation is the following:
ycit = β1Regional African MNBit + β2Domestic bankit + β3Emerging MNBit
+ ρXit + δZct + αt + γc + cit (1.3)
ycit is the dependent variable, an indicator of financial performance. I include the
dummies regional African MNB, Emerging MNB and Domestic Banks and exclude
the dummy Global MNB, hence the interpretation of the results for the three own-
ership categories is relative to global banks. Xit represents a vector of time-varying
firm-level controls and Zct a vector of time-varying country controls. cit is an error
term. I relax the assumption of identical and independent distribution of the errors
and I cluster the standard errors at the firm level to allow for possible correlations
between residuals of a firm across time. The residuals are correlated across two
31Essentially subsidiaries of the large pan-African group Ecobank.
32http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/0,,contentMDK:
20345037~pagePK:64214825~piPK:64214943~theSitePK:469382,00.html
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observations of the same firm, but are assumed to be independent across firms (Pe-
tersen, 2005). The standard errors are also corrected for heteroskedasticity. Year
fixed effects αt are introduced to take into account aggregate (regional) macroeco-
nomic shocks and host country c fixed effect γc are included to take into account
country specific omitted variable that are time invariant. In alternative specifica-
tions I also control for heterogeneity in the cross-section with year-host country
fixed effects, in order to compare firms’ performance within year-host countries. I
do not include firms’ fixed effects given that for 92% of the banks in this sample
the ownership dummy variables do not change over the period studied, leaving too
little variation in the data. I control for many firm, time and host country factors,
but the possibility of omitted variable bias, related to omission of variables affecting
both performance and ownership, remains. The objective of this research is thus to
find whether there are significant and robust correlations between the bank owner-
ship dummies and the indicator of financial performance, but it does not attempt
to prove causality. The possibility of reverse causality (performance affecting own-
ership) is not excluded, although it is relatively low, as it would primarily be driven
by acquisitions of a lower-performing group of banks by another group of banks,
but, as mentioned above, changes in ownership only concern less than 10% of the
banks in the sample. In addition, while it may be that performance at time t affects
ownership at time t+1, it is less likely that it affects ownership at time t, as specified
in equation (1.3).
Dependent variables: Measures of financial performance. To test Hy-
pothesis 1a I employ the return on equity using income before tax (ROE). I do not
use the traditional return on equity based on net income to avoid accounting dif-
ferences being driven by different tax regulations. In addition, I do not use market
to book value as a measure of financial performance, despite a long tradition in
the literature on bank performance to use this measure, given that only 57 banks
in the sample are listed. To test Hypothesis 1b I use the cost income ratio, cal-
culated as Overheads / (net Interest Revenue + Other Operating Income), which
is traditionally used in banking to measure operational efficiency. I focus on the
comparison of performance between regional African banks and global banks (the
latest being the omitted dummy in equation (1.3)), which lie at two extremities of
the horizontal/vertical capabilities configuration. For Hypothesis 1a I expect β1 < 0
(ROE is lower on average for regional African banks than for global banks) and
for Hypothesis 1b I expect β1 > 0 (The cost income ratio is higher on average for
regional African banks than for global banks). To mitigate the problem of outliers
the dependent variables ROE and cost/income ratio are winsorized at 1%.
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Testing H2. To test Hypothesis 2 according to which institutional and eco-
nomic distance, or asymmetry, between the host and the home country exerts a
negative influence on the performance of foreign affiliates, I interact measures of
host countries’ institutional and economic development with the bank ownership
dummies. As such, the baseline equation (1.3) is modified as follows:
ycit = β1Regional African MNBit + β2Domestic bankit + β3Emerging MNBit
+ β4Institutions (Demand)ct
+ β5Regional African MNBit ∗ Institutions (Demand)ct
+ β6Domestic bankit ∗ Institutions (Demand)ct
+ β7Emerging MNBit ∗ Institutions (Demand)ct
+ ρXit + δZct + αt + γc + cit
(1.4)
I use the return on equity before tax as the financial measure of performance.
Institutionsct captures institutional quality in the host country c. I use two indicators
of institutional environment obtained from the Worldwide Governance Indicators
database provided by the World Bank. The first one, Corruption is an indicator of
corruption which ranges from -2.5 (low corruption) to 2.5 (high corruption)33. The
second indicator, the Bad Governance index, is a composite measure of the follow-
ing governance indicators: rule of law, control of corruption, political stability, no
violence, regulatory quality, all obtained from the Worldwide Governance Indicators
database (see Table A.3 in the Appendix for the definition of variables). Again, I
reverse-code the indicators so that when the index of Bad Governance is high, the
governance is weak and when it is low, the governance is strong. The index ranges
from -2.5 (strong governance) to 2.5 (weak governance). I expect a positive sign on
the coefficient of the two interaction terms between regional African banks and cor-
ruption and the Bad Governance index (β5 > 0). In other words, I expect regional
African banks to perform relatively better in environment with high corruption and
weak governance. Similarly, Demandct captures characteristics of the demand, and
more specifically the income level in the host country, which I proxy by the GDP
per capita. I expect regional African banks to perform relatively worse in countries
with higher GDP per capita, in other words, I expect β5 < 0 when the African MNB
dummy is interacted with GDP per capita. Because of potential multi-collinearity
between the two alternative indicators of institutional environment (Bad Gover-
nance index and Corruption Index) (correlation close to 1, see correlation Table A.5
33For ease of interpretation, I reverse-code the “control of corruption” indicator of the World
Bank.
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in the Appendix) I examine the effect of these variables on performance in separate
regressions.
1.4.2 Control variables
The nature of the ownership variables is restrictive concerning the inclusion of other
firm controls. Indeed, the ownership indicator does not only represent banks’ cat-
egory of ownership but is also a broader proxy for banks’ capabilities, operational
and management practices, which are likely to be outcomes of banks’ ownership34.
Bank controls. I proxy the portfolio of (relevant) horizontal capabilities, which
mitigates the adaptation cost of entering into an unfamiliar host environment, with
the relevant country experience of the bank measured by the number of foreign
subsidiaries of the parent company (the “General Ultimate Owner”) in sub-Saharan
Africa35. In doing so, I follow Barkema and Drogendijk (2007) who operationalize
the concept of international experience by using the log of number of subsidiaries
in countries in host country region in the year of host country entry. Given the
limited information on the year of entry of subsidiaries in sub-Saharan Africa, I do
not consider the year of host country entry but use the number of subsidiaries of the
parent in the region in 2012. Admittedly, this imperfectly accounts for experience
prior to entry in a country, however given that most of the subsidiaries for which
information on experience is available were set up before the sample starting date,
2003, this gives a relatively accurate measure of the regional coverage and experience
of the parent. Among the bank characteristics, I also include two dummies indicating
the listed status and government ownership status of the bank. Finally, in some
regressions I also control for the year of entry of the bank (date of incorporation),
as it may affect performance especially if substantial costs are incurred by recent
entrants to adapt to the new host country. I do not control systematically for the
year of entry given that it is only available for 303 banks in the sample out of 657
banks, resulting in an important loss of information.
Host country controls. Among host countries’ characteristics I include GDP
per capita in U.S. dollars obtained from the IMF World Economic Outlook36, which
34The category of ownership might influence banks’ practices such as asset-liability management,
risk management, and also bank variables such as bank size. As such, I do not include these financial
variables as controls in the regression of financial performance as they would be bad controls, that
is, variables that are themselves outcome variables (Angrist and Pischke, 2009).
35Here, and in contrast to Lu and Beamish (2001) and Fang, Wade, Delios and Beamish (2007),
who use a general concept of internationalization experience, I consider a specific international-
ization experience: that of the host region as a whole. In so doing, I follow authors such as
Barkema and Drogendijk (2007) and Brouthers, Brouthers and Werner (2003) who have examined
the location-bound experience (Clarke, Tamaschke, Liesch, 2012) at the host regional level.
36Other host country indicators were initially included, such as the level of banking sector devel-
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proxies the level (and sophistication) of the demand in the host market. I also con-
trol for banking regulations. More specifically, I include indicators of entry barriers
in the banking sector for foreign banks (prohibition of entry via joint venture and
via branch) which are obtained from the World Bank’s Bank Regulation and Su-
pervision survey. Regulation indicators, the minimum capital adequacy ratio and
the minimum capital requirement, are obtained directly from central banks’ web-
sites. In addition, I introduce an indicator of market concentration, the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index, or HHI37, which I lag by one year to address the potential reverse
causality between concentration and profits38. Finally, I introduce three regional
dummies: East Africa, West Africa, and Central Africa (the omitted dummy being
Southern Africa), which capture regional differences in terms of culture, institutions
and level of development. A summary table of the different variables and their
sources is presented in Table A.3 in the Appendix. Summary statistics for banks’
financial variables and a correlation matrix are presented in Table A.4 and Table
A.5 respectively in the Appendix.
1.4.3 Preliminary graphical analysis: Survivorship bias
Given that this research focuses on multinational banks that have succeeded in their
internationalization, it is necessary to control for banks’ survival when examining
banks’ performance. Indeed, one crucial element to consider in this analysis is the
persistence of firms’ heterogeneity. Assuming that firms know their productivity
before taking their decision to enter a foreign market, they could still be wrong in
their estimates and exit the market in the short term. As such, firms’ heterogeneity
at a specific point in time may only be the consequence of their inexact forecast and
would not constitute persistent differences in performance. In the present analysis,
we then need to rule out that heterogeneity between foreign firms is a result of mere
ignorance over productivity before entering the host country. Indeed, even assuming
that firms’ decision to internationalize occurs after it gains knowledge of its produc-
tivity (Melitz, 2003), there remains uncertainty over productivity in the foreign host
country as the entry decision of firms facing sunk entry cost is forward looking and
opment, population density, FDI inflows, but these variables were dropped due to multi-collinearity.
Including them does not change qualitatively the main results on the coefficient of the ownership
dummies.
37According to the Structure Conduct Paradigm (Bain, 1956), banks operating in more concen-
trated markets are able to set higher loan rates as a result of non-competitive behavior or collusion:
higher market concentration thus generates more market power and higher bank profits.
38The idea is the following: high profit margins at time t = 0 allow firms to build barriers to entry
which determines concentration at t = 1. However, profits at t = 0 do not influence concentration
at t = −1.
40
rests on expected future probabilities of exit related to random productivity draws
with unknown mean but known variance (Jovanovic, 1982; Hopenhayn, 1992).
I first proceed to a graphical analysis examining entry and exit of banks (Figures
3 and 4), following the descriptive industry dynamics tradition (Dunne, Roberts and
Samuelson, 1988). I use the year of incorporation of domestic banks or subsidiaries
of foreign banks, which is available for a sub-sample of 303 banks, as the year of
entry. Similarly, I use the last date for which accounts are available in BankScope
as the reference point for the year before exit for banks that are inactive. Figure
3 on banks’ entry shows that African banks started their internationalization in
sub-Saharan Africa around the mid-1980s. South African banks, such as Absa and
Standard Bank, started their regional expansion after the end of Apartheid, two
decades ago (Beck et al., 2011). Nigerian banks have started to expand throughout
West Africa as a consequence of the consolidation wave in Nigeria following the
banking reforms in 2005. Concerning non-African emerging banks, their experience
of sub-Saharan Africa markets vary importantly. While Indian banks have had a
long presence in East Africa, especially in countries with an important population
of ethnic Indians -for instance the Ugandan subsidiary of Bank of Baroda was in-
corporated in 1953-, the presence of Chinese banks is more recent, as illustrated by
the purchase of a 20 percent stake by Industrial and Commercial Bank of China
in Standard Bank in South Africa in 2007. For global banks, their presence in
sub-Saharan Africa is often much older, starting in the colonial period (Figure 3).
Concerning domestic banks, we note two peaks, one around the 1970s, period dur-
ing which African banking systems, previously dominated by colonial banks, were
nationalized; and another in the 1990s around the time of the liberalization and
privatization programs in sub-Saharan Africa.
— Figure 3 insert here —
Turning to banks’ exit (Figure 4), the graph shows that foreign banks’ exit is rela-
tively low, especially compared to the higher exit pattern of domestic banks39. In
this sample, five subsidiaries of global banks, five subsidiaries of regional African
banks and four subsidiaries of emerging banks became inactive between 2003 and
201240. This graphical analysis is a first evidence that any significant difference
between foreign banks in terms of financial performance is unlikely to be driven by
39Given incomplete information on year of entry for banks, I do not compute entry and exit rate.
40Note that for simplicity I do not distinguish between exit through M&A and exit through
bankruptcy or liquidation, although exit through M&A does not necessarily imply a below-average
performance, while it is most often the case for exit through bankruptcy.
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disproportionate exit of specific categories of foreign banks.
— Figure 4 insert here —
1.4.4 Empirical Results
Given that the panel is largely unbalanced, I look at three different samples: the
first one includes all active and inactive banks included in BankScope. The second
one only includes active firms, thus excluding firms that have exited the market.
The third one is a balanced panel of banks that are active and have no missing data
for book assets for the five year period 2007-201141.
Testing Hypothesis 1a: Return on Equity as the dependent variable.
I proceed to the testing of the first set of hypotheses which examines the relation
between vertical capabilities and firms’ performance, controlling for horizontal ca-
pabilities.
— Table 2 insert here —
Table 2 reports the results on the determinants of banks’ performance in sub-Saharan
Africa for the three different samples. The dependent variable is the return on equity
using income before tax (ROE). As mentioned above, I control for the fitness of the
portfolio of adaptation capabilities by including a variable indicating the number of
foreign subsidiaries owned by the parent group in sub-Saharan Africa. I examine
first the sample containing both currently active and inactive firms. In model 1, the
coefficient on the regional African MNB dummy is negative and significant at the
1 percent level indicating that regional African MNB have significantly lower ROE
than global banks. While in model 1 I use several host country controls capturing
the level of development of the country (GDP per capita), the degree of market
competition (lagged HHI index), indicators of banking regulation and African ar-
eas dummies, in model 2 I apply host country fixed effects. The increase in the
R-squared between the two models suggests that there are indeed significant coun-
try effects affecting the performance of banks that are not totally captured by the
control variables in model 1. In model 3 I include year-host country fixed effects
instead of separate year and host country fixed effects, which would capture any
cross-section heterogeneity at the year-host country level. As such, instead of con-
41Given the high proportion of banks with missing data on the last available year of 2012 related
to the fact that some banks had not yet reported results for 2012 at the time when the data was
downloaded, the estimation is carried on the 2007-2011 period.
42
trolling for regional, sub-Saharan, macro-economic shocks, as in model 2, model 3
controls for temporal variations in macro-economic conditions at the country level.
The R-squared of model 3 compared to model 2 increases slightly; the parameter
estimates of the ownership dummies also change, but marginally. Overall, being a
regional African bank is associated with a ROE between 18 percentage points to
23 percentage points lower on average than that of a global bank, depending on
whether host country dummies or year#host country dummies are included. Con-
cerning the other groups of banks, we note that the coefficient on domestic bank is
also significantly negative in the three models considered, although the coefficients
are nearly half the size of those of regional African banks. Finally, the difference be-
tween emerging banks and global banks in terms of ROE is not significant, although
the sign of the coefficient is negative for the dummy emerging MNB.
Turning to the second panel consisting exclusively of active firms, the results are
qualitatively similar but the coefficients are higher for the three ownership dummies.
This suggests that the lower performance of regional African banks relative to global
banks in the sample including all firms is not due to a higher number of non-
performing regional African banks which are then forced to exit the market. On
the contrary, when I exclude firms which have exited at one point during the 10-
year period (2003-2012), regional African banks are performing even worse relative
to global banks. In the 5-year balanced panel (2007-2011), which controls for both
time of entry and exit of firms, the coefficients on the regional African MNB dummies
are smaller in the three specifications, suggesting that the results obtained on the
two other panels may be in part driven by more recent entry of regional African
banks (after 2007), and thus less experience and time for those banks to adjust to
their host countries.
Finally, given that global banks entered African host countries on average two
decades before African banks they might have had time to build the required adap-
tation capabilities. As such, in columns (10) and (11) I control for the year of entry
as it might influence the possession of adaptation capabilities. In column (10) the
estimation is done on the sample with all firms. The sample is smaller than in
columns (1)-(3) given that information on the year of entry (date of incorporation)
is missing for more than half of the banks. The year of entry enters negatively but
it is only significant at the 10% level. In column (11) I restrict the sample to the
banks that entered after 1994, given that the median year of entry for African banks
is 1995 (see Table A.4 in the Appendix). In other words, this sample excludes global
banks (as well as other banks) which had entered prior to 1995 and which might
have had enough time to adapt to the local environment and to build their adap-
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tation capabilities. The sample size is much smaller (395 observations). We note
that regional African banks are still associated with ROE on average 19 percentage
points smaller than global banks.
Overall, the finding that regional African banks are performing worse than global
banks, as measured by ROE, is robust across different samples and different specifi-
cations. It is consistent with the first Hypothesis 1a, according to which the higher
the level of a multinational firm’s operational capabilities, the higher its total profit,
controlling for its portfolio of adaptation capabilities. Concerning the control vari-
ables, I first note that the coefficient on the proxy variable for the portfolio of
adaptation capabilities, the number of foreign African subsidiaries of the parent
group, is negative and not significant across the different specifications, which may
be interpreted as evidence of the short-lived advantages of adaptation capabilities
when competing with firms with higher levels of operational capabilities. This re-
sult is similar to Fang et al. (2007) who found no significant association between
performance and internationalization experience in the long term. I also find that
listed banks42 are on average associated with higher ROE, which is not surprising
if we consider that these banks are on average larger and more experienced than
non-listed banks. Finally, it is worth mentioning that the explanatory variables re-
produce, at best, around 20% of the variation in ROE in column (1)-(10), suggesting
the presence of important time-invariant bank fixed effects.
To sum up, these first results lend support to Hypothesis 1a according to which
higher operational capabilities are associated with higher profits, controlling for
adaptation capabilities.
Testing Hypothesis 1b: Cost income ratio as the dependent variable. I
now turn to Hypothesis 1b according to which regional African banks should record
lower operational efficiency than global banks. The dependent variable is the cost
income ratio and the estimation is done on the three panels. The results are reported
in Table 3.
— Table 3 insert here —
The coefficient on the dummy regional African banks is positive and significant in
model 1 (without host country fixed effects) and model 2 (including host country
fixed effects) across the three panels, which supports Hypothesis 1b. Being a re-
gional African bank is associated on average with a cost income ratio between 18
42In 2011, 10% of the domestic banks, 13% of the subsidiaries of global banks, 3% of the sub-
sidiaries of regional African banks and 8% of the subsidiaries of emerging banks were listed.
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percentage points and 27 percentage points higher than that of a global bank, de-
pending on the sample chosen and on whether host country fixed effects are included.
The association is significant at the 5% level across all specifications and samples.
Domestic banks are also associated with lower efficiency than global banks, but the
dummy coefficient is much lower than that of regional African banks. Finally, the
difference in operating efficiency between global banks and emerging banks is not
significant. Overall, the results presented in Table 3 are consistent with Hypothesis
1b and are robust to the inclusion of host country and bank controls as well as to
year and host country fixed effects.
Testing Hypothesis 2: Interacting bank ownership dummies with insti-
tutional quality and GDP per capita. I then examine whether regional African
banks might in fact, within sub-Saharan Africa, perform better in countries where
the institutional environment is weaker and per capita income levels are lower. The
results are reported in Table 4.
— Table 4 insert here —
Columns (1) and (2) in Table 4 report the estimates of the relation between finan-
cial performance and control of corruption. The sign on the ownership dummies
are similar to those reported in Table 2, with regional African banks and domestic
banks on average associated with significantly lower ROE than global banks. The
coefficient on corruption, which captures the association between corruption and
the performance of global banks, the omitted bank ownership dummy, is negative,
which is consistent with expectations, but not significant. The interaction term be-
tween the dummy regional African banks and control of corruption has a negative
sign, which is contrary to expectations, as it indicates that higher corruption affects
even more negatively the performance of regional African banks, relative to global
banks. However, the coefficient is not significant. These results are robust to alter-
native specifications, using time fixed effects and host country fixed effects as well
as different firm and host country control variables.
Columns (3) and (4) which include a broader measure of institutional environ-
ment, the Bad Governance index, report results that are qualitatively similar to
those using the indicator of control of corruption. The bad governance variable
has a negative coefficient, which is consistent with expectations as it indicates that
global banks perform worse in environments with weaker governance, but it is not
significant. Concerning the interaction term between the dummy regional African
banks and the governance index, the coefficient has the expected positive sign but
45
it is not significant. When additional controls are included, this result does not
change. To sum up, these results do not support Hypothesis 2 according to which
regional African banks should be better able to perform than global banks in coun-
tries where corruption is more prevalent, or where governance is weak. The results
suggest that the institutional environment does not have a significant impact on
financial performance when other factors are controlled for and that there are no
significant differences between regional African banks and global banks on the effect
of institutional environment quality on their performance. In other words, the in-
stitutional voids’ advantage hypothesis is not supported by these results as regional
African banks do not seem to have an advantage over global bank in operating in
markets with low institutional quality. If they do, this advantage does not translate
into significantly higher performance.
Finally, the last two columns, (5) and (6), investigate whether regional African
banks are better able to perform in countries with low GDP per capita, relative
to global banks. Contrary to expectations, the sign on the interaction variable
GDPc#Africa is positive in column (5), indicating that African banks are relatively
better able to perform when the host country GDP per capita is higher. The coeffi-
cient is however only significant at the 10% level. When further controls and fixed
effects are included, the significance drops below conventional levels (column (6)).43
1.5 Channels at work: Investigating the drivers
of performance differences
I further investigate the drivers of financial performance by decomposing the profit
measure into its accounting components. Banks’ profits are driven by net interest
margins and non interest expenditures. Indeed, banks’ profit before tax satisfies the
following accounting identity:
Profit before tax = Net interest margin+ (noninterest income− overheads
− other noninterest expenditures− loan loss provisioning)
(1.5)
As such, I re-estimate equation (1.3) with alternatively interest income and interest
expenses (the difference between these two elements constituting the net interest
43The different specifications were also estimated on the sub-sample of survivor firms and on the
5-year balanced panel, but the results were not qualitatively different, in particular, the coefficient
on the interaction terms were not significant.
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margin) and bad loans (which impacts profit through lower interest income and
higher loan loss provisioning) as dependent variables. The results for the three
different samples of firms are presented in tables 5, 6 and 7.
1.5.1 Interest income vs. interest expenses
No significant differences between regional African banks and global banks
in interest income, but significant differences in interest expenses. The
results in Table 5 indicate that while there are no significant differences between
global banks and regional African banks in terms of interest income generated by
average earning assets, there is however a significant difference between these two
groups of banks concerning interest expenses generated by average interest bearing
liabilities. Indeed, once host country fixed effects are included, regional African
banks have interest expenses that are on average two percentage points higher than
global banks. This indicates that regional African banks have higher funding costs
as interest expenses comprise interests paid on deposits and borrowings to fund the
loan portfolio44. This result is not surprising if we consider that global banks have
better access to international capital markets, and should therefore have lower cost
of funding than regional African banks. Subsidiaries of these global banks may also
benefit from internal loans at lower cost and higher quantity than subsidiaries of
regional African banks. At the same time this result may also suggest that regional
African banks and domestic banks offer higher interest rate for customer deposits
than global banks45. Unfortunately, we do not have detailed data on interest ex-
penses by customer segment or direct information on deposit interest rates charged
by each bank to examine whether the difference in the overall cost of funding is
related to (input) price differences between banks for a particular source of capital.
— Table 5 insert here —
1.5.2 Explaining differences in interest expenses: the liabil-
ity mix
Another possibility is that the lower cost of funding of global banks is due to differ-
ences in the liability mix: banks with a larger proportion of their funding composed
44Note that this result also suggests the existence of important geographic, or location, effects
on banks’ interest expenses.
45Research done by Cull and Trandafir (2010) comparing foreign and domestic banks in Uganda
indicates that the latter indeed have higher average deposit rate than the former, although the
authors do not compare between different categories of foreign banks.
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of current deposits have a lower total interest charge because these current de-
posits generally pay lower interests than savings or term deposits. I use data from
BankScope to investigate further this issue. Given the smaller number of banks
reporting a detailed liability break-down, the sample size is reduced to 287 banks
in total. Table 6, which reports the liability mix of regional African banks relative
to global banks indicates that a composition effect related to the liability mix may
be driving the results. The results indicate that regional African banks have a sig-
nificantly lower share of their funding composed of (low-cost) short-term capital,
compared to global banks. In particular, more detailed data indicate that regional
African banks have a significantly lower current deposit base than global banks
(see Table A.3 in the Appendix for definitions of the funding categories). Regional
African banks are also more reliant on more costly customer term deposits. Anecdo-
tal fieldwork evidence from Kenya, Tanzania and Ghana corroborates this finding:
some global banks benefit from a large deposit base through financing large corpo-
rates and institutional clients. In addition, large global banks tend to be very well
established in the retail market and therefore have easy access to current customer
deposits. Regional African banks, on the other hand, tend to be newcomers and
need to open additional bank branches and establish trust in order to increase their
deposit base. Access to current customer deposit was a concern for a significant
number of foreign regional African banks and small domestic banks surveyed during
the fieldwork.46
— Table 6 insert here —
1.5.3 Differences in credit quality
I further investigate whether the difference in performance between global and re-
gional banks is related to the quality of their loan portfolio as identified by their level
of bad loans. I use two different measures of bad loans, the ratio of non-performing
loans to gross loans and the ratio of impaired loans to equity. The results are re-
ported in Table 7. While I find that regional African banks have significantly higher
levels of non performing loans compared to global banks in the baseline equations,
the difference disappears when firm and host country controls as well as year fixed
effects are included. Given that non-performing loans reduce interest income for
banks, this corroborates the previous finding that there are no significant differ-
46Indeed, a little under 50% of the domestic and regional African banks surveyed considered
that it was easy to access customer deposits, whereas this number was close to 90% for the foreign
affiliates of global banks. See Chapter 3 for more details on the survey.
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ences between global and regional African banks in their ability to generate interest
income once additional controls are included. Impaired loans (see Table A.3. in
the Appendix for definitions) have an impact on the income statement through an
increase in the provision for loan losses (see equation 1.5). In the first panel with
all firms, we note that regional African banks have significantly higher levels of im-
paired loans than global banks. However, the difference is only significant at the
10% level when host country fixed effects are included. In the sample with survivor
firms and in the 5-year balanced panel the difference between African banks and
global banks in their level of impaired loans is robust to the inclusion of host coun-
try fixed effects. Overall, this suggests significant differences between global banks
and African banks in the quality of their loan portfolio when one considers impaired
loans, that is, loans for which it is probable that all amounts due will not be col-
lected. One should be cautious in interpreting these results however. Indeed, the
change in the point estimates and significance of the coefficient when host country
controls are included could be due to cross-country differences in accounting systems
and definitions of impaired loans, on top of potential variation in the average quality
of credit in the different host countries.
— Table 7 insert here —
Overall, these additional findings suggest that the lower ROE of the foreign affiliates
of regional African banks relative to those of global banks is due to higher interest
expenses, related to the composition of their liability mix, as a significantly lower
proportion of their funding base is constituted of low cost demand deposit compared
to global banks. In other words, the lower performance of regional African banks is
due to higher cost of funding, while there is no strong evidence of significant differ-
ences in the quality of the loan portfolio as measured by the ratio of non-performing
loans to gross loans, once host country controls or fixed effects are included. In
the next section I test the robustness of these results to two potential composition
effects: the first one related to the geographic choices of location of foreign banks
and the second one related to segmentation in the loan market.
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1.6 Alternative explanations: geographic compo-
sition and market segmentation
1.6.1 Geographic location of foreign banks in sub-Saharan
Africa
The difference in performance between foreign banks in sub-Saharan Africa could
also be driven by self-selection of foreign banks into specific host countries. Pre-
vious literature (The World Bank, 2006; Van Horen, 2007, Cuervo-Cazurra and
Genc, 2008) has shown that the determinants of foreign firms’ entry in develop-
ing countries differed between developing and developed country multinationals. In
particular, multinational firms may self-select into host markets depending on their
vertical capabilities and their portfolio of horizontal capabilities. Firms with lower
levels of vertical capabilities may not be able to enter certain countries if their verti-
cal capabilities are below a certain threshold determined by the characteristics of the
demand and the intensity of competition in the host country. They may be more
likely to enter countries where the demand is less sophisticated, the institutional
environment is weaker and the degree of regulation is lower. Similarly, firms with
the highest levels of vertical capabilities and with a larger international presence
may have a higher opportunity cost to invest abroad and may prefer to direct their
resources to fast-growing economies where they can enjoy higher profits. If country
characteristics such as culture or regulation have an impact on firms’ performance
beyond what can be taken into account by additive host country fixed effects or
by two-way host country-time fixed effects (as included in the different performance
regressions), then the differences in firms’ performance could be driven by a composi-
tion effect (see Blundell, Macurdy and Meghir, 2007). I first examine the geographic
location of regional African banks and global banks by analyzing the host country
determinants of the market shares of global banks and regional African banks. I
then proceed to examine how much of the difference in performance between these
two groups is explained by host country characteristics using the Oaxaca-Blinder
decomposition technique.
1.6.1.1 Host country determinants of foreign banks’ market shares
I examine separately the host country determinants of the total market shares of
global banks and of regional African banks in sub-Saharan African host countries to
assess whether there are significant locational differences between these two groups
of banks. Given that the dependent variable of market share is censored below by
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0 and above by 1, I use a two-limit Tobit model for the estimations. The two-limit
Tobit model can be represented as:
y∗itc = βXct + cit (1.6)
where y∗itc is a continuous latent variable (unobserved for values smaller than 0
and greater than 1) representing the total market share of each group of bank i
(global banks or regional African banks) in country c at time t, X is a vector of
host country time-varying explanatory variables, β is a vector of coefficients to be
estimated cit is an error term.
If we denote the observed dependent (censored) variable as yitc (market share of
group i at time t in host country c), then
ycit =

0 if y∗itc ≤ 0
y∗itc if 0 < y∗itc < 1
1 if y∗itc ≥ 1
(1.7)
The host country variables are similar to those included in previous regressions.
They include a measure of concentration in the banking market (HHI lagged), indi-
cators of the strength of regulation in the banking sector (minimum capital require-
ments and minimum capital adequacy ratio), the bad governance index to capture
institutional quality, and measures of income level (GDP per capita) and macroe-
conomic growth (GDP growth). I cluster the standard errors at the host country
level. The results are reported in Table 8.47
There are a few significant associations between the market shares of each two
groups of banks and country characteristics, once year fixed effects and regional
dummies (East, West and Central Africa) are included. Overall, they suggest that
the prevalence of regional African banks is lower in countries where minimum capital
requirements are higher, while it is the contrary for global banks. These banking
regulations may constitute higher barriers to entry for African banks, which have
smaller balance sheets on average than global banks. These results also indicate
that global banks have higher market shares in countries where GDP growth is
higher, which probably reflects their higher opportunity cost.48 Interestingly, I do
47In theory, the number of observations is 10 years*47 countries, however, for an important
number of small African countries, there were no banks included in BankScope in the first years
of the sample, and for some in the last reporting year (2012). In addition, missing values in host
country characteristics are also explaining the lower sample size. As such, these results should be
interpreted with caution and only considered as indicative.
48This result echoes findings in the international banking literature (Van Horen, 2007), according
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not find that the geographic prevalence of global banks or regional African banks is
significantly associated with the quality of the institutional environment in the host
country, as measured by the Bad Governance Index. In particular, regional African
banks are not significantly more prevalent in countries where governance is weak.49
— Table 8 insert here —
1.6.1.2 To what extent does geographic self-selection explain perfor-
mance differences?
To further examine the extent to which performance differences may be driven by
a geographic composition effect, I employ the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition tech-
nique (Blinder 1973; Oaxaca 1973)50 to examine how much of the difference in ROE
between global banks and regional African banks is explained by characteristics of
their host countries. This technique provides a decomposition of outcome variables
between two groups into a part that is explained by differences in the predictors,
the observed characteristics, and an “unexplained” part attributable to differences
in the estimated coefficients, and which captures all the potential effects of differ-
ences in unobserved variables.51 Given that the goal of this exercise is to determine
how much of the performance differences between the two groups of banks are deter-
mined by location differences, I use a two-fold decomposition into an explained part
and an unexplained part.52 I use the set of host country characteristics included in
to which banks from industrialized countries tend to go to large developing countries, while banks
from developing countries tend to enter the smaller developing countries.
49This result is relatively consistent with Cuervo-Cazurra and Genc (2008), who also use Tobit
analyses but include each World Bank Governance variables (non reverse-coded) separately and
find that the prevalence of developing-country MNEs among the largest foreign affiliates is, as
expected, negatively related to regulatory quality and the control of corruption, but, contrary
to expectations, positively related to the rule of law. In other words, while developing-country
multinationals may be better able than developed-country multinationals to deal with political
instability, they still prefer to operate in countries where the rule of law applies.
50The Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition methodology is often used in labor economics to decompose
mean differences in wages between two groups (for instance male/female). In particular Blinder
(1973) and Oaxaca (1973) used this technique to examine wage discrimination. It divides the wage
differential into a part that is explained by group differences in productivity characteristics, for
instance education, and a residual part which cannot be accounted by such differences and is often
used as a measure for discrimination. While it has mainly been used in the labor market literature,
it can be applied to study group differences in any outcome variable.
51Given are two groups, A and B; an outcome variable, Y ; a set of predictors and a constant
X; slope parameters and intercept β and a nondiscriminatory coefficient vector β∗. We have:
E(YA) − E(YB) = Q + U . Q is the explained part: Q = {E(XA)− E(XB)}′ β∗ and U is the
unexplained part: U = E(XA)′(βA − β∗) + E(XB)′(β∗ − βB).
52Note that a three-fold decomposition technique is also frequently used. In the three-fold
decomposition the outcome difference is divided into a first component, which is the part of the
differential that is due to group differences in the predictors (the “endowments effect”), a second
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the previous Tobit regressions as predictors. I employ the package Oaxaca in Stata
(see Jann, 2008) and the results are reported in Table 9. They indicate that the
average difference in ROE between the two groups over the sample period is 24 per-
centage point, of which only 12% (1.953/24.142) is explained by group differences
in characteristics of their geographic location.
— Table 9 insert here —
Overall, these results indicate that the differences between global banks and regional
African banks in the characteristics of their geographic location account for only a
small part of the performance differential.
1.6.2 Is segmentation in the loan market driving the results?
A second potential composition effect that might account for the difference in per-
formance between groups of banks is related to the existence of market segmentation
and stable differences in the composition of the loan portfolio between banks. In-
deed, if some banks have a portfolio which primarily consists of loans to sectors with
high return and/or low risk with low levels of bad loans, then these banks might have
a competitive advantage which then translates into higher profits. In other words,
if different categories of foreign banks cater to different market segments then for-
eign banks’ heterogeneity in a host country could be explained, and sustained, by
product differentiation and niche markets. However, the fact that I did not find any
significant differences between global and regional African banks in terms of interest
income and non performing loans, and that the performance differences seemed to
be driven by banks’ liability mix may already suggest that regional African banks
and global banks are not operating in separate markets on the asset side of their
business. In this sub-section I test the robustness of my results by further examining
the existence of market segmentation.
1.6.2.1 Bank performance and market segmentation
I explore the possibility that the difference in performance is due to the existence
of different market niches, or strategic groups (Cool and Schendel, 1988; Dranove,
Peteraf and Shanley, 1998), consisting of firms following similar competitive strategy
component measuring the contribution of differences in the coefficients (including differences in the
intercept) (the “coefficient effect”) and a third component, which is an interaction term accounting
for the fact that differences in endowments and coefficients exist simultaneously between the two
groups (See Blinder, 1973; Oaxaca, 1973 and Jann, 2008).
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and which are relatively stable over time. In the commercial banking industry, these
strategic groups are likely to be defined along customers’ lines, with banks catering
to specific customers or products, such as corporates, SMEs or retail customers.
The existence of strategic group, which implies market segmentation, would have
two likely consequences. The first one is that there would be performance differ-
ences between groups, which may be large, and the second one is that performance
differences in the same strategic group would likely be small (see Rumelt, 1991).
The existence of mobility barriers (Caves and Porter, 1977) guarantees a relative
permanence in observed performance differences. If we are trying to isolate the re-
lation between firms’ capabilities and performance, we need to examine whether the
mechanism at play is primarily that of the division of firms into specific strategic
groups, with high mobility barriers between them. More specifically, what I want to
examine here is the possibility of an overlap between the proxy for firm’s underlying
capabilities, the “ownership dummies”, and possible strategic groups defined along
product lines, explaining significant and stable differences in performance. In sub-
Saharan Africa, strategic groups could exist if global banks systematically cream-
skimmed the best borrowers, without offering loans to lower ranked customers, in
other words if there were systematic and stable differences in the customers that
global and regional African banks target.
To illustrate this issue with a theoretical example applied to the commercial
banking sector, I consider three different pools of borrowers: Pool A consists of
borrowers for which information is readily available and accurate, generally large
firms with credit history. Pool B consists of returning applicants to the loan markets
for which financial information is limited. Pool C comprises primo applicants with
no credit history or former borrowers with default history or rejected borrowers.
Given that the quality of type A borrowers can be assessed easily, banks with high
operating processes and able to offer lower prices due to lower cost of funding, in
other words, higher level of vertical capabilities, will be at an advantage. Global
banks should then have an advantage over other categories of banks. A portion of
these perfect information firms are large firms requiring large loans. As such, smaller
banks cannot finance them. In countries with low capital requirements and a large
unbanked population, small local banks will be unable to supply these firms with
the amount of loan required. Global and regional firms will thus compete on price.
If global banks are relatively more efficient to screen firms with perfect information
they will be able to push down prices, that is, interest rates on loans, further, even if
we take the conservative view that global banks do not get more favorable terms to
finance themselves on the wholesale market than regional banks or obtain internal
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funding at a lower cost and/or in a higher quantity.
Concerning firms for which financial information is limited, type B borrowers, re-
lationship lending dominates as a screening method. To the extent that relationship
lending is intrinsically linked to the knowledge of the local environment, it can be
considered as a specific horizontal capability. I consider that domestic banks have an
advantage over both regional and global banks due to cultural factors and stronger
presence in the market. As such, for type B borrowers, the amount of labour re-
quired to screen and monitor a loan B should be the lowest for domestic banks,
and the highest of the three for global banks. The pool of type C borrowers then
consists of a higher percentage of risky firms, those rejected by other banks and/or
those which have previously defaulted on their loans. Regional banks then need to
screen carefully to reject the “lemons”. Given that there is no information readily
available, they will take more time to screen and monitor these projects. Having
to tap into the type C pool of borrowers should imply higher overhead costs and
potentially higher levels of bad loans (lower interest income), which could translate
into systematic performance differences in ROE and cost income ratio, all else equal.
1.6.2.2 Loan portfolio of foreign banks in sub-Saharan Africa
As suggested in the above example, the observed difference in financial performance
between foreign banks might be driven by the fact that different categories of banks
extend loans to different types of clients. In this section I investigate empirically the
possible existence of market segmentation along customer niches. I look at three
different aspects of the composition of banks’ portfolio: its maturity profile, the
allocation of loans by business segments (corporate, retail), and the allocation of
loans by economic sectors. The econometric specifications are based on equation
(1.3), with a measure of loan portfolio allocation as the dependent variable and the
same three ownership dummies as explanatory variables. I obtain data on loans from
three different sources. The first source is the BankScope database, which provides
information on loan maturity and on loans to the retail and corporate sectors. I then
complement this data with information on loan portfolio allocation by economic
sector, which I hand collected from banks’ annual reports. I obtain information
on a subsample of 106 banks which publish data on the sectoral allocation of their
loans in their annual reports. I have sectoral loan data for around 21% of banks
included in the BankScope sample (Table A.6 in the Appendix). This sample of
banks reporting the allocation of loans by sector is an unbalanced panel over the
period 2003-2012. The third data source that I use to further examine the differences
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in loan portfolio within the corporate segment (SMEs vs. large corporates)53, is
the survey data that I collected mainly during fieldworks in Kenya, Tanzania and
Ghana, which are among the countries with the highest number of foreign banks
in sub-Saharan Africa. This fieldwork data is completed by data from banks in 11
other sub-Saharan African countries to which I distributed the survey questionnaire
by email. I obtain a sample of 74 banks (Panel A) with non missing information
on loan portfolio allocation by segment, including 59 banks (Panel B) which were
surveyed during the three fieldworks and representing on average over 60% of the
banks in Kenya, Tanzania and Ghana.54 More details on the survey methodology,
sample description and representativity are presented in Chapter 3, Section 4.
Maturity profile of banks loan portfolio. Examining loan maturity of banks’
portfolio using OLS regression, the results presented in Table 10 show that regional
African banks tend to have a lower percentage of long term loans - riskier than the
shorter term loans- than global banks. This is consistent with Beck et al. (2011)
who find that almost 60% of loans in Africa are for less than one year and less than
2 percent of loans are for more than 10 years55. The difference is however only
significant at the 10% level and disappears when additional controls are included.
The difference between global banks, emerging banks and domestic banks is not
significant.
— Table 10 insert here —
Allocation of loans by business segment. I then use information obtained from
BankScope on the type of customers to which banks extend their loans. The results
are reported in Table 11. Regional African banks have a lower percentage of their
loan portfolio exposed to the residential mortgage and to the corporate sectors than
53As mentioned in the introduction, a significant literature has examined the impact of foreign
banks’ entry on local credit. The comparison was generally between global banks from developed
countries and domestic banks from developing countries. An important debate has focused on
whether foreign banks decreased the credit available to SMEs via cream-skimming the best clients
thus preventing local banks from cross-subsidizing SMEs with more secure loans to large corporates.
These studies often rely on data on loan size as a proxy for the type of firms (see Clarke et al.
(2005)), but it is not unfortunately not always an appropriate proxy (Stein, 2010).
54Rather than giving banks a predetermined size classification of firms, the survey questionnaire
directly asks banks their definition of SMEs. In that respect, it follows the methodology employed
by Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Martínez Pería (2008) for their survey of bank SME financing around
the world. Most of the banks surveyed during the fieldworks define SMEs according to their annual
turnover (77%), the rest of the banks defining them according to their transaction amount. On
average, the annual turnover varies between US$200000 and US$5 millions and the transaction
amount varies between US$3,000 to US$300,000 depending on the client and the bank. These
numbers are consistent with Beck, et al. (2008) banks’ SME definitions.
55The authors use the database Making Finance Work for Africa (http://www.mfw4a.org/).
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global banks, however the difference disappears once firm and host country controls
are included as well as year fixed effects. Domestic banks have a higher share of
their portfolio invested in residential mortgages than global banks and other foreign
banks. The result is significant at the 5% level and robust to the inclusion of ad-
ditional controls. This can be explained by better knowledge of local conditions by
domestic banks allowing them to extend more retail mortgage loans while foreign
banks may be more reticent to provide loans to retail customers to finance housing
projects56.
— Table 11 insert here —
Allocation of loans by type of corporate customers. I further investigate the
differences between banks in terms of the type of corporate customers in their loan
portfolio, distinguishing between small and medium enterprises (SMEs) and large
corporates relying on the survey data presented above. The results, reported in Ta-
ble 12, indicate that there are no significant differences between the four categories
of banks (global, emerging, regional African and domestic banks) in the share of
their portfolio allocated to large corporates. Concerning loans to SMEs, the coef-
ficient on the regional African dummy is positive, but only significant at the 10%
level, while the coefficient on the domestic bank dummy is positive and significant
at the 5% level in column (1). However, once further firm and host country controls
are included, both coefficients become insignificant. This data is admittedly limited
but it further suggests that there are no significant differences between foreign banks
in their allocation of loans by business segment, especially no significant differences
between global banks and regional African banks in the share of their loan portfolio
allocated to the SMEs segment.
— Table 12 insert here —
Allocation of loans by economic sectors. Finally, I examine the sectoral allo-
cation of loans in Table 13 using data obtained directly from banks’ annual reports.
As reported in Table A.6 in the Appendix, only 21% of the banks in the BankScope
sample report the sectoral allocation of their loan portfolio. A comparison of means
between the group of banks which reports this sectoral loan data and the one which
56This was confirmed by anecdotal evidence from fieldwork in Kenya and Tanzania. The man-
agers of global banks interviewed in these countries reported that their headquarters were reluctant
to have a high exposure to the local mortgage market, while domestic banks were much more willing
to finance this sector given the high return that it offered.
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does not indicate that the reporting banks are significantly larger (by total assets).
The means differences between the two groups in terms of financial performance
indicate that the reporting banks tend to record higher ROEs over the sample pe-
riod. However, this difference is not significant at the 5% level for foreign banks,
which suggests that potential sampling biases are not strongly affecting performance
measures.
The results of the OLS estimations reported in Table 13 indicate that both
regional African banks and emerging banks have a significantly higher share of their
loan portfolio invested in extractive industries. The result is especially significant
for emerging multinationals, at the 1% level, while the result is only significant at
the 10% level for regional African banks. Another significant result is the higher
exposure of regional African banks, relative to global banks, to the transport and
communication sector. In addition, both domestic and regional African banks offer
significantly less loans to the manufacturing sector than global banks. As such,
although I do not find strong evidence of market segmentation with respect to types
of loans (retail vs. corporate) and maturity of loans, I do find that global banks
finance the manufacturing sector more than other banks do and that regional African
banks and emerging banks offer relatively more loans to the extractive industries
sector, as a percentage of their total loans. This is consistent with the fact that
FDI from China and India began their expansion in Africa in the natural resource
extraction industry (Beck et al., 2011). I do not find any significant difference
between banks with respect to the agriculture sector, community and social sector,
and government sector. The findings also corroborate Beck et al. (2011:43) findings
that the agricultural sector is significantly underrepresented in the loan books of all
banks, while trade and commerce and construction are overrepresented on the loan
books of African banks.
— Table 13 insert here —
To sum up, I find only weak evidence of market segmentation along customer niches,
and more specifically, I do not find that global banks offer significantly more loans
to corporate clients than regional African banks. As such, with the limitation of the
data at hand, I do not find strong evidence that the heterogeneity of foreign banks’
performance is driven by market segmentation on the asset side of the business:
once again, the performance differential between these two groups of banks seems
to be driven by differences in interest expenses (the cost of capital), rather than
differences in interest income.
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1.7 Discussion
The theoretical framework developed in this research examined how host country
environment impacted the exploitation of multinational firms’ capabilities. Testing
the hypotheses in the context of banking in sub-Saharan Africa, I found empirical
support to the first two hypotheses: firms with lower levels of vertical capabilities
(regional African banks) are less profitable than firms with higher levels of vertical
capabilities (global banks), controlling for the fitness of the portfolio of horizontal
capabilities (proxied by the number of foreign subsidiaries of the general ultimate
owner or parent company) [H1a]. The lower performance of firms with low levels of
vertical capabilities (lower return on equity of regional African banks) is driven by
lower operational efficiency (higher cost/income ratio) [H1b]. However, contrary to
Hypothesis 2, I do not find that regional African banks are significantly better able to
navigate institutional voids than global banks or that they perform relatively better
in countries with low income levels. Decomposing the measure of profit before tax,
most of the evidence pointed to significant differences in interest expenses between
global banks and regional African banks, related to the composition of the liability
mix, while differences in interest income were not significant.
I further examined whether the performance differences were driven by two po-
tential composition effects, the first one related to the geographic location of banks
and the second one related to the composition of banks’ loan portfolio. While there
is evidence of self-selection into host countries, with a higher prevalence of global
banks in African countries with high GDP growth and a lower prevalence of re-
gional African banks in countries with high minimum capital requirements, I find
that host country characteristics explain little of the performance difference between
global and regional African banks. Finally, I find only weak evidence of market seg-
mentation which suggests that the results are not primarily driven by the existence
of market niches. To answer the research question (“Can experience in operating
in environments with weak institutions and low GDP per capita compensate for
lower levels of productivity when operating in other developing environments?”) it
seems that the answer is no. A more nuanced interpretation is that the potential
adaptation cost advantages provided by well-adapted horizontal capabilities when
operating in a host market are limited. In addition, relevant experience is a potent
mitigating factor for high adaptation costs when horizontal capabilities have to be
built. This answer raises a second question.
Why do regional African banks survive despite facing strong competition from
global and emerging banks? A first potential explanation could be that most of
the regional African banks have in fact a higher exit rate and most of them do not
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survive very long, which would explain the negative and significant coefficient on the
dummy Regional African MNB in the performance regressions. Considering that the
large majority of firms exits within five years after their entry57, if the majority of
regional African banks have entered in the last five years and therefore face a high
probability of exit within a few years after entry, it could explain their relatively
lower performance. In the sample, and with the limitation that I do not have
complete information on the date of incorporation of banks, no global banks have
opened up a branch or subsidiary in sub-Saharan Africa after 2007, while six regional
African banks did, out of a total of 161 regional African banks in 2007. However,
it is unlikely that these few last comers are driving the differences in performance.
In addition, as shown previously in Table 2, the difference in performance between
regional African and global banks is still significant in the 5-year balanced panel.
A second explanation could be be that there are important quality differences
between customers inside each market segments: although there are very few differ-
ences between global banks and regional banks in terms of maturity, business and
sectoral allocation of their loan portfolio, and therefore little evidence of market
segmentation, it could be that, in a second layer, these banks differ by the quality
of their customers within their portfolio. In other words, there is still the possibility
of cream-skimming by global banks of the best borrowers within each economic sec-
tor and business segment, without observing significant differences between foreign
banks in terms of overall sectoral and business allocation of their loan portfolio.
Variations in the quality of customers and their associated costs, especially cost of
screening and monitoring, could then translate into significant variations of perfor-
mance between firms. Indeed, although I have found weak evidence of higher level
of bad loans for regional African banks relative to global banks once additional con-
trol and country fixed effects are included, the results indicated a significantly lower
operational efficiency of regional African banks. One potential reason could be that
they incur higher costs of screening and monitoring than global banks due to their
dealing with more difficult borrowers. As the data suggested that regional African
banks have a slightly (but not significantly) higher part of their portfolio allocated
to SMEs than global banks, they may need to set up strong monitoring and infor-
mation systems, which is costly and pushes the cost to income ratio up, at least
until the system is amortized. If global banks offer large loans and rely more heavily
on commission and fees to increase their revenues they economize on operating costs
57Dunne et al. (1988 : 510) examining patterns of firm entry and exit in the manufacturing
industry found that “on average across four-digit industries, 61.5% of all firms exit in the five years
following the first census in which they are observed. On average, 79.6% of all firms exit within
ten years”.
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and as a consequence are more efficient. It is thus possible that the coexistence of
banks with different levels of performance is related to market segmentation at the
sub-sector level, in the type of customers to which banks cater within each business
segment.
Finally, and probably more convincingly, as Bloom and Van Reenen (2007) have
shown, in countries with low competition the dispersion of firms’ productivity tends
to be higher. Given that most sub-Saharan African banking markets are character-
ized by high level of concentration and relatively low market competition, this may
also explain why lower-performing (regional African) banks do not exit the market.
In addition, it is important to note that even in the most competitive markets, such
as Kenya where more than 40 banks operate and compete for the same customers, all
the banks are actually generating important profits. In this market interest spreads,
especially in the SME segment, are still very high and the banks have not reduced
them despite a reduction in operational costs over the years (see Osoro (2013)).
In fine, the higher performance of global banks is due to higher levels of vertical
capabilities, embedded in their organizational capital, allowing them to benefit from
lower operating and funding costs. The reason why regional African banks may
not benefit from the same organizational capabilities may be related to advantages
purely conferred by size. In other words, for overhead costs of regional African
banks to decrease to the level of that of global banks, economies of scale need to be
achieved, which may only be done through a growth in size of regional African banks.
Given the small size of African banking markets, it is possible that such economies
of scale may only be achieved through international expansion. Similarly, access to
lower cost sources of funding will predominantly be achieved with growth in size
and increased presence in international wholesale markets.
From a theoretical perspective, the finding that regional African banks are on
average associated with lower performance than domestic banks poses the question
of the relevance of superior “ownership advantages” to explain FDI as postulated
in the OLI framework (Dunning, 1977). In addition, the results do not confirm the
“institutional voids’ advantage” hypothesis. On the contrary, I find that the perfor-
mance of regional African banks relative to that of global banks is not significantly
affected by the quality of the institutions in the host country. There may be sev-
eral reasons for the absence of evidence of institutional voids’ advantages. The first
reason may be that as global banks have set up subsidiaries in sub-Saharan Africa
decades before regional African banks started their expansion in the sub-continent,
they may have had enough time and experience to adjust adequately to their host en-
vironment. This would reduce significantly global banks’ adaptation cost (increase
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the adequation of their horizontal capabilities with their host environment), and
therefore reduce the supposed “institutional voids’ advantage” of regional African
banks. The second reason may be that the measures of institutional voids used in
this study do not accurately capture this concept. It is for instance possible that
institutional voids manifest themselves at a more micro-economic level than what is
captured by the Worldwide Governance Indicators. A third reason may be, simply,
that in the context of banking in sub-Saharan Africa, institutional voids’ advantages
are very limited or even non-existent. To examine whether this is the case and to
understand why if it is so would require further research, not only empirical, but
also theoretical to further refine the concept of institutional voids and explore more
in-depth the channels through which it could confer advantages to multinationals.
Limitations. One limitation of this research concerns the availability and qual-
ity of financial data on banks and the problems associated with using accounting
data which can be manipulated, or which may be affected by different reporting
standards. Financial data is missing for a few banks in years in which they are
active (most often the latest years) and not all the commercial banks in Africa are
included in BankScope, although this non-reporting only concerns the smaller banks
and those which were incorporated most recently58. These omissions however are
unlikely to affect substantially the results, and may in fact indicate that they are
conservative estimates: given that most of the omitted banks in BankScope are
banks which were only recently incorporated and that foreign affiliates of regional
African banks are those which have most recently entered new markets in their
neighboring countries, including these banks may lower the average measures of fi-
nancial performance of regional African banks, if we consider that new entrants tend
to face higher risk of exit due to lower performance.
A second data limitation concerns the lack of detailed information on loan port-
folio of banks, and more specifically the lack of information on the firms to which
the different categories of banks lend money. Ideally, I would have data on the
amount of the loans, the interest rates, as well as on the size and nationality of the
58For a review of the BankScope database and its limitations, see Bhattacharya (2003). A
comparison of the number of commercial banks licensed in three of the largest banking markets in
sub-Saharan Africa, Kenya, Tanzania and Ghana (which are also those with the largest number
of foreign banks) as recorded by the central banks’ websites, and those recorded by BankScope
suggests that BankScope coverage is very large and that selection bias due to under-reporting is
not an important concern. The comparison indicated that out of the 43 active licensed commercial
banks in Kenya, only 2 small domestic banks and one small foreign-owned affiliate of a banking
group headquartered in Switzerland were not reported in BankScope. For Tanzania, out of the
34 licensed commercial banks, two domestic banks (one licensed in 2009 and another 2011) and
one small Indian bank were not reported in BankScope. Finally, in Ghana, out of the 27 licensed
commercial banks, two domestic banks (one incorporated in 2009 the other one in 2011) and a
subsidiary of an Indian bank incorporated in 2008 were not reported in BankScope.
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borrowing firms to which the banks lend. This data would be important to examine
whether lower performance of regional African banks is due to specific borrowers’
characteristics, beyond loan portfolios’ sectoral allocation and loan maturity. As
mentioned above, there is still the possibility that these results are driven by mar-
ket segmentation by type of borrowers (cf. “cream-skimming” of the best clients by
large foreign banks). In addition, having more detailed information at the borrower
level would allow us not only to have a more in-depth understanding of the drivers
of performance but also to examine the welfare implication for host markets of the
presence of foreign banks. Indeed, from a policy perspective, the performance of
foreign banks matters as it has repercussions on the path of financial development
in host countries. The results obtained in this study may be interpreted as evidence
that regional African banks increase the fragility of the host banking system as they
are associated with lower performance while global banks may improve the stability
of the banking system. At the same time, it may be that regional banks are also
the ones lending relatively more to small enterprises and non traditional borrowers
excluded by global banks, which face high financing constraints despite being cru-
cial for economic development. As such, the impact of these banks on local financial
development cannot be adequately inferred from financial statements if it is not
associated with a better understanding of the customers to which they lend. This
preliminary analysis of the drivers of banks’ performance needs to be complemented
with further information on banks’ lending pattern and behaviour to infer policy
implications for FDI in the banking sector.
A third limitation is the quality of proxies for vertical and horizontal capabilities
of multinational firms. I have used dummies capturing both the level of vertical
capabilities and the characteristics (in terms of size and variance) of the portfolio
of horizontal capabilities of firms, but more direct measures would be welcome to
assess more accurately the relative impact of vertical and horizontal capabilities on
performance. Assessing precisely vertical capabilities would require data on input
prices (essentially cost of funding), while measuring horizontal capabilities would
require to capture both the foreign experience duration and foreign experience va-
riety of each bank group, taking into account all its foreign subsidiaries. Finally,
because of insufficient data on the date of entry of banks, I have not been able to
assess the extent to which horizontal capabilities confer time advantages. Ideally,
I would have compared the performance of subsidiaries of multinationals with dif-
ferent horizontal capabilities at different time intervals after entry, controlling for
vertical capabilities, to examine the sustainability of advantages conferred by hori-
zontal capabilities. With these caveats in mind, it is, to the best of my knowledge,
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the first study which has conducted a rigorous comparison of the performance of
North-South versus South-South FDI in the banking sector, and put to the empiri-
cal test the advantages conferred by the ability to navigate institutional voids.
1.8 Conclusion
This chapter contributes theoretically to the strategic management literature by
taking into account foreign firms’ heterogeneity when examining multinationals’
international performance. The theoretical framework posited the existence of two
different types of firms’ capabilities: vertical capabilities, which impact the price
and marginal cost of firms’ product, and horizontal capabilities which impact firms’
sunk adaptation cost when operating abroad. I tested the hypotheses in the context
of banking sector in sub-Saharan Africa, both an under-studied sector and under-
studied location despite being a fast-growing recipient of banking FDI. In so doing
this chapter also contributes empirically to the international banking literature.
I found that banks’ heterogeneity in their possession of vertical capabilities trans-
lated into sustainable differences in performance, while I found no evidence that
horizontal capabilities conferred any competitive advantage. In particular the for-
eign affiliates of regional African banks systematically under-perform those of global
banks, and they are not better able to perform in weaker institutional environments
and poorer countries. These results are robust across different samples of firms, con-
trolling for entry and exit, for firm and host country characteristics and including
year and host country fixed effects. Moreover, the findings are unlikely to be primar-
ily driven by banks’ self-selection into host markets and by the existence of market
niches. An important message of this chapter is that it is very difficult, or even
impossible, to compensate lower vertical capabilities by a better fit of horizontal
capabilities with the local host environment: no evidence was found in this research
of the existence of “institutional voids’ advantage”. In other words, the potential
advantages provided by lower adaptation costs are short lived when competing with
firms with high vertical capabilities.
The implications for future research of these findings are twofold. First, the
empirical results have shown that developing and developed country MNEs are as-
sociated with different strategies, and perform differently in the host markets. As a
consequence, they do not have the same impact on the host economies. This stresses
the need to take into account the level of development of the country of origin of
foreign firms when examining foreign multinational’s entry into host markets. This
distinction is particularly important when researchers examine the welfare impact
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of foreign firms’ entry. Secondly, this research poses the question of the sustainabil-
ity, or even existence, of potential advantages provided by the ability to navigate
institutional voids. This research suggests that “home country” or “home region”
advantages are limited when foreign competitors are highly productive and global.
This implies a need to reconsider both the concepts of “institutional voids advan-
tage” (Khanna and Palepu, 2006) and that of “liability of foreignness”59 (Zaheer,
1995). In particular, it is important to acknowledge that there are situations in
which the liability of foreignness does not manifest itself, and in which institutional
voids advantages are not sufficient to compensate for productivity disadvantages.
Understanding how time, as well as host and home countries specific factors, af-
fect the prevalence of these advantages and disadvantages constitutes an avenue for
future research.
One potential lesson for developing countries’ firms embarking on an interna-
tional expansion in other developing countries is that to catch up with developed
country firms they should build on their knowledge of developing environments by
further specializing in niche customer markets, untapped by developed countries’
multinationals. In the banking sector in particular, this research suggests that ac-
cess to low-cost deposit is the key to unlock performance. Given the large unbanked
population in African markets, there are still many opportunities for regional African
banks to tap into local deposits. For host countries’ policy makers, this research sug-
gests that the expansion of regional African banks will not have the same impact
on domestic banks than that of global banks. Indirectly testing for the existence of
cream-skimming of the best customers by global banks and regional African banks,
which would affect negatively domestic banks, this research suggests that so far the
expansion of regional African banks does not seem to have threaten the performance
of domestic banks, as these enjoy superior average performance relative to the for-
eign affiliates of regional African banks. The fact that regional African banks are not
significantly associated with higher levels of non performing loans once host coun-
try characteristics are controlled for might reassure policy-makers when designing
banking regulations for increased financial stability. But, as mentioned above, more
data is required to assess whether these regional African banks might help close the
financing gap which is acute for small and medium entrepreneurs. Finally, more
research on the organizational capital of multinational firms, especially examining
the relation between the headquarters and the subsidiaries in terms of transmission
of information, lending practices and capital, would be necessary to identify the
sources of the efficiency advantages enjoyed by the subsidiaries of global banks.
59The additional cost incurred by foreign firms over local firms when operating abroad
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Table 3: Bank operational efficiency and bank ownership in sub-Saharan Africa
[Hypothesis 1b]
This table presents the results of multivariate regression analyses of bank performance for three dif-
ferent samples (all firms, survivor firms, and 5-year balanced panel), using OLS estimation. The
dependent variable is the cost to income ratio. The excluded ownership dummy is Global MNB. Vari-
able definitions are in Table A.3 in the Appendix. The following controls are included the regressions:
listed company, # foreign subsidiaries in sub-Saharan Africa of GUO, GDP per capita (host), HHI
(t-1), minimum capital requirements (host). Model 1 include additional controls: minimum capital
adequacy ratio (host), prohibition of entry via JV (host), prohibition of entry via branch (host), East
Africa, West Africa, and Central Africa. All models include a constant and year fixed effects. Stan-
dard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and are adjusted for firm clustering with values reported
beneath each coefficient estimate in parenthesis. The dependent variable is Winsorized at 1%. *, **
and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
(1) (2)
All firms (657)
Regional African MNB 19.882*** 25.686***
(6.568) (6.389)
Domestic bank 12.465** 14.143***
(4.848) (4.659)
Emerging MNB -0.946 1.348
(6.136) (6.105)
Observations 1,622 1,979
R-squared 0.097 0.133
Host Country fixed effects
Sample with survivor firms (495)
Regional African MNB 20.924*** 27.137***
(6.815) (6.656)
Domestic bank 12.813** 14.167***
(4.958) (4.784)
Emerging MNB -0.822 1.455
(6.191) (6.157)
Observations 1,528 1,885
R-squared 0.098 0.137
Host Country FE
5-year balanced panel (217)
Regional African MNB 18.189*** 22.391***
(5.966) (5.889)
Domestic bank 14.107*** 15.231***
(5.224) (4.884)
Emerging MNB -0.377 -1.399
(5.598) (4.963)
Observations 694 823
R-squared 0.121 0.214
Host Country FE
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Table 4: Bank performance - institutional and economic environment [H2]
This table presents the results of multivariate regression analyses of bank performance over the 2003-
2012 sample period, including all firms, using OLS estimation. The dependent variable is the return
on equity using income before tax. The excluded ownership dummy is Global MNB. The following
firm and host country controls are included in 2, 4, and 6: listed company, # foreign subsidiaries in
sub-Saharan Africa of GUO, HHI (t-1), minimum capital requirements (host). Constants are included
but not reported. Variable definitions are in Table A.3 in the Appendix. Standard errors are robust
to heteroskedasticity and are adjusted for firm clustering with values reported beneath each coefficient
estimate in parenthesis. The dependent variable is Winsorized at 1%. *, ** and *** indicate statistical
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Institutions Income level
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Regional African MNB -18.222*** -23.500*** -20.922*** -26.682*** -22.659*** -25.139***
(2.308) (5.157) (5.022) (5.324) (4.189) (4.928)
Domestic bank -9.198*** -16.216*** -9.444*** -16.254*** -9.260*** -14.810***
(1.838) (4.226) (3.299) (3.989) (3.352) (3.869)
Emerging MNB -4.000* -3.871 -4.960 -4.161 -3.585 -1.527
(2.218) (4.784) (4.359) (4.582) (5.274) (5.809)
Corruption -0.926 -6.113
(1.780) (5.723)
Africa#corrupt -3.197 0.231
(2.988) (6.566)
Domestic#corrupt 0.159 1.817
(2.221) (4.216)
Emerging#corrupt -6.047** 4.240
(3.084) (6.198)
Bad Governance (BG) -1.468 -13.581*
(3.178) (7.800)
Africa#BG 1.536 6.282
(6.260) (7.082)
Domestic#BG 0.734 1.646
(3.636) (4.304)
Emerging#BG -3.167 7.071
(6.471) (6.183)
GDP per capita (host) 0.014 0.112
(0.078) (0.113)
Africa#GDPc 0.238* 0.132
(0.122) (0.120)
Domestic#GDPc -0.012 -0.006
(0.094) (0.088)
Emerging#GDPc -0.021 -0.035
(0.143) (0.127)
Observations 2,606 2,014 2,606 2,014 2,554 2,025
Adjusted R-squared 0.064 0.171 0.062 0.173 0.069 0.173
Firm controls
Host country controls
Year FE
Host Country FE
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Table 5: Interest income vs. interest expenses and bank ownership
This table presents the results of multivariate regression analysis of operating performance for three
different samples (all firms, survivor firms, 5-year balanced panel), using OLS estimation. The de-
pendent variables are the ratio of interest income to average earning assets and the ratio of interest
expenses to average interest bearing liabilities. The excluded ownership dummy is Global MNB. The
following controls are included in all models: listed company, # foreign subsidiaries in sub-Saharan
Africa of GUO, GDP per capita (host), HHI (t-1), minimum capital requirements (host). All models
include time fixed effects. Models 1 and 3 include additional controls: minimum capital adequacy
ratio (host), prohibition of entry via JV (host), prohibition of entry via branch (host), East Africa,
West Africa, and Central Africa. Constants are included but not reported. Standard errors are robust
to heteroskedasticity and are adjusted for firm clustering with values reported beneath each coeffi-
cient estimate in parenthesis. The dependent variables are Winsorized at 1%. *, ** and *** indicate
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Interest income Interest expenses
/avg earning assets /avg int bearing liabilities
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All firms (657)
Regional African MNB -0.283 0.540 1.141*** 1.716***
(1.132) (0.942) (0.380) (0.372)
Domestic bank 2.459** 2.055** 2.308*** 1.864***
(1.177) (0.861) (0.344) (0.327)
Emerging MNB -2.570* -1.954* -0.144 -0.258
(1.437) (1.073) (0.469) (0.382)
Observations 1,469 1,791 1,464 1,787
Adjusted R-squared 0.242 0.354 0.346 0.436
Host country FE
Sample with survivor firms (495)
Regional African MNB -0.491 0.435 1.102*** 1.687***
(1.145) (0.966) (0.381) (0.375)
Domestic bank 1.841 1.700* 1.981*** 1.699***
(1.204) (0.876) (0.349) (0.319)
Emerging MNB -2.800* -2.084* -0.265 -0.332
(1.432) (1.073) (0.465) (0.377)
Observations 1,390 1,712 1,384 1,707
Adjusted R-squared 0.244 0.344 0.359 0.428
Host country FE
5-year balanced panel (217)
Regional African MNB 0.373 1.343 1.369*** 1.630***
(1.417) (1.369) (0.430) (0.469)
Domestic bank 1.619 1.524 1.751*** 1.589***
(1.358) (1.128) (0.378) (0.385)
Emerging MNB -2.464* -2.590** -0.299 -0.501
(1.426) (1.234) (0.461) (0.423)
Observations 665 785 662 782
Adjusted R-squared 0.253 0.305 0.500 0.507
Host country FE
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Table 7: Level of bad loans and bank ownership
This table presents the results of multivariate regression analyses of bad loans for three different
samples (all firms, survivor firms, 5-year balanced panel), using OLS estimation. The dependent
variables are the ratio of non-performing loans to gross loans and the ratio of impaired loans to equity.
The excluded ownership dummy is Global MNB. The following controls are included in models 2, 3, 5
and 6: listed company, # foreign subsidiaries in sub-Saharan Africa of GUO, GDP per capita (host),
HHI (t-1), minimum capital requirements (host). Models 2 and 5 include additional controls: minimum
capital adequacy ratio (host), prohibition of entry via JV (host), prohibition of entry via branch (host),
East Africa, West Africa, and Central Africa. Constants are included but not reported. Variable
definitions are in Table A.3 in the Appendix. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and
are adjusted for firm clustering with values reported beneath each coefficient estimate in parenthesis.
The dependent variables are Winsorized at 1%. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
NPL/gross loans Impaired loans/equity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All firms (657)
Regional African MNB 3.270*** 1.941 1.693 15.173** 25.366*** 14.377*
(1.166) (1.628) (1.568) (5.984) (8.072) (7.871)
Domestic bank 4.442*** 3.653*** 2.554** 6.590 9.582* 10.376*
(1.123) (1.303) (1.281) (4.877) (5.446) (5.679)
Emerging MNB -1.662 -0.247 0.001 -14.731*** -3.473 -1.718
(1.098) (1.309) (1.192) (4.862) (5.947) (5.428)
Observations 1,435 969 1,121 1,477 995 1,150
Adjusted R-squared 0.047 0.156 0.223 0.032 0.101 0.167
Controls
Year FE
Host Country FE
Sample with survivor firms (495)
Regional African MNB 2.964** 1.660 1.546 15.953*** 28.716*** 16.609**
(1.171) (1.677) (1.641) (6.143) (8.199) (8.098)
Domestic bank 3.735*** 3.533*** 2.471* 3.161 7.898 6.922
(1.141) (1.319) (1.272) (4.850) (5.333) (5.337)
Emerging MNB -1.662 -0.329 -0.112 -14.731*** -3.605 -2.407
(1.098) (1.278) (1.158) (4.863) (5.948) (5.438)
Observations 1,358 901 1,053 1,401 928 1,083
Adjusted R-squared 0.040 0.140 0.227 0.036 0.107 0.177
Controls
Year FE
Host Country FE
5-year balanced panel (217)
Regional African MNB 2.337* 3.432* 3.175 11.949* 24.919*** 18.147**
(1.368) (1.903) (2.026) (6.464) (8.195) (9.069)
Domestic bank 0.863 1.262 1.209 -1.046 8.712* 9.543**
(1.043) (1.031) (0.994) (4.765) (4.773) (4.539)
Emerging MNB -0.813 0.492 1.563 -8.415 2.381 6.730
(1.531) (1.409) (1.448) (6.848) (6.082) (6.898)
Observations 705 480 550 718 491 561
Adjusted R-squared 0.015 0.098 0.173 0.033 0.116 0.175
Controls
Year FE
Host Country FE
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Table 8: Determinants of the presence of banks by category of ownership
This table presents the results of regression of the total market shares of regional African banks
(models 1-3) and global banks (models 4-6) in each host country for each year over the 2003-2012
sample period, including all firms, using tobit maximum likelihood estimation. Variable definitions
are in Table A.3 in the Appendix. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and are clustered
at the host country level with values reported beneath each coefficient estimate in parenthesis.*, **
and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Market Shares of: Africa MNB Global MNB
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
HHI (t-1) 0.213 0.198 0.366 -0.253 -0.228 -0.299
(0.463) (0.464) (0.396) (0.448) (0.432) (0.417)
Min. capital requirements 0.000 0.001 -0.006*** 0.002 0.001 0.006***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Min. capital adequacy ratio -4.001 -3.970 -2.041 1.472 1.165 -0.080
(3.951) (3.966) (2.995) (2.658) (2.436) (2.118)
Bad Governance -0.019 -0.016 -0.161 0.042 0.019 0.090
(0.145) (0.145) (0.103) (0.106) (0.111) (0.116)
GDP per capita -0.004* -0.004* -0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
GDP growth -0.006 -0.005 0.022** 0.020**
(0.010) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009)
East Africa 0.104 -0.011
(0.138) (0.144)
West Africa 0.543*** -0.321**
(0.165) (0.152)
Central Africa 0.291** -0.103
(0.135) (0.151)
Observations 278 278 278 278 278 278
Pseudo R2 0.247 0.247 0.247 0.247 0.247 0.247
Year FE
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Table 9: Blinder-Oaxaca two-fold decomposition
This table presents a two-fold decomposition of the ROE of global banks and regional African banks,
using the Blinder-Oaxaca method.
ROE Coef. Std. Dev. P > |z|
Overall
Global MNB (439 obs.) 29.074 1.325 0.000
Regional African MNB (579 obs.) 4.933 2.552 0.053
Difference 24.142 2.876 0.000
Explained 1.953 1.384 0.158
Unexplained 22.189 2.651 0.000
Explained
HHI (t-1) -0.470 0.271 0.083
min. capital requirements -0.159 0.338 0.638
min capital adequacy ratio 0.421 0.379 0.267
Bad Governance -0.032 0.125 0.798
GDP per cap 0.686 0.600 0.253
GDP growth 0.012 0.157 0.937
East Africa -0.072 0.179 0.688
West Africa 1.446 1.491 0.332
Central Africa 0.121 0.282 0.669
Unexplained
HHI (t-1) 0.447 3.641 0.902
min. capital requirements -0.514 0.582 0.377
min capital adequacy ratio 57.698 15.003 0.000
Bad Governance -5.023 3.505 0.152
GDP per cap -2.994 1.643 0.068
GDP growth -2.336 3.452 0.499
East Africa 8.519 2.003 0.000
West Africa 14.060 2.591 0.000
Central Africa 4.498 1.583 0.005
constant -52.164 16.419 0.001
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Table 10: Allocation of loans by maturity (long term loans in % of total loans)
This table presents the results of multivariate regression analysis of banks’ loan portfolio allocation by
maturity over the 2003-2012 sample period, including all firms, using OLS estimation. The dependent
variable is loans with maturity over one year in percentage of total loans. The excluded ownership
dummy is Global MNB. Variable definitions are in Table A.3 in the Appendix. The following controls
are included in model 3: listed company, government ownership, # foreign subsidiaries in sub-Saharan
Africa of GUO, GDP per capita (host), HHI (t-1). Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and
are adjusted for firm clustering with values reported beneath each coefficient estimate in parenthesis.*,
** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3)
Regional African MNB -0.095* -0.050 0.049
(0.052) (0.051) (0.057)
Emerging MNB -0.012 -0.053 0.032
(0.064) (0.056) (0.049)
Domestic bank -0.001 -0.028 0.023
(0.052) (0.046) (0.051)
Observations 519 519 456
Adjusted R-squared 0.015 0.282 0.340
Firm and host country controls
Year FE
Host Country FE
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Figure 1: Ranking of firms by their level of vertical capabilities
Adapted from Sutton (2012)
Figure 2: Banks by category of ownership
Source: Author calculations based on BankScope database
79
Figure 3: Banks’ entry by year
Note: information only available for 303 banks out of 657.
Source: BankScope database and banks’ websites.
Figure 4: Banks’ exit by year
Source: BankScope database and banks’ websites
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Appendix 1
81
Table A.1: Host country banking sector in 2012 as reported in BankScope database
Global MNB Regional Emerging Domestic Total
MNB African MNB MNB bank
Angola 7 0 2 8 17
Benin 0 11 0 0 11
Botswana 3 2 4 7 16
Burkina Faso 2 7 0 1 10
Burundi 0 2 0 5 7
Cameroon 6 5 0 5 16
Cape Verde 4 2 0 1 7
Central African Republic 0 3 0 0 3
Chad 1 5 0 0 6
Comoros 1 0 0 0 1
Congo Dem. Rep. 4 4 2 4 14
Congo, Rep. 1 6 0 1 8
Cote d’Ivoire 4 9 0 6 19
Djibouti 2 2 0 0 4
Equatorial Guinea 2 2 0 0 4
Eritrea 0 0 0 2 2
Ethiopia 0 0 0 10 10
Gabon 1 3 0 2 6
Ghana 3 8 3 10 24
Guinea 3 5 2 0 10
Guinea-Bissau 0 1 0 0 1
Kenya 5 4 7 40 56
Lesotho 1 0 2 1 4
Liberia 0 3 0 2 5
Madagascar 3 5 0 0 8
Malawi 1 1 1 5 8
Mali 0 7 0 4 11
Mauritania 2 1 0 6 9
Mauritius 5 0 6 11 22
Mozambique 6 3 4 3 16
Namibia 2 0 2 5 9
Niger 1 5 1 2 9
Nigeria 5 2 1 72 80
Rwanda 1 3 0 7 11
Sao Tome and Principe 1 2 0 1 4
Senegal 2 8 0 4 14
Seychelles 1 1 1 3 6
Sierra Leone 2 5 1 3 11
Somalia 0 0 0 1 1
South Africa 9 0 4 47 60
Swaziland 1 0 2 1 4
Tanzania 5 10 6 10 31
The Gambia 1 5 2 1 9
Togo 0 3 0 5 8
Uganda 4 10 2 8 24
Zambia 3 5 6 5 19
Zimbabwe 2 2 1 17 22
Total 107 162 62 326 657
Source: Author calculations based on Orbis database
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Figure A.1: Global banks by country of origin
Source: BankScope database and banks’ websites
Figure A.2: Emerging banks by country of origin
Source: BankScope database and banks’ websites
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Figure A.3: Regional African banks by country of origin
Source: BankScope database and banks’ websites
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Chapter 2
Internal capital market practices
of multinational banks
Evidence from South Africa
2.1 Introduction
This chapter examines the financial advantages and drawbacks of being part of a
large multinational group by analyzing the flows of internal capital between foreign
affiliates of multinational banks located in an emerging economy, South Africa, and
their headquarters. It discusses under which conditions parent banks are a source
of financial support for their foreign affiliates, and under which conditions group
affiliation may represent a source of vulnerability.
The literature on business groups has provided significant theoretical and em-
pirical evidence on the advantages of being part of a large group. Although this
literature focuses on diversified groups, it also offers important insights into multi-
national banking groups with affiliates engaged in very similar activities. First, this
literature has emphasized that the benefits of group affiliation depend on the in-
stitutional context. Khanna and Palepu (2000), using the transaction cost theory
developed by Coase (1937) and Williamson (1985), suggest that in countries where
market failures (or “institutional voids”) are important -limited enforcement of con-
tracts, inadequate rule of law, lack of financial intermediaries-, and especially where
capital markets are not functioning well, affiliation to a large group can provide
benefits as economies of scale and scope allow large business groups to replicate in-
ternally intermediation functions. Furthermore, the benefits of affiliation to business
groups extend beyond internal capital markets to also include internal labor mar-
kets both for skilled employees and executives when skills are scarce in an economy
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(Khanna and Yafeh, 2007). However, as Khanna and Rivkin (2001) point out, group
affiliation entails costs and the effect of affiliation on members’ profits is ambiguous.
Some of the costs are directly related to the sharing of profit and risks by group
members. Other costs are related to agency issues leading to mis-allocation of cap-
ital, tunneling of resources by owners of business groups (see Bertrand, Mehta and
Mullainhathan (2002)) and suboptimal decisions due to centralization of decisions.
Despite the costs associated with business groups, the payoffs may be sufficiently
high at an aggregate level to encourage the formation of such organizations. In
addition, while some papers have pointed to a diversification discount1 in developed
economies, especially the United States (Montgomery, 1994; Rajan, Servaes and
Zingales, 2000), in emerging markets, the evidence provided so far have suggested
the existence of a diversification premium when capital markets are sufficiently weak
(Khanna and Palepu, 2000; Khanna and Rivkin, 2001).
As suggested by the business groups literature, in developing countries where
interbank and capital markets are underdeveloped and a large part of the population
is unbanked, the ability to receive funding through internal capital markets at low
cost and in large quantity might present a significant advantage for foreign banks’
affiliates. In other words, internal capital may substitute for external capital when
local market conditions are weak. However, these financial inter-linkages among
group members also imply that foreign affiliates may become a source of internal
funds in case of an adverse shock to the balance sheet of the head office or of another
group member. In such case, abrupt capital reallocation to another part of the group
may alter the financial position of a lending affiliate, which might consequently lead
to a reduction of its credit to local customers. In this scenario, an outflow of capital
will have consequences not only for the foreign affiliate but also for the host country
where it is located.
I consider two different motives for the transfer of funds across a group, following
the Morgan, Rime and Strahan (2004) model of interstate banking, where internal
capital flows across affiliates of a banking group. The first motive is a “support”
motive: the parent bank transfers more funds to its subsidiaries when there is a
tightening of the conditions in the host external capital markets or when the foreign
bank affiliate is under financial distress (stretched liquidity or solvency position).
The second motive is related to investment considerations. It posits that the parent
bank transfers more funds when there are more investment opportunities or faster
growth in a foreign affiliate’s host country, relative to the other countries where the
1The “diversification discount” refers to the loss of firm value associated with group diversifi-
cation.
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banking group is present. I then examine whether these additional internal funds
are used to increase the supply of credit locally. As such, this research aims to (1)
examine the internal capital market strategies of parent companies in relation to
their foreign affiliates by examining simultaneously firm factors as well as home and
host country factors: is parent bank primarily driven by investment considerations
when allocating its internal funding (which could exacerbate macroeconomic pro-
cyclicality in the host country) or by support considerations (which would be anti-
cyclical)? (2) document how funding shocks such as experienced during banking
crises affect reallocation of internal capital and (3) examine the link between internal
funding and bank credit: do transfers of internal funds help recipient banks’ affiliates
to expand local credit?
Much of the empirical literature on business groups has relied on lending and fi-
nancial performance comparison between affiliated and unaffiliated firms to examine
the existence and mode of operations of internal capital markets, without directly
observing this channel. In this chapter, I revisit this issue by using a novel database
on banks operating in South Africa which records stocks of internal funds. This
data is provided by the South African central bank which publishes on its website
detailed information on the balance sheet of banks operating in South Africa, in-
cluding information on internal loans and deposits from and to the banking group.
To the best of my knowledge, this data on internal group loans and internal group
deposits of banks located in South Africa have never been explored for research on
internal capital markets. This data allow me to examine directly the transfers of in-
ternal capital within multinational banking groups, focusing on the benefits of group
affiliation for foreign affiliates located in South Africa. Furthermore, South Africa
is a particularly appropriate place to examine the issue of internal capital allocation
for two main reasons. First, as an emerging economy its external capital markets
are not as developed as those of developed economies, and as such internal capital
might be an important source of funding for foreign banks. Second, a large variety of
foreign banks operate in South Africa, both from developed and emerging countries,
with important heterogeneity in terms of home countries’ macroeconomic conditions
and groups’ international exposure. This heterogeneity allows me to examine how
internal capital flows are impacted by changes in macroeconomic conditions in the
other countries where a banking group operates. In particular, it is an interesting
setting to examine how a banking crisis in a developing/emerging region (east Asia)
impacts the funding position of foreign banks in another emerging economy (South
Africa).
The empirical analysis provides evidence for a support motive to internal fund-
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ing, as foreign affiliates receive on average more funding when their solvency ratio
declines. However, when we take into consideration the macroeconomic environ-
ment of the host country and the investment opportunities in the other countries
where a group operates, which I label the “Outside Option”, the results indicate
that the parent bank is particularly responsive to macroeconomic conditions in its
other locations. In other words, when conditions in the home country and in the
other countries of operation of the parent bank are improving, the volume of internal
funding received by a foreign affiliate decreases. To further examine the implication
of a systemic banking crisis in the “Outside Option” for foreign affiliates’ access to
internal capital I use the event of the 1997 Asian financial crisis. I estimate a differ-
ence in difference model and find that South African affiliates belonging to banking
groups with high exposure to East Asian Crisis countries experienced a significant
drop in their net internal funding position during the crisis, relative to South African
affiliates of less exposed groups. This result suggests that parent bank of more ex-
posed groups reallocated capital away from South Africa to support their affiliates
in east Asia. Finally, I proceed to examine the link between the reception of inter-
nal funding and the expansion of local bank credit, using an instrumental variable
technique. I find a positive impact of internal funding on bank credit expansion in
the mortgage market, suggesting that foreign affiliates do not only use this capital
to acquire government securities or to invest abroad, as it has often been reported in
Africa (see Demetriades and Fielding, 2009; Andrianova et al., 2011; Beck, Maimbo,
Faye and Triki, 2011), but also “pass it on” to the local economy by expanding their
domestic lending.
This chapter makes three contributions. First, it contributes to the literature on
the benefits of internal capital markets (Gopalan, Nanda and Seru, 2007; De Haas
and Van Lelyveld, 2010) by relying on direct internal transactions, instead of indi-
rectly relying on an investment-cash flow sensitivity approach (e.g., Hoshi, Kayshap,
and Scharfstein, 1991) about which some doubts have been raised (Kaplan and Zin-
gales, 1997). Furthermore, it examines internal lending in an international setting,
examining affiliates of companies from different countries of origin, while most of
the literature has focused on internal capital markets inside groups from a single
country of origin (Gopalan et al., 2007; Cetorelli and Goldberg, 2012). In so do-
ing, it contributes to the international strategy literature, examining an alternative
channel (internal capital) that might affect the international competition between
multinational firms, distinct from firms’ productive capabilities or operational pro-
cesses.
Second, this research examines the internal fund channel for bank credit, instead
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of relying on comparisons between credit growth of foreign affiliates of multina-
tional banks and of domestic banks to infer internal capital market practices as has
traditionally be done in the literature (Popov and Udell, 2012).
Third, this research also provides evidence on the relationship between the or-
ganizational form of the foreign affiliates (as branches or subsidiaries) and their
integration with the rest of the group through participation in internal capital mar-
kets. The foreign banking literature has traditionally relied on Orbis or BankScope
balance sheet information (Allen, Jackowicz and Kowalewski, 2013) which tends to
under-report financial information on bank branches, and has focused instead on
subsidiaries’ lending, therefore overlooking lending by branches. However, the or-
ganizational form of foreign affiliates has important implications for the financial
stability of both host and home countries as it determines, to a certain extent,
foreign affiliates’ ability to tap into internal funds (Fiechter et al., 2011).
The remaining part of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 presents
the traditional approaches adopted in the empirical literature to examine internal
capital market. Section 2.3 develops the research hypotheses. Section 2.4 presents
the data and provides some descriptive statistics. Section 2.5 examines empirically
the motives for intragroup transfer of funds. Section 2.6 analyzes the impact of a
systemic banking crisis (the 1997 east Asian financial crisis) in countries where a
group has foreign affiliates on reallocation of internal capital inside the group, while
Section 2.7 documents the relation between internal group funding and bank credit.
Section 2.8 concludes.
2.2 Empirical literature on internal capital mar-
kets: direct and indirect evidence
The empirical literature has attempted to examine the role and functioning of inter-
nal capital markets by first demonstrating the existence of such a market through
evidence of cross-subsidization (Lamont, 1997) and then by answering the ques-
tion of whether or not this reallocation of capital is efficient (Shin and Stulz, 1998;
Scharfstein and Stein, 2000; Rajan, Servaes and Zingales, 2000). However, most of
the empirical research has been hampered by the difficulty to obtain information on
financial flows between group affiliates. As a consequence, the evidence on the func-
tioning of internal capital market has mainly been indirect, based on comparisons
between investment behavior of conglomerates and stand-alone firms (Rajan et al.,
2000) or investment behavior of firms before and after being spun off from their
parent firms (Gertner, Powers and Sharfstein, 2002). More specifically on banking
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groups, work by Campello (2002) has relied on differences in responses to exoge-
nous shocks to external capital markets across small stand-alone banks and banks
that are affiliates of financial conglomerates to draw inferences about the role of
internal capital markets. Related work in the international banking literature by
De Haas and Van Lelyveld (2010) has examined how financial characteristics of the
parent bank influence their subsidiaries’ credit growth, controlling for subsidiaries’
characteristics as well as home and host country factors. The authors find that
multinational bank subsidiaries with financially strong parent banks are able to ex-
pand their lending faster. By comparing the lending behavior of domestic banks
to that of the subsidiaries of foreign banks, the authors in this empirical tradition
indirectly infer the internal capital practices of multinational banks.
Research using direct evidence on internal capital markets has only emerged
recently due to the availability of specific datasets allowing researchers to directly
track internal flows of capital. Few papers, so far, have provided direct evidence
on internal lending. Gopalan, Nanda and Seru (2007) exploit time-series variation
in internal loans of Indian business group to examine the motives for the transfer
of resources across group firms. They find evidence of support motives, with group
extending loans to financially weaker firms to avoid default by a group firm and the
resulting negative reputational spillovers to the rest of the group. More recently,
Glaser, Lopez-de-Silanes and Sautner (2013), using a dataset drawn from the inter-
nal accounting system of a large multinational conglomerate, examine planned and
actual internal capital allocation to its 20 business units. They provide empirical
evidence that internal capital allocations are affected by managerial power and con-
nections, especially in times of financial slack, producing inefficiencies in resource
allocation. In the banking literature, recent work by Cetorelli and Goldberg (2012)
also uses internal capital data to examine internal capital practices in US banks
during the latest financial crisis. They find evidence of a locational pecking order,
whereby parents draw more intensively on funds from traditional funding locations
to buffer shocks, while leaving affiliate locations that are important for the parent
bank revenues relatively protected from liquidity reallocation inside the group. Fi-
nally, Cremers, Huang and Sautner (2013) look at capital allocation data in a retail
banking group consisting of 181 members banks, in which bank members cannot
access the external capital market. They find that capital transfers from the head-
quarters compensate for deposit shortfalls, thus suggesting that the headquarters
provide an inter-temporal insurance function. They also find, like the subsequent
work of Glaser et al. (2013), that the headquarters allocate more funds to more in-
fluential banks. Moreover, they find that the loan growth of more-influential banks
100
is much less sensitive to their own deposit growth, suggesting that their deposit
smoothing is facilitated by internal financial transfers.
In sum, the recent empirical literature on internal capital markets suggests that
the support motive is an important driver for internal capital allocation, but that
group members do not face equal access to internal capital. Indeed, empirical evi-
dence available so far has shown that access is also partly driven by connections and
managerial influence, as well as by the importance of the bank for group revenues.
As direct empirical evidence on internal capital market has so far been limited
to groups from the same country of origin, it has precluded an analysis of the
competitive advantage provided by internal capital flows to subsidiaries operating in
a same host country but with different conditions in their home country. In addition,
internal capital markets when operated across national borders have repercussions
that go beyond the reputational effects caused by the default of a group member
on the rest of the group, as documented by Gopalan et al. (2007). In the banking
sector, depending on whether or not the parent bank repatriates liquidity from its
subsidiaries to the headquarters in times of crisis, internal capital markets can either
accelerate or dampen the transmission of financial and economic crises, beyond the
effects of the cross-border claims channel. For instance, Popov and Udell (2012) show
that foreign banks’ affiliates reduced their lending more aggressively than domestic
banks in the CEE countries during the global financial crisis of 2008. At the same
time, these financial inter-linkages can have a positive and stabilizing effect on the
host country credit market if the parent bank supports its foreign affiliates when local
conditions in the host countries worsen and external capital is scarce. For instance,
De Haas and Van Lelyveld (2004) examining foreign banks in CEE countries found
that the credit supply of foreign banks’ subsidiaries did not decrease during financial
crises or economic downturns, contrary to domestic bank. The dataset used in this
research allows these issues to be revisited by directly examining the functioning of
internal capital markets inside multinational banks and their repercussions on host
credit markets.
The following section presents the research hypotheses before turning to the
presentation of the dataset.
2.3 Research hypotheses
Theoretically, the question of the allocation of funds by corporate headquarters
across business and geographic units has been extensively analyzed from an infor-
mation and agency perspective. However, no clear answer has emerged on how well
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internal capital markets perform in the theoretical literature. On the “bright side”,
Williamson (1970) argues that internal capital markets are more efficient than exter-
nal markets because corporate headquarters are better informed about investment
opportunities than external capital suppliers. Essentially, internal capital markets
are formed by the pooling of internally generated cash flows and allocation to units
is optimally determined by units’ investments prospects. The headquarters are
then engaged in winner-picking activities, with larger allocations granted to units
with better investment opportunities (Stein, 1997). On the “dark side”, Meyer,
Milgrom and Roberts (1992), Scharfstein and Stein (2000), Rajan, Servaes and Zin-
gales (2000) and Wulf (2009) argue that internal capital markets may be distorted by
rent seeking behavior of divisional managers. Motivated by rent-seeking or empire-
building, unit CEOs try to obtain larger capital allocations and use their managerial
influence in order to obtain more funds. As a consequence of influence, allocations
of capital to these units are larger than what they would be if allocations were only
based on investment opportunities, and internal capital markets are inefficient.
In this chapter, I follow de Haas and Van Lelyveld (2010) in relying on the inter-
state banking model developed by Morgan, Rime and Strahan (2004) to examine
internal capital allocation by multinational banks. Morgan et al. (2004) extend
the Holmström and Tirole (1997) model to a two-state version where capital can
flow between the two states.2 This model can easily be adapted to an inter-country
setting to examine the international allocation of internal capital by multinational
banks. In such a setting, multinational banks are capital constrained and risk neutral
and they re-allocate capital between countries to equalize the rate of return on
capital across countries. The model generates two propositions.
The first one is that the impact of a bank capital crunch on its lending in one
2This model was initially developed by Morgan et al. (2004) to investigate how integration
of bank ownership across states in the U.S. in the early 1980s affected economic volatility within
states. The authors compare the impact of collateral and bank capital shocks under an interstate
banking regime, where capital can flow freely across states, versus an intrastate regime, where
capital flows across states are restricted. Building on Holmström and Tirole (1997), their basic
model comprises risk neutral firms, banks and investors. Firms choose between a good project
and two bad projects, with one bad project having higher private benefits to the firm than the
other. Furthermore, the good project has a relatively higher likelihood of success than the two bad
projects, and all the projects return R if they succeed, 0 otherwise. Through monitoring banks
can prevent investments with large private benefits for the firm to occur, but not those with small
private benefits. As such, banks incur monitoring costs and they must invest enough of their own
capital in the project to be credible monitors. Firms borrow both informed capital from the bank
and uninformed capital from investors. The authors show that in the interstate model, where
informed capital can move freely to equalize the equilibrium rate of return in informed capital
markets, bank capital shocks have a smaller impact on investment than in the intrastate model,
while the impact of firm collateral shocks gets amplified (see appendix in Morgan et al. (2004) for
proofs).
102
country A is mitigated by the availability of additional bank capital from country B.
As a consequence of this extra capital inflow, bank lending in country A decreases by
a lower amount than in the situation where there would not be extra capital available
from another state3. The intuition is the following: a reduction in bank loan supply
in country A increases bank returns in A, which attracts credit from country B and
eventually equalizes rates of return on capital between the two countries (Morgan
et al., 2004).4 From this inter-state model, I derive the following hypothesis, which
reflects the “support motive” for the allocation of internal funds:
Hypothesis 1a The quantity of internal group funding from a parent bank to its
foreign affiliate is negatively related to this affiliate’s financial
strength.
I define financial strength broadly, both in terms of capital and liquidity position5.
A sharp decline in a foreign bank affiliate’s capital position, related for instance to a
systemic banking crisis in the host country leading to a large share of non-performing
loans in the bank’s balance sheet, should prompt the parent bank to transfer internal
funds to this affiliate in order to avoid bank’s insolvency. Furthermore, in case of
high refinancing constraints in the host country’s wholesale market, leading to a
stretched liquidity position, bank affiliates of a large group should be able to tap
into internal market to avoid default. In both cases, internal capital markets should
reduce volatility in the host country.
The second proposition is that a collateral squeeze in country A will have a
negative impact on bank lending in that state because the decrease in the rate of
return on capital after the collateral squeeze will lead to a capital flight to the bank
in country B6. The idea is that a weak demand in country A, due to declines in
borrower wealth or collateral, will lead to an outflow of capital from country A to
country B, where the rate of return on capital is higher (Morgan et al., 2004). A
collateral squeeze could be related to real-economic shocks such as a sharp reduction
in economic growth in the country of operation. The parent bank reallocates its
3The authors also show how this positive effect on lending is reinforced by the smaller reduction
in pledgeable income that can be promised to uninformed investors by firms in country A, given
that the amount lent by banks to firms in country A decreases less.
4Note that if capital could not fow from one country to another, the authors show that the
borrowers would bear the full brunt of the shock, with lower loan quantities and higher loan
interest rates.
5While bank capital and liquidity are two different concepts in practice there are important
interplay between risks to a bank’s capital and liquidity positions, and changes in a bank’s capital
position can affect its liquidity position and vice versa (Farag, Harland and Nixon, 2013).
6Similarly to proposition 1, this reduction in informed capital available to firms is exacerbated
by a reduction in uninformed capital, due to the reduction of pledgeable income that can be
promised by firms to uninformed investors.
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capital where it is more profitable, from low-return to high-return countries: this is
the “investment” motive7. As such, I formulate the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1b The quantity of internal group funding from a parent bank to
its foreign affiliate is positively related to the economic growth
(lending opportunities) in the affiliate’s host country and nega-
tively related to the economic growth in the other countries where
the group is operating.
In this situation, the reallocation of internal capital by multinational banks may
amplify business cycles, the group transferring more funds to foreign affiliates located
in host countries with strong macro-economic environments and lending opportuni-
ties.
Furthermore, and as an extension of the first set of hypotheses, a capital squeeze
faced by affiliates located in the other countries of operations of the banking group,
such as may occur during systemic banking crises, should lead to a reallocation of
internal group funding away from foreign affiliates in non-crisis countries to support
foreign affiliates located in countries where the crisis is occurring. The existence
of financial inter-linkages between entities of a same group leads to the following
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2 The quantity of internal group funding to a foreign affiliate de-
creases when other group affiliates face a systemic banking crisis
leading to rapid reallocation of internal funding inside the group.
Two remarks are important at this point. The first one is that the “investment”
motive and the “support” motive are not necessarily exclusive, although one may
predominate over the other. The second one is that these hypotheses are based
on the assumption of a “bright side” view of internal capital market allocation and
do not take into account the impact of managerial influence on capital allocation.
Although the Morgan et al. model is based on the incentive model of Holmström
and Tirole it does not include influence considerations in capital allocation. I do
not control for managerial influence by the foreign affiliate due to the difficulty
to capture this variable in this particular dataset and the difficulty to compare
influence across groups using a single measurement8. Failure to confirm empirically
7In the literature, this has also been referred to as a “substitution effect” whereby parent banks
allocate more internal capital to their subsidiiaries in fast-growing economies. See De Haas and
Van Lelyveld (2010).
8In the recent empirical literature on internal capital markets, Cremers et al. (2013) examine
the role of influence in internal capital allocation in one large retail banking group. They measure
the influence of a bank in the organization by the ratio of a bank’s share of voting rights divided by
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these hypotheses could be related to managerial influences leading to sub-optimal
internal capital allocation, distorting the motives of transfer. However, given that
most of the South African foreign affiliates in the sample represent only a small
portion of the total assets of their group, these affiliates are unlikely to be able
to significantly influence capital allocation in their favor and the estimates in this
research can therefore be considered as conservative.
Finally, the mechanism that underlies the two propositions is the group’s re-
sponse to variation in its foreign affiliates’ investment prospects or solvency, ceteris
paribus, through the channel of internal capital. In other words, foreign affiliates use
internal capital to compensate for a reduction in their capital base, to profit from
higher return on capital in their host country or, more generally, to compensate for
the insufficiency of available external capital. Either way, an increase in internal
capital should result in an expansion of bank credit to firms, or at least should help
avoid declines in the credit supply when the capital position of the affiliate is weak9.
This will need to be tested empirically. The advantage of the data is that instead
of making a conjecture on the inflow of internal capital from the observed variation
in bank credit as a result of an exogenous shock, I can directly examine the internal
capital channel.
Hypothesis 3 An increase in (net) internal funding to a foreign affiliate leads
to an expansion of this affiliate’s lending in its host country,
ceteris paribus.
In the next section, I present the data and empirical framework on which I rely
to examine directly the functioning of internal capital market inside multinational
banks.
2.4 Data, empirical framework and descriptive statis-
tics
2.4.1 Data
The data on internal loans come from the central bank of South Africa (Resbank).
The Resbank requires all banks operating in South Africa to provide detailed balance
its share of ownership rights in headquarters; a member bank with more voting rights relative to
its ownership rights is perceived as more influential because it can bargain for more favors relative
to its ownership share.
9Given the fungibility of capital it is not possible to track the specific uses of internal funds,
however, what the model implies is that variation in internal capital causes variation in bank credit,
ceteris paribus.
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sheet information on a monthly basis. The banks have to disclose information on
group bank loans and deposits, under both assets and liabilities categories. This
data, collected under the format Banks DI900 Returns is available from January
1993 to December 2007. After this date, the reporting format changes (BA900),
with the categories “bank group funding” and “interbank funding” being merged
into a single category, and it becomes impossible to isolate the stock of internal
bank funding (see Table 1 for an overview of a simplified DI900 reporting format of
the Resbank). Therefore, I only use the files for the 1993-2007 period. The data
are stored in separate excel spreadsheets for each month and each bank. I only
compile the information for the end-of-quarter months of March, June, September
and December. This information is available to the public on the website of the
Resbank (http://www.resbank.co.za) but to the best of my knowledge, this data
on internal loans and deposits have never been explored for research on internal
capital market.
This dataset is completed by financial and ownership information on banks from
Bureau Van Dijk’s BankScope database. Banks’ ownership is defined as follow: I
use the global ultimate owner indicator of BankScope database and update it using
the same definition by looking on banks’ websites when the information is missing
in BankScope. A company is an Ultimate Owner (UO) if it controls at least 50.01%
of the entity and has no identified shareholders or if its shareholder’s percentages
are not known. For banks which have a dispersed ownership and for which there is
no ultimate owners controlling at least 50.01% of the company, I then determine the
country of origin of the bank based on the country of the owner with the highest
percentage of shares.
I obtain an unbalanced panel of 82 banks, consisting both of domestic banks and
of foreign banks’ affiliates. 80% of these banks are commercial banks or saving banks
while the rest are either investment banks or securities firm. These banks have a
unique bank identification number provided by the Resbank. The names of some
of the banks in the sample have changed over time due to mergers, acquisitions or
divestments at the group level (for instance ING Baring became ING in 2004), but
the unique number ensures that we can follow the same bank over time (see Table 2
for a list of the banks included in the sample). For mergers or acquisitions between
banks in South Africa, the acquiring bank keeps its identification number, while the
target bank ceases to report financial information.10 Mergers and acquisitions may
10For instance Nedcor Group was formed on 1 January 2003, combining Nedcor Bank Ltd. (ac-
quirer), BoE Bank and Cape of Good Hope Bank into one legal entity and it was subsequently
renamed Nedbank Group in 2005. Nedbank Ltd. and Nedcor Bank Ltd. have thus the same identi-
fication number, while BoE and Cape of Good Hope Bank do not report any financial information
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overstate the role of internal capital market in the expansion of domestic lending;
however, over the sample period mergers and acquisitions mainly concern domestic
banks which are not the focus of the empirical analysis. Figure 1 maps the geographic
distribution of the country of origin of banks operating in South Africa. In the
sample, 60% of the banks are domestic, 27% are global multinational banks from
developed countries (henceforth, Global MNB) and 13% are multinational banks
from emerging countries (henceforth, Emerging MNB).
Concerning the organizational form of the foreign affiliates in the sample, branches
are the most common organizational form.11 In 2007, among the 22 foreign affiliates,
14 were organized as branches and 7 as subsidiaries.12 Branches tend to be preferred
as a form of foreign bank expansion given their lower cost of establishment compared
to a wholly owned subsidiary, while still allowing the bank to conduct a full range of
banking businesses (Casu, Girardone and Molyneux, 2006). Furthermore, the level
of development of the local markets also drives the organizational choice of foreign
banks: when it is easier for foreign affiliates to raise wholesale funding locally to
supplement retail deposits, a decentralized organization is favored, whereas the for-
eign affiliate relies much more on its parent’s funding when local markets are weak
(Fiechter et al., 2011).
2.4.2 Measuring internal group funding
I use two main variables to examine internal capital markets. The first variable,
internal funding is a liability item reported on the balance sheet and indicates the
funding that the bank owes to its group, either in the form of deposits or loans.
In Table 1, internal funding corresponds to the sum of items [A], [B], [C] and [D].
Loans or deposits denominated in foreign currency are reported in South African
Rands so there are no currency conversion issues. The reporting banks also make
deposit and loans to the rest of the group, reported under item [E] in Table 1.
This corresponds to internal lending and it is reported as an asset item on the
bank balance sheet. The difference between internal lending and internal funding
indicates the net internal funding position of the affiliate in relation to its group. If
the net position is positive, the affiliate is a net receiver of internal funds from its
after 2002, which avoids double counting.
11Foreign affiliates are organized differently according to their level of commitments to the host
country. Several organizational options exist, ranging from the representative office which cannot
provide banking business, the branch which is a key part of the parent bank and acts as a legal
and functional part of the parent’s headquarters, to the subsidiary which is a separate legal entity
from the parent bank with its own capital and is under the regulation of the host country (Casu,
Girardone and Molyneux, 2006).
12Foreign representatives are not included in the sample.
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group. If it is negative, the affiliate is a net provider of internal funds to its group.
I present below the calculation of these two variables:
internal funding = internal loans+ internal deposits (2.1)
net due internal funding = internal funding (liabilities)
− internal lending (assets) (2.2)
Note that I focus here on internal transfers of liquidity in the form of loans
or deposits. I do not take into account transfers of equity capital from a parent
bank to its subsidiaries which often occur in the first few months or years following
licensing or in some instances when minimum capital requirements are increased in
the host country. The reason for this choice is that, with the data at hand, it is
difficult to precisely identify the source of variation in core capital, and as such to
observe when increases in core capital are due to transfers from the parent bank, as
it regroups shares, retained earnings and other comprehensive income. This research
thus provides a conservative analysis of the role of parent banks as purveyors of bank
capital.
2.4.3 Descriptive statistics
In this section I examine the funding model of banks operating in South Africa to un-
derstand the role played by internal funding. Specifically, I evaluate the importance
of the group as a source of funding, compared to wholesale funding and customer
deposits. I also examine the net internal funding position of the banks in relation to
their group. Table 3 provides detailed definitions and sources of the variables used
in the empirical analysis. Table 4 provides descriptive statistics on selected bank
financials for the sample period 1993q1-2007q4. All nominal values are deflated by
the consumer price index (CPI) of South Africa provided by the IMF. The first half
of Table 4 groups banks in three different ownership categories: Domestic banks,
Global MNB and Emerging MNB. Domestic banks are the largest by assets, closely
followed by Global MNB while Emerging MNB have a much smaller size. The table
shows that the net internal funding position of the three categories of banks is on
average positive over the sample period, indicating that the banks are on average
net receivers of internal funds. The second half of Table 4 groups foreign banks
according to their organizational form: bank branches and bank subsidiaries. The
statistics reveal a much more limited participation of foreign bank subsidiaries in the
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internal capital markets of their group compared to foreign bank branches, which is
consistent with both the organizational set up and the legal commitments implied
by each structure.
Table 5 provides more detailed information on the funding model of the three dif-
ferent categories of banks (Domestic, Global MNB and Emerging MNB). It presents
the different sources of funding of each bank in the sample, as a percentage of their
liabilities for the period 1993q1-2007q4.
The table shows that internal group funding represented 6% of total liabilities
for domestic banks, while it was 9% for Global MNB and 3% for Emerging MNB,
over the sample period. While clearly not as important as customer deposits, this
source is however non-negligible and often more significant, in terms of amount, than
interbank funding. This suggests that the traditional interbank wholesale market
is underdeveloped in South Africa, in comparison to developed countries and that
internal funding might represent an alternative to interbank funding. On average
for all banks, interbank liabilities represented 4% of total assets over the period
studied.13
Finally the second half of Table 5 compares the funding model of foreign bank
branches to that of foreign bank subsidiaries. The difference in organizational struc-
ture is translated into sharp differences in funding patterns. Indeed, the subsidiaries
of foreign banks in the sample are heavily reliant on deposits from other parties
(close to 90% of their liabilities), while interbank and internal funding are negligible
sources of funding. On the contrary, the branches of foreign banks have a more
balanced funding model, with internal funding representing around 10% of their
liabilities over the sample period. This suggests that foreign bank subsidiaries are
relatively insulated from internal capital reallocations by their parent bank, while
branches are much more financially integrated to their group.
Most of internal funding is received in the form of internal bank deposits, while
only a small percentage is received in the form of bank loan. The fact that most of
the internal funds are under the form of deposits suggests that they are a very cheap,
if not free, source of liquidity. This is in line with Gopalan et al. (2007) analysis
of the terms of intragroup loans, who find that intragroup loans are extended at an
interest that is significantly below the corresponding borrowing rate in the market
and that these loans are negative net present value for the groups that provide them.
Grant (2011) also reports results from a survey of 38 banks from nine countries indi-
cating that most banks surveyed lacked a liquidity transfer pricing policy and that
13As a comparison, in Europe, interbank liabilities stood at around 30% of total assets for banks
in the Euro area pre-crisis (end of 2007 to third quarter of 2008) followed by a drop in the median
values to around 22% in 2011 (European Central Bank; 2012:10).
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liquidity was considered as a free good, with providers of liquidity within the groups
typically underpaid for their liquidity creation and liquidity users receiving free liq-
uidity. Furthermore, the distinction between loan and deposit has also implications
in terms of regulation. So far, most of the literature has assumed that the internal
funds are transfered in the form of loans. However, internal deposits are also an
important channel to transfer funds (Allen, Gu and Kowaleski, 2011). While both
internal loans and deposits serve the same function, they are not regulated in the
same way. In Europe, for instance, internal loans face important regulations that
restrict their use14, while internal deposits are generally not covered by any regula-
tion and disclosure requirements (Allen, Gu and Kowaleski, 2011), which could then
encourage the use of internal deposits over internal loans.
The empirical results are presented in the following three sections. Section 2.5
provides tests for hypotheses 1a and 1b on the determinants of internal funding.
Section 2.6 examines how systemic banking crises in other countries where the parent
bank has operations influence the reception of internal group funding by South
African affiliates, thus providing a test for Hypothesis 2. Section 2.7 tests Hypothesis
3 on the relation between reception of internal funding and bank lending.
2.5 Support and Investment motives
2.5.1 Estimation strategy
I analyze jointly support motives (Hypothesis 1a) and investment motives (Hypoth-
esis 1b) for internal funds transfer for the sample of foreign affiliates, examining
three sets of independent variables: the macroeconomic conditions in the host coun-
try, the macroeconomic conditions in the home country, and the macroeconomic
conditions in the “Outside Option” of the headquarters, defined here as the set of
countries in which the group already operates and which reflects alternative invest-
ment opportunities for the parent bank.
I first examine the probability of being a net receiver vs. a net provider and
then, given a positive net internal funding position, I examine the determinants of
the volume of funds received. The goal of conducting these two different estimations
is to examine whether the probability of being a net receiver (“intensive margin”) is
driven by different factors than the volume of fund received (“extensive margin”).
I create a dependent variable Internal Funding Status which has three categories:
14See Section 5 Large Exposures, Directive 2006/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 14 June 2006 relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institution,
Official Journal L 177 , 30/06/2006. Cited in Allen, Gu and Kowaleski, 2011.
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Receiver, Provider and Zero Activity. More specifically, for each time period (year-
quarter) I classify banks into Receiver if their net group funding position is positive
and into Provider if their net group funding position is negative in a specific year-
quarter. Zero Activity regroups banks which neither receive nor lend internal funds
to their group15. Over the sample period, 13% of foreign banks’ affiliates are net
provider and 37% are net receiver of funds. The remaining 50% have a net group
funding position equal to zero. I estimate a multinomial logit model with Internal
Funding Status as the dependent variable. The explanatory variables include foreign
affiliates factors (solvency), home country and host country factors, as well as the
Outside Option variable. I choose Receiver as the baseline comparison group and I
focus on the log-odds of Receiver vs. Provider:
log
(
Pr(Internal Funding status=Receiver)
Pr(Internal funding status=Provider)
)
= α + β1Solvencyit + β2Hostit
+ β3Homeit + β4Outside Optionit + γControlsit + αc + δt + γi (2.3)
I then examine the determinants of the volume of internal funding given a non-
zero net internal funding position, that is excluding the group of “zero activity”
banks from the sample. The dependent variable is the ratio of internal funding to
total assets. I create a dummy Receiver which equals 1 if the bank is a net receiver
of funds, and zero if it is a net provider. The other explanatory variables are the
same as in equation (2.3). I estimate the following model:
yit = β1Solvencyit + β2Hostit + β3Homeit + β4Outside Optionit
+ β5(Solvency * Receiver)it + β6(Host * Receiver)it + β7(Home * Receiver)it
+ β8(Outside Option * Receiver)it + γControlsit + αc + δt + γi + εit (2.4)
Independent variables of interest.
Testing H1a: Solvencyit is bank (foreign affiliate)’s solvency ratio. This variable
measures a bank’s ability to meet its long-term financial obligations and is calculated
as the ratio of equity to asset.16 According to Hypothesis 1a, internal funding will
15There is no bank in the dataset for which internal funding and internal lending exactly cancel
each other out. As such the “zero activity” category only includes banks which are not active in
internal capital markets.
16In unreported regressions I have also added two other variables to examine the relation be-
tween bank affiliate’s financial strength and reception of internal group funding, beyond capital
constraints: Liquidity constraint and Tangibility. Banks’ liquidity constraint was measured as the
ratio of loans to deposits, which is commonly used to assess a bank’s liquidity position. Tangibility
was measured as the firm’s tangible assets (property, plants and equipment) and is measured as
the ratio of tangible assets to the book value of total assets. However, these variables were not
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flow to support affiliates with a weak balance sheet (low solvency ratio). As such, I
expect β1 < 0 in equation (2.3) and β5 < 0 in equation (2.4).
Testing H1b: Hostit is an indicator of host country investment opportunities
which I proxy by the real GDP growth in South Africa. Homeit is an indicator
of home country macroeconomic conditions, which I proxy by the growth of GDP
in the foreign affiliate’s home country. Outside Optionit represents the alternative
investment opportunities for the parent bank, located in the other countries of oper-
ation. This variable is calculated as the sum of GDP growth in the other countries
of operation of the parent (excluding its home country and South Africa), weighted
by the assets of the foreign subsidiaries in each host country as a percentage of
the total assets of the foreign portfolio of the parent. According to Hypothesis 1b,
higher GDP growth in South Africa should be associated with an increase in the
relative probability of being a net receiver (β2 > 0 in equation (2.3)) and an increase
in the volume of internal funding received given a net receiver position (β6 > 0 in
equation (2.4)). In addition, higher GDP growth in the home country and in the
Outside Option should be associated with a decrease in the relative probability of
being a net receiver (β3 < 0 and β4 < 0 in equation (2.3)) and a decrease in the
volume of internal funding received given a net receiver position (β7 < 0 and β8 < 0
in equation (2.4)).
Figure 2 plots the evolution of the Outside Option for Global MNB and Emerging
MNB over the sample period. One striking feature of this graph is that in the 1993q1-
2007q4 period, the Outside Option of Emerging MNB was on average higher than
that of Global MNB. This is due to the relatively higher exposure of Emerging
MNB, a group essentially composed of Indian and Chinese banks, to fast-growing
Asia. Moreover, we notice a dip around 1998 in the Outside Option of Emerging
MNB: this reflects the impact of the East Asian Crisis on the GDP growth rate of
countries in this region to which Emerging MNB are highly exposed.
Controls. The dummy Branch, taking the value of 1 if the foreign affiliate is
a branch and 0 if it is a subsidiary, is included to take into account the fact that
different organizational structures translate into varying degrees of centralization of
decision-making and restrictions on internal transfer.17 As mentioned above, one
of the main distinctions between a branch and a subsidiary is that the parent is
legally inseparable from its branch and is responsible for its financial commitments,
significant and did not improve the fit of the model, and as a consequence they were not included
in the reported estimations.
17Under a centralized form, which is often associated with a foreign branch structure, internal
group funds flow freely within the group and organizational and risk management functions are
integrated. Under a decentralized model, which corresponds to the subsidiary organizational form,
foreign affiliates are financially, as well as operationally, independent.
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while it has no legal obligation to support a subsidiary that is financially distressed
(Fiechter et al., 2011). As such, I expect this dummy to be positively associated
with the reception of intragroup funding. I include a dummy Commercial which is
equal to one if the main business line of the bank is retail and commercial banking,
and 0 if it engages primarily in wholesale or investment banking. Investment banks
may prefer to adopt a more centralized model to be flexible globally in their liquidity
management and services to large corporate clients (Fiechter et al., 2011). I thus
expect this dummy to be negatively associated with the reception of internal group
funding.
I then include two control variables, Size, calculated as the log of total book
assets deflated by the CPI index and Age, measured as the bank’s age since the date
of incorporation, as both variables may affect the degree of integration of the foreign
affiliate with its banking group and drive internal funding and lending. For instance,
Gopalan et al. (2007) show that larger firms are more likely to be providers of funds
to their group than receivers.18
An important factor to consider is the tax effect of internal capital allocation.
Indeed, Cerutti, Dell’Ariccia and Martinez Peria (2007) have found evidence of a
positive and significant relationship between the top corporate tax rate in a host
country and the decision of banks to incorporate their local businesses as branches,
given that it would ease profit shifting across borders to avoid tax burden. Desai,
Foley and Hines (2004) also found that internal borrowing is particularly sensitive
to local taxes. Furthermore, different tax treatments by home regulatory authorities
of repatriated profits from overseas could differ between branches and subsidiaries,
which would not only influence the group’s choice of organizational form abroad but
also drive the observed variation in internal funding. One way to control for that is
to include home country fixed effects. As such, I include home country fixed effects
αc to capture any difference in tax regimes between home countries that could affect
the reception of internal funds by the foreign affiliates, and time fixed effects δt to
control for variations in local conditions. I finally include firm fixed effects γi to
control for any unobserved time-invariant difference between bank affiliates.
The standard errors reported are corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustered
at the firm level, that is at the (foreign) affiliate level.19
18In unreported preliminary analysis I also included control variables capturing cultural links
such as common language or former colonial links between host and home countries, which might
indicate the strategic importance of the foreign affiliate for the group or might capture the ability of
the affiliates’ managers to influence outcomes of internal capital allocation (for instance if they share
the same language as global headquarters’ managers). However, these variables were not significant
and did not change the point estimates of the variables of interest once included, therefore I chose
not to add them as controls in the following empirical analysis.
19In so doing I follow the method used in related empirical literature, where standard errors are
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At this stage, and before turning to the estimations, it is important to note that
these results are only intended to be suggestive and that their interpretation should
be taken with caution. Indeed, a limit of this analysis is that the relation between
the measure of financial strength, solvency calculated as the ratio of equity to asset,
and the dependent variable of internal funding is relatively mechanical, linked to
accounting identities. As such, the aim of this first exercise is only to provide
preliminary insights into the drivers of internal funding, which will be conducted
more in-depth in Section 2.6.
2.5.2 Supporting parent or opportunistic investor?
Probability of being a net receiver vs. a net provider. I first examine the
probability of being a net receiver vs. a net provider, including host and home coun-
try variables as well as the Outside Option variable, following equation (2.3). The
results are reported in Table 6.20 They indicate that bank’s solvency is negatively
associated with the odds of being a net receiver vs. a net provider. The coefficient
is statistically significant at the 1% level and the result is robust to the inclusion
of home and host country controls, as well as firm, time and home country fixed
effects. This is consistent with Hypothesis 1a. However, contrary to the prediction
of Hypothesis 1b, the results suggest that the probability of being a net receiver
vs. a net provider is not related to macroeconomic conditions in South Africa, as
clustered at the firm level to reduce the bias in OLS standard errors when residuals are correlated
across observations (Petersen, 2005). However, given the small number of clusters (below 30) the
method may not be appropriate as asymptotic inference supposes that we have a large number of
clusters (Angrist and Pischke, 2009). I have tried an alternative method to correct for standard
errors, namely bootstrapping as suggested by Cameron et al. (2008). To do so I have used the
bootwildct.ado command for Stata which implements the wild-cluster bootstrap-t procedure, with
a specified null hypothesis, as described in Cameron et al. (2008). This procedure is shown to
improve inference in cases with few clusters. However, it only works for linear models with clustered
standard errors and with simple hypotheses. As such I was not able to implement fixed effects
or estimate a logit model under this method. Given that the standard errors using bootstrapping
on linear models were of similar size to the ones calculated with the cluster option with stata, I
decided to report the latter, that is, the standard errors corrected for heteroskedacitity and firm
clustering.
20I have preliminary examined whether the data meet the assumption of independence of irrele-
vant alternatives (IIA) which underlies the multinomial logit model. This assumption implies that
the probability ratio between two given alternatives is not different whether or not the other alter-
natives are included. I performed a Hausman and McFadden (1984) test to check the validity of the
assumption. The test is based on the idea that if a subset of the location choice set is irrelevant, its
omission from the model will not systematically change the estimates. I tested whether the odds
ratio receiver/provider is really independent from the presence of the “zero activity” alternative.
To do that I first estimated the model on the full set of three alternatives and re-ran it on the
subset of two alternatives, provider and receiver (excluding the “zero activity” alternative). The
results obtained indicated that the model meets the IIA assumption: the results of the Hausman
tests indicated that I could safely accept H0 [Prob > Chi2= 0.8934], indicating that the two sets
of estimates were not statistically different.
114
the coefficient on GDP growth is not significant at conventional levels.21 Regarding
conditions in the home country of the foreign bank’s affiliate, the results show that
GDP growth in the home country increases the odds of being a net receiver of fund
vs. a net provider, and the coefficient turns significant when firm controls and fixed
effects are included. This finding is not consistent with Hypothesis 1b which would
have predicted a negative sign. This positive association between GDP growth in
the home country and the probability of being a net receiver may actually signal
that higher growth in the home country translates into stronger balance sheet for
the parent bank and thus a higher financial capacity to redistribute funds across the
group22. Finally, the results show a positive association between (weighted) GDP
growth in the other countries of operation of the parent (the “Outside Option”) and
the odds of being a receiver vs. provider, but the coefficients are not significant in
the three models estimated.
In sum, these results suggest that support motives are important determinants
of the probability of a foreign affiliate to be a net receiver vs. a net provider, which
is consistent with Hypothesis 1a. However, at this stage the findings do no support
Hypothesis 1b. While the results provide some evidence that investment opportu-
nities in the host country may drive allocation of internal group funding, which is
consistent with expectations, the coefficients are not significant at conventional lev-
els. In addition, the signs of the coefficients on GDP growth in the other countries
of operation are positive, which is not consistent with Hypothesis 1b, which would
have predicted a negative association.
Determinants of the volume of internal funding for net receivers. I
turn to the analysis of the determinants of the volume of internal funding given a
non-zero net internal funding position, that is excluding the group of “zero activity”
banks from the sample, following equation (2.4). The results are reported in Table
7.
21In unreported results I have also include measures of monetary conditions in South Africa,
proxied by the interbank rate and the inflation rate, and alternative measures of investment op-
portunities and macroeconomic expansion in South Africa, such as the growth in industrial pro-
duction, or growth in household consumption expenditures, but the coefficient on these variables
was not significant either.
22This result may also partly be driven by omitted variable bias, in particular the solvency
position of the parent group. If the solvency position of the parent is positively correlated with
the probability of a foreign affiliate of being a net receiver, the correlation between GDP growth
in the home country and solvency of the parent bank is positive, and if the product of these two
coefficients is superior to the coefficient on GDP growth in the home country, then it is possible
that the coefficient on GDP growth in the home country turns negative when parent bank solvency
is controlled for. Unfortunately, the data at hand does not allow me to control for parent banks’
solvency position as very little information is available on a quarterly basis in BankScope for
the parent bank of these South African foreign affiliates over the study period, with less than 50
observations available.
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First, the coefficient on solvency is negative but not significant and when in-
teracted with the dummy receiver, the coefficient becomes positive, but it remains
insignificant. The sign on the interaction terms of Outside Option*Receiver is nega-
tive and significant in models 1 and 2, which is consistent with Hypothesis 1b. The
results of these two models indicate that, for net receivers, a one unit increase in the
Outside Option is associated with a 3.1% decrease in the ratio of internal funding to
total assets. The coefficient on the interaction terms with GDP growth in the home
country is negative in models 1 and 2, which is consistent with expectations, but not
significant. Similarly, the coefficient on the interaction terms with GDP growth in
South Africa is positive, which is consistent with hypothesis 1b, but not significant.
When firm fixed effects are included (model 3), the statistical significance of the
coefficient on the variable Outside Option*Receiver drops below conventional levels,
while the coefficient on the interaction term GDP growth Home*Receiver becomes
significant. The smaller and less significant coefficient on the interaction term with
Outside Option may partly be due to a worsening of the attenuation bias when
including fixed effects due to classical measurement error in the variable Outside
Option23. Furthermore, the F-stat of the model is reported as missing by Stata due
to lack of degrees of freedom. When variances are adjusted for clustering, the rank
of the variance-covariance matrix is limited by the number of clusters; in this case
the maximum number of constraints that can be tested is 19 (20-1). In addition,
Stata reports the existence of multicollinearity among the firm (bank) dummies.
The models in column (1) and (2) are therefore preferred.
To sum up, the results presented in Table 7 are partially consistent with Hypoth-
esis 1b: while there are some evidence that investment opportunities in the Outside
Option and in the home country, as proxied by the growth in GDP, are negatively
associated with the volume of internal funding to net receivers, macroeconomic con-
ditions, or investment opportunities, in South Africa seem to be irrelevant factors
in internal capital allocation decisions.
Overall, the results of these two preliminary exercises indicate that the factors
influencing the probability of being a net receiver and those influencing the volume
of internal funding received, given that a foreign affiliate is a net receiver, are differ-
ent. While the solvency ratio (Hypothesis 1a) is an important factor influencing the
probability of being a net receiver vs. a net provider, it is not a significant determi-
nant of the volume of internal funding received by net receivers. Furthermore, while
there is little evidence that investment opportunities in the host country drives the
23Indeed, it is likely that the serial correlation in the measurement error is lower than the serial
correlation in the signal given that GDP growth is relatively persistent.
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reception of internal funding (at least in the South African case), there is some evi-
dence that the volume of funding received is driven by investment opportunities in
the other countries of operation (Hypothesis 1b). The link between macroeconomic
developments in the Outside Option and internal funding is examined more in-depth
in the next section.
2.6 Internal capital lending in times of crisis
In this section I illustrate the importance of the evolution of the Outside Option to
the internal funding position of a bank and provide a test for Hypothesis 2. More
specifically, I examine how the internal bank funding position of foreign banks’
affiliates changes when other affiliates of the group are affected by a sudden reversal
of fortune, affecting their capital and liquidity position and prompting the banking
group to reallocate rapidly its internal capital. The East Asian Crisis which started
in summer 1997 offers a sort of quasi-natural experiment on the functioning of
internal capital market. East Asian economies which had been attracting significant
amounts of short term foreign capital in the early 1990s faced a large and sudden
reversal of capital flows in the second half of 1997 (Radelet and Sachs, 1999). As
such, according to Hypothesis 2, the group should reallocate internal capital from
non-crisis countries to crisis countries. I first provide a brief summary of the East
Asian Crisis and its potential implications for internal capital markets and I then
proceed to the presentation of the identification strategy and estimations.
By the end of 1996, the majority of the east Asian countries had a share of short
term foreign liabilities above 50%, and the ratio of foreign liabilities to assets rela-
tive to BIS (Bank for International Settlements) reporting banks was extremely high,
close to 2.0 for the majority of the countries, and reached a factor of 11 in the case of
Thailand (Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini, 1998). The exchange rates appreciated in
real terms24 and investors anticipated a depreciation25. Strong speculative attacks
led to the flotation of the Thai baht on the 2nd of July 1997. This was followed
by a speculative attack on the Korean won in October 1997 (Corsetti et al. 1998).
While the causes were varied and debatable26 the crisis had significant macroeco-
24Real exchange rates appreciated by more than 25% in the four southeast Asian countries
between 1990 and early 1997 (Radelet and Sachs, 1998)
25Several factors sparked investors’ concern that the currencies might be devalued. In Thailand
and Korea large current account deficit and the general weakness of the Thai financial system were
sources of concern.
26Corsetti et al. (1998) cite over-borrowing in foreign currency in Thailand and Indonesia,
bankruptcy of the large domestic conglomerate chaebols in South Korea, and financial difficulties
in the real estate sector in Malaysia as the origin of the crisis.
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nomic effects, including sharp currency devaluations, drops in stock markets prices,
and other asset prices of east Asian economies. The East Asian Crisis developed into
a twin crisis, characterized by the simultaneity of a currency crisis and a banking
crisis, with the two reinforcing each other. Given weaken macroeconomic conditions
in 1997, national stock markets started to drop and currencies came under attack,
starting with the Thai Baht and then followed by the currencies of Malaysia, In-
donesia and Philippines, countries which shared similar economic fundamentals and
export structures than Thailand. The devaluation of these currencies in the sum-
mer of 1997, in a context of low interest rates, had negative spill-over effects on the
currency of the other economies of the region, Singapore, Taiwan and Korea. The
crisis intensified during 1998: as the east Asian economies slowed down sharply, the
recession spread from the crisis countries (Korea, Indonesia, Thailand and Malaysia)
to the other neighboring east Asian economies (Hong Kong, Philippines, Singapore
and Taiwan). The IMF stepped in and several conditional agreement with financial
aid packages where concluded in the year following the third quarter of 1997. Strict
fiscal discipline and high interest rates were imposed.
I conjecture that the sudden reversal of capital flows of short term foreign debt
and the reluctance of foreign creditors to extend new loans and roll over existing
loans, which led to a severe banking crisis and the sharp contraction of the econ-
omy, created a funding shock for the south east Asian foreign affiliates of banking
groups present in the region. Cetorelli and Goldberg (2012) have shown how global
banks respond to such shocks by activating internal capital markets to reallocate
funds across locations in response to their relative needs, while also creating another
channel of international transmission of financial crises (see also Peek and Rosengren
(2000) on the role of global banks in international shock transmission, with the case
of Japanese banks in the U.S.). This should lead to an increase in internal capital
flows from foreign banks’ affiliates located outside the crisis region to those operating
in countries affected by the crisis in order to support the affiliates’ solvency and more
importantly their liquidity positions27. Furthermore, even though the subsidiaries of
foreign banks in east Asia may not have been as reliant as domestic intermediaries
on short-term, unhedged, foreign currency denominated debt, they also faced higher
funding constraints both on the domestic and international wholesale market as a
result of the crisis. As such, following Hypothesis 2, I expect the net internal funding
27Radelet and Sachs (1998) estimating a simple probit model on a panel of data for the years
1994-97 for 22 emerging markets in which the onset of a financial crisis depends on a vector of
economic and institutional variables show that the defining element of such crises was illiquidity as
measured by a high ratio of short-term debt to short-term assets, rather than a crisis of fundamental
solvency.
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position of South African affiliates belonging to a group very exposed to east Asia
to decline more during the crisis, relative to before, compared to affiliates of groups
with little or no exposure to east Asia.
2.6.1 Estimation strategy
I estimate a difference-in-difference model on the period 1996q4-1998q3, with a
continuous treatment variable which is the exposure of the parent to the Asian crisis
that started in the third quarter of 1997. The variable Asian Exposure is calculated
as the weighted number of subsidiaries of the same parent (or “General Ultimate
Owner” following BankScope’s terminology) that are located in Thailand, Indonesia,
Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea for each year in the sample. The
weight is calculated as the assets of the subsidiaries in the above-mentioned Asian
countries divided by the total assets of the foreign subsidiaries (excluding South
Africa) of the parent. This number is thus bounded below by zero (the group does
not have any subsidiary in these east Asian countries) and above by one (all the
other foreign subsidiaries of the group are located in these east Asian countries).
As there was no foreign affiliate in South Africa over the sample period that was
part of a banking group originating from one of these six Asian countries, excluding
the assets of the parent bank from the variable of interest is not biasing the results
through under-reporting of exposure to the crisis.
I consider that the East Asian Crisis started in the third quarter of 1997, after
the Thai Prime Minister said on the 30th of June 1997 that the Thai baht would
not be devalued, despite the speculative attacks on the currency on the 14 and 15 of
May 1997 (see Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini (1999) and Radelet and Sachs (1998,
1999) for a more detailed macroeconomic analysis of the East Asian Crisis). The fact
that the crisis was largely unanticipated and that high levels of capital continued to
flow into east Asia until the very brink of the crisis itself (Radelet and Sachs, 1998)
helps the identification exercise by limiting the potential existence of a pre-crisis
trend. Figures 3 and 4 chart the evolution of the ratio of net internal funding to
asset for two different levels of exposure to East Asian Crisis country: “High east
Asian exposure” regroups foreign affiliates which banking group has above average
exposure to east Asian Crisis countries (more than 2.5% of total assets of foreign
subsidiaries ex. South Africa are in east Asia) and “Low east Asian exposure”
regroups banks with below average exposures. Of these graphs, three features are
worth mentioning. The first one is that until 2000q4, and with the exception of the
period immediately after the start of the East Asian Crisis in 1997q4-1998q1, the
net internal funding position of the “high exposure” group is always higher than that
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of the “low exposure” group (see Figure 3, which graphs the evolution of the ratio
over the long period 1993q1-2007q4). This suggests that banks are not randomly
assigned into these groups. The second one is that 1998q1 is the only quarter, with
the exception of 2007q1, in which the net internal funding position of the “high
exposure” group becomes negative (-3% of total assets on average), meaning that
the South African affiliate of these exposed groups becomes a net provider of internal
funding to its group shortly after the start of the East Asian Crisis. The third one is
that despite important and stable differences in the level of their net internal funding
position, both groups follow relatively similar trends in their reception of internal
funds prior to 1997q3 (see Figure 4), which is important given the common trend
(or parallel) trend assumption underlying difference in difference estimations. The
classification into Low and High exposure to east Asia being arbitrary I use instead
the continuous variable “Asian Exposure”, which is an indicator of the weight of
east Asian countries (in terms of assets) in the total foreign exposure (ex. South
Africa) of the banking groups. I estimate the following model:
Net internal funding/assets = α0 + βAsian Exposureit+
γPostt + λAsian Exposureit.Postt + δControlsit + εit (2.5)
The dummy Post is equal to one for the period 1997q4-1998q3, and zero for the
period prior to 1997q4. The estimation period is 1996q4-1998q3, that is, on the
four quarters leading up to the financial crisis and the four quarters after. The
parameter of interest is λ, which measures the difference in the effect of the East
Asian Crisis on net internal funding for a one percentage point increase in Asian
Exposure28. I include the following variables as control: Size, the dummy Branch,
the dummy Commercial. I cluster the standard errors at the (South African) foreign
affiliate level to correct for the presence of within cluster correlation. The results
are reported in Table 8.
2.6.2 Estimation results
The results indicate that banks belonging to groups more exposed to East Asian Cri-
sis countries show a significant drop in their net internal funding position. Affiliates
of banking groups with higher exposure to East Asian Crisis countries experienced a
drop in their net internal funding position of 25 percentage points relative to other
foreign affiliates. In columns (2) and (3) I exclude banks that entered or exited
28That is, a one percentage point increase in the total assets of the subsidiaries in east Asia of
the group, relative to the total assets of all the foreign subsidiaries, ex-South Africa.
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during the 1996q4-1998q3 period. In addition, in column (3) I also include time
fixed effects to control for changes in the local demand of credit, firm fixed effects
and home country fixed effects. The results are still significant and qualitatively
similar to the ones reported in column (1) of Table 8, however the point estimate
of the impact of the Asian crisis on net internal funding drops by 10 percentage
points, which might be due to the fact that exposure to East Asian countries is
not randomly assigned, therefore controlling for unobservables captures part of the
difference. That said, the coefficient on the interaction term is still significant at the
1% level.
Finally, in column (4) I collapse time into into one pre- and one post-shock
periods to avoid serial correlation problems (see Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan,
2004, for the methodology) and I control for entry and exit. The results are robust
and the point estimates do not change significantly between models 1, 2 and 3.
These results could suggest either a lower reception of internal loans as a con-
sequence of the East Asian Crisis or higher remittance of internal funds to the
group. In unreported regression, I re-estimated the empirical model (2) of Table 8
using alternatively internal funding/assets and internal lending/assets as indepen-
dent variables. The interaction term was negative in both models and statistically
significant at the 1% level. I find that a one percentage point increase in Asian
Exposure was associated with a decrease in the internal funding ratio of 11.7 per-
centage points in the Post period relative to the Pre period, while it was associated
with an increase in the internal lending ratio of 13.3 percentage points. In other
words, the South African foreign affiliates of highly exposed multinational banks
both received less internal funding from their group during the East Asian Crisis
period than before, and lent more to their group, relative to the affiliates of less
exposed groups. Consistent with Hypothesis 2, this suggests that the headquarters
of groups highly exposed to the East Asian Crisis countries altered their internal
capital allocation, diverting their internal funds from South Africa to support their
affiliates in east Asia.
2.6.3 Robustness tests
As a robustness test, I show that the results are not qualitatively affected by changes
in the end date of the Post period. In Table 9 I investigate further the lasting
effects of the East Asian Crisis by extending by one quarter the end of the Post
period. I control for entry and exit by only examining the banks that were present
during the entire period 1996q4-1998q3. The signs of the interaction term Asian
Exposure*Post are negative and significant until the first quarter of 2000, however
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the point estimates decrease progressively, from -0.25 for the period ending in 1998q3
to -0.04 for the period ending in 1999q4. The results indicate that the transmission
of the shock was rapid and it was mostly felt during the first year post the start of
the crisis. Two years after, most of the effects had disappeared.
One of the limits of this estimation is that Asian Exposure is not randomly as-
signed. In addition, and as mentioned before, one of the key identification assump-
tions of the difference-in-difference model is the so-called parallel-trend assumption
according to which in the absence of the treatment, the unobserved differences be-
tween treatment and control groups are the same over time. I explore the possibility
that a bank belonging to a group that was more significantly exposed to the East
Asian Crisis was on a different internal funding path than those that were less
significantly exposed. If this was the case, my estimates could be capturing such
pre-existing differences across the two groups of banks and not the effect of the
East Asian Crisis shock on internal funding. I perform the following falsification
placebo test: I estimate equation (2.5) over the period 1995q3-1997q2, by lagging
the internal funding measure by one year, as if the East Asian Crisis had started in
the third quarter of 1996 instead of the third quarter of 1997. The placebo test is
estimated over the period t = (Pre-1,Pre) where Pre is the period 1996q3-1997q2,
the same as in our baseline estimation, and Pre-1 corresponds to the 4 previous
quarters, 1995q3-1996q2. The results are presented in Table 10. The coefficient on
the interaction terms of the placebo “post” dummies and Asian Exposure are not
significantly different from zero. Furthermore, these different outcomes are driven
by changes in the point estimates themselves. These results provide some additional
reassurance on the validity of the exercise, indicating that banks that belonged to
a group significantly exposed to the East Asian Crisis did not face any differential
supply of internal funding prior to the crisis period.
2.7 From internal loans to domestic credit
In this section I provide a test for Hypothesis 3, investigating the impact of the
reception of internal funding on banks’ credit. According to Hypothesis 3, an in-
crease in (net) internal funding to a foreign affiliate should, ceteris paribus, lead to
an increase in bank credit. I examine whether foreign banks’ affiliates use these
additional internal funds to increase their credit to domestic firms and individuals
in South Africa using an instrumental variable technique.
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2.7.1 Estimation strategy
I want to estimate β, the elasticity of credit to internal funding using the following
empirical model29:
Creditit = βInternal fundingit + γControlsit + δt + εit (2.6)
However, identifying the causal effect of internal funds on banks’ credit is problem-
atic as it may be influenced by the same unobservable factors affecting bank credit
and therefore be endogenous. Indeed, apart from internal group funding, banks’
supply of credit is determined by the demand for credit, by domestic macroeco-
nomic conditions but also by the availability of external bank funding (customers’
deposit, interbank markets). The identification problem is that the availability of
internal funding may be itself a function of local (i.e. host country) demand of
credit and of local supply of external funding. The identification strategy relies on
the exploitation of an instrumental variable technique. I use the variable Outside
Option as an instrument for the volume of internal funding in the affiliate bank’s
balance sheet. The identification reposes on the assumption that the Outside Op-
tion is uncorrelated with any other determinant of the foreign affiliate’s local supply
of credit, especially uncorrelated with the local demand of credit, or more generally,
with local macroeconomic conditions.
I use two dependent variables. The first one is the outstanding volume of mort-
gage advances. In DI900 reporting format, the category mortgage advances includes
farm mortgages, mortgages to companies and close corporations, to unincorporated
businesses and to individuals as well as to non-profit institutions. The second one is
the outstanding volume of private sector loans30. The category private sector loans
and advances includes overdrafts and loans to companies, unincorporated businesses,
individuals as well as non-profit institutions31. I employ the same bank controls as
in the preceding estimations, Size, the dummy Branch, the dummy Commercial,
and in some models I also control for the bank’s age. I also include time fixed effects
δt to control for variations in local market conditions, such as variation in credit
demand.
29Credit and Internal funding are in log so that β is an elasticity.
30As mentioned previously, both variables are deflated by the CPI.
31Due to the small number of observations, I have not disaggregated further the measures of
credit.
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2.7.2 Estimation results
I have performed a preliminary Hausman test for endogeneity of the variable internal
funding which rejected the null hypothesis of the exogeneity of this variable at the
5% confidence level. The results of the first stage are reported in Table 11 in the
Appendix. For the instrument to be valid it needs to be relevant and to satisfy
the exclusion restriction. The first stage shows that the coefficient on the variable
Outside Option is negative and statistically significant in model 1. In model 2,
I add a set of firm controls: Size, Commercial, Branch and Age. The number of
observations drops due to missing age information for several banks. Outside Option
enters negatively and significantly at the 1% level, although the point estimate is
lower and the F-statistic is also lower (dropping from 22.29 to 14.78). These first
results indicate that the volume of internal funding is negatively associated with the
GDP growth of countries in the Outside Option. This is in line with the precedent
analysis on the economic determinants of the reception of internal funding. The
F-statistics of the first stage are above 10, which provides reassurance about the
strength of the variable Outside Option as an instrument. In columns (3) and (4) I
investigate the potential use of a second instrument, GDP Growth Home, as it has
been identified previously as a predictor of the probability to be a net receiver of
funds (see Table 7). While the coefficient on this variable is negative and significant
at the 1% level, the first stage F-statistic falls below 10, when additional controls are
included, which raises concerns about the strength of the instrument. In column (5)
I investigate the use of both instruments, including firm controls, but the statistic
on the F-test on the excluded instruments is also below 10. I decide to use only
the variable Outside Option as an instrument and to proceed to a just-identified
instrumental variable. This choice is also based on the fact that just identified 2SLS
is approximately median-unbiased (Angrist and Pischke, 2009).
To satisfy the exclusion restriction, the instrument Outside Option cannot be
correlated with the error term. This would be the case if the weighted sum of
GDP growth in the other countries of operation of the parent affected local de-
mand of credit. This is unlikely to be the case for mortgages, but it might be
the case for private sector loans if borrowers were predominantly exporters. How-
ever, they would also need to be primarily exporters in the countries of the Outside
Option. Given that home countries of foreign banks, which are often the ones af-
fecting global exports (United States, United Kingdom, China), are excluded from
the Outside Option, it is unlikely that changes in the macroeconomic conditions of
the Outside Option affect demand of credit in South Africa. Furthermore, I am only
considering the category of private sector loans in domestic currency, not the foreign
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currency loans and advances, for which demand is more likely to be determined by
the conditions in the Outside Option, especially if it is driven by financing for trade
activities.
The results of the Instrumental Variable (IV) estimations are reported in Table
12. Panel A presents results for mortgage advances and Panel B for private loans. I
also report the OLS estimations. Concerning mortgage advances, the IV estimates
reported in column (3) imply that a 10% increase in the outstanding volume of
internal funding results in a 3.2% increase in the volume of mortgage advances.
When controlling for banks’ age, the impact is slightly lower, and a 10% increase in
internal funding results in a 2.4% increase in the outstanding volume of mortgage
advances. The IV estimate of the credit elasticity to internal funding is a third
larger as the OLS estimate. The downward bias of the OLS estimate implies that
(non-internal funding) shocks to credit are negatively correlated with changes in
internal funding.
In unreported regressions, I have estimated the model in column (3) using the
net volume of internal funding instead of the gross volume and I obtain a 3.0%
(point estimate of 3.0, standard error of 0.11 and first stage F-stat of 29.9) increase
in the volume of mortgage advances. However, the sample size is much reduced (159
observations) due to negative values of the net volume of internal funding which
cannot be log-transformed, hence I prefer to report the results on the gross volume.
Consistent with Hypothesis 3, these first results indicate that foreign affiliates
increase their mortgage advances to farms, businesses and individuals in South Africa
when their volume of internal funding increases, both in gross and in net terms. Now,
turning to the estimations of the outstanding volume of private sector loans, the
results indicate a sensibly different relationship between internal funding and loans.
Indeed, the results reported in the second half of the table (Panel B) show that the
sign of the coefficient β turns negative, with an elasticity of private sector loans to
internal funding between -0.32 and -0.39 depending on whether age is included as
an additional control or not32.
In other words, these results suggest that when a foreign affiliate receives more
internal loans, it reduces its loans and advances to the private sector but increases its
mortgages, controlling for bank’s organizational form, size, and business activities
and for time trends in local market conditions. The negative relation between private
sector loans and internal funding may be driven by a positive correlation between
the Outside Option and the demand for private sector loans, especially if the bulk
32In unreported regressions I have used the net outstanding volume of internal funding as the
instrumented variable instead of the gross volume and I obtained a negative and statistically
significant elasticity of -0.143 (standard error of 0.14, first stage F-stat of 11.09, 339 observations).
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of the demand for credit comes from exporting firms to the countries in the Outside
Option of foreign affiliates’ groups. In a situation when the rest of the world (or
the Outside Option) faces a macroeconomic downturn, it may also mean that South
African exporters face hard macroeconomic conditions and as a consequence their
demand for private loans is lower. If most of the firms applying for private sector
loans in domestic currency (note that, as mentioned above, the supply of private
sector loans examined here excludes those in foreign currency) are exporters, the
exclusion restriction is violated. Unfortunately, I am not able to determine whether
this is the case, as I do not have information on the firms to which the banks are
lending, and the assumption on the exclusion of Outside Option from the causal
model of private sector loans may be too strong to validate the IV analysis.
As a consequence, in this exercise, the identification strategy is more appropriate
for the supply of mortgage credit. Indeed, the link between demand for mortgage
loans in South Africa and the Outside Option is unlikely to be strong, especially
if a large part of the demand for mortgage comes from the middle or lower class.
However, if most of the mortgage demand corresponds to investment demand driven
by an elite with an international portfolio, then changes in the Outside Option might
cause changes in the demand for mortgage in South Africa. Indeed, this elite would
reallocate their portfolio strategically in countries where real estate potential, or
investment opportunities in general, are higher. If this was the case, an increase
in the Outside Option would be associated with a decrease in internal funding,
and a simultaneous decrease in the demand for mortgage. This would violate the
exclusion restriction, as the Outside Option would be correlated with the demand for
mortgages, and invalidate the use of the variable Outside Option as an instrument.
Access to mortgage and housing finance in general is relatively open for middle
and lower income in South Africa, having dramatically improved with the signing of
the Financial Sector Charter (FSC) in 2003, which promoted access to the goods and
services of the financial services industry for those who had been previously excluded
(CAHF, 2013a, 2013b). According to statistics from the Banking Association of
South Africa (BASA), 312 703 “FSC” loans were originated between January 2004
and December 2008. These loans were issued to households with a monthly income
between R1,500 and R7,500 measured in 2004 Rands. By far the greatest area of
activity was in mortgage lending: 234 638 mortgage loans to a total value of R28
billion were originated in the five-year period from January 2004 to December 2008.
This suggests that mortgage demand in South Africa is not predominantly captured
by an elite with an international portfolio and as such it provides reassurance on
the validity of the instrumental variable estimation.
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To sum up these results using instrumental variable technique provide evidence
that an increase in the reception of internal capital has a positive impact on banks’
mortgage lending. In other words, when foreign affiliates receive more internal funds
from their group they expand their local mortgage advances. This confirms the third
research hypothesis.
Summary of findings. Overall, I find partial support to Hypothesis 1a and
Hypothesis 1b. While the foreign affiliate’s solvency ratio is negatively and signif-
icantly associated with the probability of being a net receiver vs. a net provider
(H1a), it is not a significant determinant of the volume of internal funding received
by net receivers. In addition, while I find some evidence that the volume of funding
received is driven by investment opportunities in the other countries of operation
(Hypothesis 1b), I do not find any significantly positive association between GDP
growth in the host country (South Africa) and the volume of internal funding re-
ceived by the foreign affiliate. Using the episode of the East Asian Crisis, which
resembles a “quasi-natural experiment”, to examine internal allocation of capital,
I found that South African foreign affiliates of banking groups highly exposed to
east Asian economies experienced a significant drop in their net internal funding,
as a percentage of their assets, during the crisis. This finding supports Hypothesis
2. Finally, exploiting the macroeconomic conditions in the “Outside Option” as an
instrument for the volume of internal funding received by a foreign affiliate, I find
support to Hypothesis 3, according to which an increase in (net) internal funding to
a foreign affiliate leads to an expansion of this affiliate’s lending in its host country.
2.8 Conclusion
Exploiting a novel dataset containing information on internal funding received and
sent by banks located in South Africa to their parent group abroad, this research has
provided evidence on the existence of support motives for internal funding as foreign
affiliates receive more internal funds when their solvency declines. As such, access
to internal capital market gives an advantage to foreign bank affiliates over purely
domestic banks in times of crisis. However, foreign affiliates’ balance sheet is not
immune to “reversal of fortune” when other parts of their banking group need large
amount of internal capital to cushion capital losses, as this reallocation of capital
divert internal funding to other affiliates. This research has also explored the link
between internal capital and bank credit and shown that an increase in internal
funding received by a bank affiliate has a positive impact on its supply of credit
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in the local mortgage market. The evidence provided in this chapter suggests that
foreign banks expand their mortgage loans to the local economy when they receive
higher volumes of internal funding.
The evidence of a support motive to internal funding is particularly important
for developing economies where sources of wholesale funding are limited and capital
markets are underdeveloped. Furthermore, these results are encouraging as foreign
affiliates use this extra (internal) capital to expand local credit, whereas it has often
been noted that banks in Africa are highly liquid but do not recycle deposits in
the form of loans, preferring instead to buy government securities or invest abroad
(Beck et al., 2011).
A first message of this research is that foreign affiliates have ambiguous effects
for the financial stability of the host country. On the one hand, being part of a
foreign group should reduce the risk of bankruptcy by allowing for the reception of
internal capital from the group. On the other hand, internal capital markets may
be a channel through which financial crises are transmitted from one country to
another, when abrupt capital reallocations inside the group take place. However,
the strength of this channel will partly depend on the legal structure of the foreign
affiliate. Indeed, the organizational form of the foreign affiliate, either as a branch
or as a subsidiary will have an impact on the stability of the banking sector and
the local supply of credit through the internal capital market channel, as branches
are more integrated to their group via this channel than subsidiaries. The choice of
a legal structure by a multinational banking group is influenced by the regulations
in the host country, which varies across countries, as well as by the development
of local capital markets and macroeconomic and political risks in this particular
country (Fiechter et al., 2011). A potential policy implication of this research for
bank regulators may be that favoring organization of foreign affiliates as subsidiaries
rather than branches, through specific banking regulations, may reduce the potential
transmission of foreign crises via internal capital markets. One caveat, however, is
that if a banking crisis occurs in the host country a parent is fully responsible for
all losses incurred under a branch structure, while its obligations are only limited to
the value of the invested equity under a subsidiary structure, which makes it more
likely to walk away from the operation (Cerrutti et al., 2007; Fiechter et al., 2011).
That said, if a foreign affiliate has systemic importance for the health of the banking
group, its parent is more likely to support it through transfers of internal liquidity,
regardless of its organizational form (Fiechter et al., 2011).
One of the limitations of this research is that, with the dataset at hand, we
only observe the internal funding position of one affiliate of a group, but we cannot
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capture the funding position of the other subsidiaries or branches belonging to this
group. As such, one can only infer that capital was diverted from one country to
another. This opens an avenue for future research, conditional on access to data,
which would consist in examining internal transfers between the different affiliates
of a group. A second research avenue would be to obtain more qualitative data
at the headquarters level through interviews with senior managers to get a better
understanding of the processes and motives for internal capital allocation inside
groups. These and other extensions of the empirical analysis are left for future
research.
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Table 2: List of banks included in the sample
Bank name Bank identification
STANDARD CORPORATE AND MERCHANT BANK 1678
ING BANK 6599
ING BARINGS 6599
BANK OF TRANSKEI 24716
MEEG BANK LIMITED 24716
CADIZ INVESTMENT BANK BEPERK 24759
DISTRIKS SECURITIES BANK LTD 24759
INVESTEC MERCHANT BANK LTD 24783
FIRST NATIONAL FIN AND LEASING CO 24821
PEOPLES BANK LIMITED 24961
F B C FIDELITY LIMITED 24961
FIDELITY BANK 24961
AFRICAN BANK LIMITED 24988
UNIBANK LTD 24996
CAPE OF GOOD HOPE BANK LTD 25011
SOCIETE GENERALE JOHANNESBURG BRANCH 25046
INVESTEC BANK LTD 25054
NEW REPUBLIC BANK LTD 25062
RENNIES BANK LIMITED 25070
BIDVEST BANK LIMITED 25070
ONS EERSTE VOLKSBANK 25070
ABSA BANK LTD 34118
NBS BLOAND 34207
BOE BANK LIMITED 34207
BOE BANK LTD 34207
BANK WINDHOEK SA LTD 60062
SECURITIES INVESTMENT BANK 67083
STANDARD BANK BOPHUTHATSWANA 95524
M L S BANK LTD 103519
PRIMA BANK LTD 106674
SAAMBOU BANK LTD 106682
BANK OF LISBON INTERNATIONAL LTD 109193
ISLAMIC BANK 109193
MERCANTILE BANK LTD 109533
ALBARAKA BANK LTD 110728
INTERNATIONAL BANK OF SOUTHERN AFRICA LTD 123234
HABIB OVERSEAS BANK LTD 129593
BOE INVESTMENT BANK LTD 133930
BANK OF TAIWAN SOUTH AFRICA BRANCH 148520
FUTURE BANK 148539
THE COMMUNITY BANK 154776
GRINDROD BANK LIMITED 155438
MARRIOTT CORPORATE PROPERTY BANK LIMITED 155438
Continued on next page
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Table 2 – continued from previous page
Bank name Bank identification
MARRIOTT MERCHANT BANK LTD 155438
CREDIT AND SAVINGS HELP BANK 155683
CITIZEN BANK 155950
COMMERZBANK AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT 164356
CITIBANK N.A 165565
A B N AMRO BANK 165573
HBZ BANK LTD 165816
IMPERIAL BANK LTD 168114
STATE BANK OF INDIA 170798
BOPHUTHATSWANA BUILDING SOSIETY 261750
TNBS MUTUAL BANK 261777
VBS MUTUAL BANK 262293
REGAL TREASURY PRIVATE BANK LTD 286206
GENBEL SECURITIES BANK LTD 292761
GENSEC BANK LIMITED 292761
FUTURE BANK CORPORATION LTD 295019
AFRICAN MERCHANT BANK LTD 295973
TA BANK OF SOUTH AFRICA LIMITED 296228
SOUTHERN BANK OF AFRICA LIMITED 298514
BANK OF BARODA 331562
JPMORGAN CHASE BANK JOHANNESBURG BRANCH 331899
MORGAN GUARANTY TRUST CO OF NEW YORK 331899
MCCARTHY BANK LIMITED 332348
MERRILL LYNCH CAPITAL MARKETS BANK LTD - JHB BRA 332933
BUSSINESS BANK 333107
THE BUSINESS BANK LTD 333107
CAPITEC BANK 333107
CORPCAPITAL BANK 333549
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 333778
REAL AFRICA DUROLINK INVESTMENT BANK LIMITED 333808
PSG INVESTMENT BANK LIMITED 333808
SASFIN BANK LTD 335487
OLD MUTUAL BANK LIMITED 336823
BANK OF CHINA LTD JHB BRANCH T/A BANK OF CHINA 337889
CASH BANK 340081
CHINA CONSTRUCTION BANK 341037
TEBA BANK LIMITED 341894
FIRST NATIONAL BANK CO LTD 416053
FIRSTRAND BANK LIMITED 416053
THE STANDARD BANK OF S A LTD 416061
NEDBANK LTD 416088
NEDCOR BANK LTD 416088
MERCANTILE BANK LTD 416096
MERCANTILE LISBON BANK LTD 416096
Continued on next page
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Table 2 – continued from previous page
Bank name Bank identification
FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF SOUTHERN AFRICA LIMITED 416118
FIRSTCORP MERCHANT BANK 416118
CALYON CORPORATE AND INVESTMENT BANK 416126
CREDIT AGRICOLE INDOSUEZ LTD 416126
THE S A BANK OF ATHENS LTD 416134
NEDCOR INVESTMENT BANK LTD 416185
NIB SECURITIES 416185
RAND MERCHANT BANK LTD 416193
BOLAND BANK PKS LTD 416223
SYFRETS BANK LTD 416312
SECFIN BANK 416525
BOE PRIVATE BANK AND TRUST CO LTD 416533
CAPITAL ALLIANCE 416541
BRAIT MERCHANT BANK LIMITED 416541
GBS MUTUAL BANK 418072
HSBC BANK plc JOHANNESBURG BRANCH 535761
STANDARD CHARTERED BANK 535788
BARCLAYS BANK PLC 3068861
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Table 4: Summary of selected bank financials
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev.
Domestic banks
Internal funding/total assets 1633 5% 20%
Internal lending/total assets 1633 2% 7%
Net internal funding/total assets 1633 4% 20%
Total assets (in millions of Rands) 1633 13200 34200
Total capital (in millions of Rands) 1633 1059 2457
Solvency ratio 1633 19% 21%
Global banks
Internal funding/total assets 736 6% 18%
Internal lending/total assets 736 2% 6%
Net internal funding/total assets 736 4% 18%
Total assets (in millions of Rands) 736 12900 33800
Total capital (in millions of Rands) 736 963 2869
Solvency ratio 736 8% 7%
Emerging banks
Internal funding/total assets 374 2% 11%
Internal lending/total assets 374 0% 2%
Net internal funding/total assets 374 2% 11%
Total assets (in millions of Rands) 374 240 178
Total capital (in millions of Rands) 374 33 16
Solvency ratio 374 20% 16%
Foreign bank branches
Internal funding/total assets 750 7% 19%
Internal lending/total assets 750 2% 6%
Net internal funding/total assets 750 5% 20%
Total assets (in millions of Rands) 750 3059 3872
Total capital (in millions of Rands) 750 166 221
Solvency ratio 750 12% 14%
Foreign bank subsidiaries
Internal funding/total assets 360 0% 1%
Internal lending/total assets 360 1% 2%
Net internal funding/total assets 360 0% 2%
Total assets (in millions of Rands) 360 20100 47200
Total capital (in millions of Rands) 360 1654 3981
Solvency ratio 360 12% 9%
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Table 5: Bank funding model (in % of total liabilities)
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev.
Domestic banks
Internal group funding 1633 6% 20%
Interbank funding 1633 5% 9%
Deposits from other parties 1633 67% 30%
Other liabilities 1633 21% 25%
Global banks
Internal group funding 736 9% 24%
Interbank funding 736 5% 8%
Deposits from other parties 736 59% 30%
Other liabilities 736 27% 26%
Emerging banks
Internal group funding 374 3% 14%
Interbank funding 374 7% 20%
Deposits from other parties 374 55% 38%
Other liabilities 374 36% 37%
Foreign bank branches
Internal group funding 750 10% 25%
Interbank funding 750 8% 16%
Deposits from other parties 750 43% 30%
Other liabilities 750 39% 32%
Foreign bank subsidiaries
Internal group funding 360 1% 2%
Interbank funding 360 1% 2%
Deposits from other parties 360 89% 7%
Other liabilities 360 10% 6%
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Table 6: Multinomial logit of internal funding status
This table presents the results of multinomial logit analysis of net group funding position over the
1993q1-2007q4 period. The dependent variable Internal funding status has three categories: Provider,
Receiver, Zero activity. Constants are included but not reported. Firm controls (bank’s size, dummy
commercial, dummy branch) are included in all models. Models 3 also includes the age of the bank as
an additional control. Variable definitions are provided in Table 3 in the Appendix. Standard errors
are robust to heteroskedasticity and adjusted for firm clustering with values in parenthesis reported
beneath. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Log-Odds of Receiver vs. Provider
(1) (2) (3)
Solvency -4.656** -9.010*** -11.905**
(-1.839) (-2.925) (-5.368)
GDP Growth, vol., SA 0.157 0.442* -0.041
(-0.189 (-0.268) (-0.169)
GDP Growth, vol., home country 0.182 0.434** 0.972***
(-0.16) (-0.198) (-0.330)
Outside option 0.024 0.01 0.017
(-0.063 (-0.070) (-0.111)
Observations 838 838 497
Quarter FE
Home country FE
Firm FE
Age included
Pseudo R2 0.163 0.511 0.602
LR Chi2 282.330 885.425 620.066
Number of clusters 22 22 14
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Table 7: Determinants of the volume of internal funding
This table presents regression analysis of the ratio of internal funding to total asset for banks with
non-zero internal funding activity. Constants and firm controls (bank’s size, dummy commercial,
dummy branch) are included but not reported. Variable definitions are provided in Table 3 in the
Appendix. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and are adjusted for firm clustering with
values in parenthesis reported beneath.*, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%,
and 1% levels, respectively.
Internal fund./total asset
(1) (2) (3)
Solvency -0.031 -0.027 -0.230
(0.079) (0.080) (0.137)
GDP Growth, SA -0.004 -0.004 0.011
(0.008) (0.008) (0.010)
GDP Growth, Home 0.000 0.000 0.005
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
Outside option -0.001 -0.001 0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.007)
Receiver 0.155** 0.155** 0.120**
(0.060) (0.060) (0.052)
Solvency * Receiver 0.318* 0.315 0.190
(0.184) (0.184) (0.122)
GDP Growth SA * Receiver 0.013 0.013 -0.006
(0.022) (0.022) (0.012)
GDP Growth Home * Receiver -0.010 -0.010 -0.010**
(0.007) (0.007) (0.005)
Outside Option * Receiver -0.030** -0.030** -0.000
(0.012) (0.012) (0.007)
Observations 476 476 476
Quarter FE
Home country FE
Firm FE
Adjusted R-squared 0.437 0.434 0.776
F stat model 9.588 9.476 .
Number of clusters 22 22 22
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Table 10: Placebo falsification test
This table presents a falsification test of the difference-in-difference analysis of the ratio of net internal
funding to total asset over the period 1995q3-1997q2. The dummy Post is equal to 1 over the period
1996q3-1997q2. Constants and firm controls (bank’s size, dummy commercial, dummy branch) are
included but not reported. Variable definitions are provided in Table 3 in the Appendix. Standard
errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and are adjusted for firm clustering with values in parenthe-
sis reported beneath.*, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels,
respectively.
1995q3-1997q2
(1) (2)
Post Placebo -0.011 -0.060
(0.014) (0.071)
Asian Exposure -2.379 0.561
(1.829) (0.471)
Asian Exposure * Post Placebo 2.363 -0.897*
(1.740) (0.482)
Observations 105 105
Time FE
Home country FE
Firm FE
Adjusted R-squared 0.0316 0.465
F stat model 26.55 .
Number of clusters 14 14
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Table 11: First stage regressions
This table presents first stage regression analysis of the volume of internal funding, in log, deflated by
the CPI index. Constants are included but not reported. All regressions include quarter fixed effects.
Additional firm controls are included in models (2), (4) and (5): bank’s size, dummy commercial,
dummy branch and age. Variable definitions are provided in Table 3 in the Appendix. Standard errors
are robust to heteroskedasticity and are adjusted for firm clustering with values in parenthesis reported
beneath.*, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Outside option -0.298*** -0.230*** -0.211***
(0.063) (0.060) (0.060)
GDP Growth Home -0.495*** -0.283** -0.232**
(0.122) (0.098) (0.089)
Observations 450 329 425 304 303
Adjusted R-squared 0.271 0.639 0.218 0.606 0.685
Firm controls
First stage F-stat 22.29 14.78 16.55 8.28 9.87
Adjusted R-squared 0.241 0.373 0.0706 0.209 0.431
Number of clusters 22 15 20 13 13
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Table 12: Elasticity of bank credit to internal funding
This table presents the results of OLS and IV estimations of equation (6) over the 1993q1-2007q4
period for the sample of foreign banks’ affiliates. In panel A, the dependent variable is the volume of
mortgages advances, in log and deflated by the CPI index. In panel B, the dependent variable is the
volume of private sector loans, in log and deflated by the CPI index. In the IV estimations, the log
of internal funding is instrumented with the variable Outside Option. Constants are included but not
reported. Variable definitions are provided in Table 3 in the Appendix. All regressions include firm
controls (bank’s size, dummy commercial, dummy branch) and quarter fixed effects. Age is included
as an additional control in models (2) and (4). Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and
are adjusted for firm clustering, with values in parenthesis reported beneath.*, ** and *** indicate
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
PANEL A: Mortgage advances
OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Internal funding (real, in log) 0.220** 0.171* 0.324** 0.236**
(0.080) (0.085) (0.159) (0.114)
Observations 231 193 231 193
Adjusted R-squared 0.951 0.956 0.948 0.954
First stage F-stat 11.855 14.857
Age included
PANEL B: Private sector Loans
OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Internal funding (real, in log) -0.158* -0.192* -0.318** -0.394***
(0.076) (0.096) (0.125) (0.143)
Observations 431 326 431 326
Adjusted R-squared 0.683 0.748 0.655 0.718
First stage F-stat 8.382 13.66
Age included
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Figure 2: Outside option of Global and Emerging multinational banks
Source: Own calculation. Quarterly averages for each of the two groups of banks.
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Figure 3: Ratio of net internal funding funding to asset, 1993q1-2007q4
Source: Resbank, BankScope and own calculations. Quarterly averages for each of the following three
groups of banks: “High east Asian exposure” regroups foreign affiliates which banking group has above
average exposure to East Asian Crisis countries (more than 2.5% of total assets of foreign subsidiaries
ex. South Africa are in east Asia), “Low east Asian exposure” regroups banks with below average
exposure, and all foreign affiliates.
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Figure 4: Ratio of net internal funding to asset, pre and post East Asian Crisis
Source: Resbank, BankScope and own calculations. Quarterly averages for each of the following three
groups of banks: “High east Asian exposure” regroups foreign affiliates which banking group has above
average exposure to East Asian Crisis countries (more than 2.5% of total assets of foreign subsidiaries
ex. South Africa are in east Asia), “Low east Asian exposure” regroups banks with below average
exposure, and all foreign affiliates.
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Chapter 3
The organization of multinational
firms in uncertain environments
3.1 Introduction
Despite a number of academic work carried out over the last decade to analyze the
expansion of firms from developed and developing countries into other developing
countries (Aulakh, 2007; Bartlett and Ghoshal, 2000; Ghemawat and Hout, 2008;
Khanna and Palepu, 2006), little is known about the organizational structure of
multinational firms. However, the organization of firms matters for performance as
evidenced theoretically by an important literature on transfer of authority and power
(Aghion and Tirole (1997); Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (1999); Dessein (2002) and
Dessein and Santos (2006); Alonso, Dessein and Matouschek (2008)). When operat-
ing in developing countries, multinational firms face the following dilemma: should
they transfer more autonomy to their foreign affiliates as these are closer to lo-
cal information, and thus are better able to make efficient use of local knowledge,
especially when the country is characterized by important “institutional voids”1
(Khanna and Palepu, 2006)? Or should they adopt a centralized organization, with
tight control of foreign affiliates’ operations by the headquarters? Preference for
a centralized organization could be related to a fear of losing control when the
incentives of the foreign affiliates’ managers are misaligned with those of the head-
quarters’ managers. Centralization could also be favored by headquarters adopting
“winner-picking” strategies which consists in allocating scarce resources to compet-
1Institutional voids are defined by Khanna and Palepu (2006) as the absence of specialized
intermediaries, regulatory systems and contract-enforcing mechanisms.
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ing projects in an internal capital market (Stein, 1997, 2002)2.
This research aims to explore the roles of (external) environmental and (internal)
firm factors on centralization of processes inside multinationals. More specifically,
this research examines the relation between centralization inside multinationals and
(1) environmental distance between host and home countries (difference in institu-
tional, economic and cultural environment between the home and host countries) and
(2) foreign affiliates’ managers reliance on soft information to assess local projects.
To do so, I analyze the organization of commercial banks in sub-Saharan Africa,
on which data has been gathered through a bank survey. The advantage provided
by this particular setting for the present research is twofold. First, sub-Saharan
Africa is characterized by high macroeconomic uncertainty, a relatively low level of
development and scarcity of “hard” information. As a consequence, this particular
context should exacerbate the environmental distance and the asymmetry of infor-
mation between headquarters and their foreign affiliates, and therefore facilitate the
examination of the relation between these variables and centralization. Second, a
large part of the banking business consists in acquiring and processing information
on borrowers. As such, acquisition of quality information is critical in this sector.
The particularity of banking markets in sub-Saharan Africa is that they are rife
with information issues, in particular, the difficulty to get trustworthy information
on small borrowers. However, access to information in these markets varies between
banks, depending on the profile of their loan portfolio and their exposure to micro,
small and medium borrowers, and between countries, as the level of transparency
is higher in the few African countries which have well-functioning credit reference
bureaus. As such, this context is particularly appropriate to analyze the relation
between quality and availability of local information and internal organization of
multinationals.
To examine theoretically the relation between headquarters and foreign affili-
ates I rely on the organizational economics literature on transfer of authority inside
firms which allows me to take into account the relative roles of information available
on local projects, headquarters’ knowledge of the host environment and congru-
ence between the headquarters’ and the foreign affiliates’ objectives, in shaping the
organizational structure. This literature focuses on the trade-off between acquisi-
tion of local information by the agent and incentives issues between principal and
agents. While the theoretical contributions on transfer of authority inside firms have
not specifically modeled the interaction between headquarters and foreign affiliates,
2The assumption made by Stein (2002) is that the CEO has better information on the prospects
of the units to proceed to profit-enhancing across-unit reallocation of capital than the external
market.
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these models are sufficiently general to be adapted to a multinational setting.
Using this framework, I formulate two sets of empirical predictions. The first
set focuses on the relation between environmental distance and centralization. I
formulate two hypotheses. The first hypothesis is that higher environmental dis-
tance should decrease centralization if it reduces global headquarters’ knowledge
about the local environment (“information channel”). In this case, the headquarters
transfer authority to their foreign affiliates, which are better placed to take decisions
adapted to local conditions. The second hypothesis is that environmental distance
should increase centralization if it reduces congruence of objectives between global
headquarters and foreign affiliates’ managers (“bias channel”). In this scenario, the
headquarters prefer to retain authority as they fear that agency issues will lead to
biased decisions by foreign affiliates’ managers.
The second prediction focuses on the relation between local information and
centralization. It predicts that the more foreign affiliates rely on soft (i.e. qualitative,
or subjective) information3 to evaluate local projects the less the organization is
centralized (i.e. the more it is decentralized).
I then test these hypotheses in the context of multinational banking in sub-
Saharan Africa, examining the relations between global headquarters and their
African foreign affiliates. The measure of centralization employed in this research
focuses on control over operational processes by the headquarters, measuring the de-
gree of dependence of foreign affiliates on their headquarters in key areas of business
operations (for instance, reliance on headquarters for IT systems or credit risk man-
agement software, imposition of operational guidelines by the headquarters, etc.).
It is an alternative measure to that of headquarters’ direct control over decisions,
employed in the empirical literature on decentralization inside plants in a same
country (Bloom, Sadun and Van Reenen, 2012). This focus on control of opera-
tional processes rather than on real authority over production decisions is preferred
given the context of multinational enterprises. Indeed, interviews with managers
have revealed that strategic decisions such as hiring of senior managers or capital
management tend to result from discussions and collaboration between headquarters
and subsidiaries, therefore making it difficult to clearly identify the level at which a
decision is taken4. However, foreign affiliates’ reliance on, for instance, operational
3Soft information tends to be communicated in texts and includes opinions, ideas, statement
of management’s future plans and is difficult to summarize in a numeric score, while hard infor-
mation is often communicated in numbers and consists of financial statements, stock returns, etc.
(Petersen, 2004).
4The survey instrument also collected this type of information, see question 11 in Appendix
B. However, in most cases, the respondents indicated that the decisions were taken jointly, or in
collaboration with their headquarters.
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software developed by the headquarters, is less subjective and easier to measure,
hence the choice to focus on centralization of operational processes.
The empirical results indicate the existence of a positive and significant asso-
ciation between environmental distance and centralization. However, while I find
evidence of an information channel, I find little evidence of a bias channel. In
addition, and consistent with the second prediction, lower quantity of information
available on borrowers and higher reliance on qualitative, “soft”, information are
found to be negatively and significantly associated with centralization.
The main contribution of this research to the literature on the organization of
firms is the empirical evidence it provides on the determinants of centralization
inside multinationals. In particular:
1. This chapter examines the relation between headquarters and foreign affiliates.
This is in contrast with most of the related empirical literature in organiza-
tional economics (Bloom, Sadun and Van Reenen, 2012; Acemoglu, Aghion,
Lelarge, Van Reenen and Zilibotti (2007); Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson, and Hitt
(2002)) which focuses on the interaction between local headquarters and plant
managers, or between plant managers and their subordinates. This research
examines the higher hierarchical level between global headquarters and foreign
affiliates5. In so doing, it sheds light on the role of environmental, host country
factors, in shaping the organizational structure of multinationals.
2. In addition, this research incorporates potential agency issues in the examina-
tion of the relation between headquarters and subsidiaries. This is in contrast
with most of the literature on headquarters-subsidiaries relation, primarily in
the field of international business and strategy, which has mainly concentrated
on networks and knowledge flows within multinationals (Ghoshal and Bartlett,
1990; Gupta and Govindarajan, 2000; Monteiro, Arvidsson and Birkinshaw,
2008), on “parenting advantages” or headquarters’ value added to their sub-
sidiaries (Goold, Campbell and Alexander, 1998; Goold and Campbell, 2002;
Nell and Ambos, 2013), as well as on subsidiaries’ contribution to the firm-
specific advantages of the MNC (Birkinshaw and Morrison, 1995; Birkinshaw,
Hood and Jonsson, 1998) without properly including agency and incentive
aspects. However, as Kaplan and Henderson (2005) argue, this separation
of domains between organizational economists and organizational theorists in
strategy is problematic, as both environmental changes and incentive struc-
tures shape the organizational structure.
3. This research also proposes a new approach to measuring centralization of
5And not between the foreign affiliates’ headquarters and the local branch.
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authority inside firms, recognizing that global headquarters can control foreign
affiliates not only directly through controlling key decisions (such as measured
by Bloom et al. 2012, between plant managers and works), but also indirectly
through controlling operational processes through which these decisions are
made.
4. Finally, this chapter contributes to the understanding of the headquarters-
foreign affiliates relation by focusing both on a sector (banking) and on a
geographic area (sub-Saharan Africa) which have never been studied previously
from on organizational point of view. Indeed, most of the literature has focused
on headquarters-foreign affiliates relation in advanced market economies, with
a few exceptions (Luo, 2003). The primary data available for this research
consists of headquarters-foreign affiliates pairs located in fourteen different
host countries in East Africa, West Africa and Central Africa, with global
headquarters based in a variety of home countries (African countries, as well
as developed and emerging countries).
The following section (3.2) reviews the literature on transfer of authority inside
organizations that is relevant to the research questions. Section 3.3 develops the
theoretical framework and the research hypotheses. Section 3.4 presents the data
and Section 3.5 the empirical strategy. The results are presented in Section 3.6 and
discussed in Section 3.7. Section 3.8 concludes. Appendix A contains the different
tables and figures and Appendix B includes the bank survey questionnaire.
3.2 Centralization in organization
3.2.1 The trade-off between local information and incen-
tives
In this section I review the most relevant theories for organizational structure and
develop a theoretical framework to analyze (de-)centralization inside multinationals.
This review focuses on the organizational economics literature related to authority
in organization (for a survey, see Bolton and Dewatripont, 2011), dealing with the
allocation of authority among managers. These models are preoccupied with verti-
cal allocation of authority6 and assume that allocations of control are enforceable
6Following Fama and Jensen (1983), Bolton and Dewatripont give four attributes to author-
ity: the power to initiate projects and direct subordinates, the power to exact obedience, the
power to ratify and approve actions in a pre-determined area of competency, the duty to monitor
subordinates and the ability to reward for good performance.
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even though agreements over action choice are not. As mentioned in the introduc-
tion, while these models do not specifically examine interactions between agents
and principals inside multinationals, their predictions can be easily applied to this
context.
More specifically, I focus on the incentive view on delegation, as I consider that
the most important problem for the headquarters is access to (better) local in-
formation when the congruence of objectives or preferences between headquarters
(principal) and foreign affiliates (agent) is low and the principal is typically unin-
formed. In this case, I posit that incentives are a problem for the headquarters,
especially when monitoring is difficult (due to environmental uncertainty), and the
principal tends to have low access to local information.
Aghion and Tirole (1997) (henceforth AT) start by contrasting formal authority
and real authority, the distinction lying in the existence of asymmetric information.
Considering that knowledge is a source of power, the authors show that real au-
thority depends on individual costs of information acquisition, objective congruence
between principal and agent and the allocation of formal authority. Crucially, formal
authority needs not confer real authority, as defined by an “effective control over
decisions on its holder” (1997:2). Considering that information can be hard or soft,
and within the basic trade-off between loss of control and initiative, they offer two
views according to which formal authority should be delegated to the agent. Ac-
cording to the “incentive view of delegation”, delegation increases agent’s initiative
(thereby increasing information acquisition by the agent), but decreases principal’s
control. According to the “participation view of delegation”, delegation of minor de-
cisions7 to agents raises participation. The implication of both views is that formal
authority should be delegated to the agent for decisions that are relatively unimpor-
tant for the principal, in order to increase participation. However, authority should
remain centralized (taken by the principal) when the principal is well-informed, or
when he is experienced in the specific decision area (cf. “core competencies”), as
initiative becomes a minor consideration. The authors also emphasize the role of
trust: when trust of the agent in the principal increases, decisions should be central-
ized. Furthermore, they show that centralization may jeopardize communications
by making the agent concerned about being overruled. However if the objectives
of the principal and the agent are sufficiently congruent, more communication may
take place under centralization.
Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (1999) (henceforth BGM) depart slightly from
Aghion and Tirole (1997) by considering that decision rights in organizations are
7Minor for the principal.
156
not contractible: the principal can always overturn a subordinate’s decision, and as
a consequence formal authority resides only at the top. As such, the main differ-
ence is that in BGM’s model informal delegation can be retracted, while AT argue
that the boss may choose formal delegation to strengthen subordinates’ incentives.
In BGM’s paper, the principal may decide to informally delegate authority to the
agent, in order to increase the agent’s efforts. Given that formal authority cannot
be delegated, and that there is always the possibility to veto subordinates actions,
how can the principal credibly (informally) delegate authority? The authors show
that when the principal is informed (i.e. he has the information necessary to as-
sess a proposed project before it is ratified), informal delegation can be superior
to centralization when the benefits from increased effort can outweigh the expected
costs of the poor projects that are sometimes ratified. Given that the principal has
always formal authority to reject a project, informal delegation is only feasible in
the informed-boss model if the boss values sufficiently his reputation for delegating
authority, as the authors assume that the subordinate will no longer trust a boss
who has failed to commit. When the principal is uninformed, he may also infor-
mally delegate authority to the subordinate. However, given that the principal can
observe the results from the project ex-post he can always retract the subordinate’s
future authority if the results from the projects are poor. In this uniformed-boss
environment, it is the subordinate’s reputation that is on the line. As in AT, BGM
underline the key role of trust and commitment by either the agent or the principal
to honor (informal) agreement.
A key assumption of the AT model is that communication between parties takes
an extreme form: when uninformed, a principal with formal authority should dele-
gate the decision to the agent. Dessein (2002) puts more emphasis on the possibility
of noisy, or strategic, communication related to divergent preferences. Furthermore,
he departs from the AT model and the BGM model by assuming that the agent is al-
ways better informed than the principal. He studies the trade-off between the loss of
control under delegation (informed but biased decisions) and the loss of information
under communication (noisy but unbiased decisions). In this model, information is
soft and the objectives of the agent and the principal may differ in a systematic way
(low congruence). The question then centers on the impact of allocation of author-
ity on the use of this private information, providing a purely informational rationale
for delegation. He considers two cases, with different degrees of uncertainty about
the environment. The principal has the choice of either fully delegating a task to
a better informed agent or to order the latter what to do after having consulted
with him. Dessein shows that, in the case of a uniform distribution of the state
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of nature, delegation of control is optimal as long as the divergence in preferences
is not too large relative to the principal’s uncertainty about the environment, the
amount of private information of the agent is large and the principal is more risk-
averse. For more uncertain environments, when the agent’s bias is small, delegation
performs better, just as with uniform distribution, or communication must be very
informative to dominate delegation. For large biases, communication will dominate
delegation when the uncertainty about the environment is sufficiently small.
Similarly, in the literature on capital allocation, Stein (2002) also proceeds to
examine the best organizational structure for the performance of the capital allo-
cation activity under different types and quality of information on the projects. In
his 2002 model he argues that a decentralized approach is most likely to be attrac-
tive when information about projects is “soft” and cannot be credibly transmitted.
In contrast, when information can be costlessly “hardened” and passed along in-
side the firm large hierarchies perform better. When information is soft, such as
in small business lending, decentralization should be a better organizational struc-
ture because it strengthens the research incentives of line managers as they will get
direct rewards from their research. However, when information can be hardened
and passed over easily to superiors, line managers can increase their capital budgets
by producing verifiable positive information. Managers then become advocates for
their units.
Finally, Dessein and Santos (2006) (and extensions by Bolton and Dewatripont
(2011) of their model) and Alonso, Dessein and Matouschek (2008) incorporate co-
ordination costs to the analysis of delegation or decentralization inside an organiza-
tion. More specifically, they examine the three-way trade-off between coordination,
specialization, and adaptation. The performance of an organization is determined
by its adaptation to the environment and the quality of coordination among tasks.
Decentralization economizes on the costly communication, red tape, and costly bu-
reaucracy that management of multiple agents’ actions entails under a centralized
command. However, in a volatile environment, the organization must be able to
adapt to new circumstances, redefining agents’ tasks and requiring coordination,
which can be costly under a decentralized organization. Dessein and Santos (2006)
show that mis-coordination costs can be reduced under centralization, given that a
single individual commands the actions taken by all the agents. The authors show
that the desire for adaptation will generate coordination problems when agents are
specialized. As such, higher uncertainty or higher mis-adaptation costs will raise the
benefits of adaptiveness (which in turn raises the benefit of communication), and
therefore favor a centralized (but high communication cost) structure, with ex-post
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coordination between agents. To summarize Dessein and Santos (2006), decentral-
ization is associated with high specialization, little communication, little responsive-
ness to the environment and ex-ante coordination. Centralization is associated with
high communication, little specialization, high responsiveness to the environment,
and ex-post coordination. One of the limits of the Dessein and Santos (2006) model
is that they assume away incentives. Introducing incentives and agent’s bias, Alonso
et al. (2008) show that centralization will outperform decentralization when agents
are very biased and coordination is important.
Table 1 in Appendix A summarizes the literature reviewed by highlighting the
different implications for the organization of firms, based on different assumptions
about principal-agent interactions and their environment.
To sum up, with the AT (1997), BGM (1999) and Dessein (2002) models we ob-
tain the same conclusion of decentralization as an optimal organizational structure
when the agent can be trusted (higher congruence principal-agent or lower agent’s
bias) and the principal is uninformed. Dessein (2002) introduces the idea of volatile
environment, and shows that the agent’s bias cannot be too large relative to envi-
ronment uncertainty. In other words, he shows that there is a upper limit on the
bias of the agent (or minimum congruence threshold) above which decentralization
will not work. Dessein and Santos (2006) and Alonso et al. (2008) introduce an
additional problem, that of coordination, and show the non-linearity of the relation
between agents’ bias, coordination and adaptation. The prediction under volatile
environment, with the need to respond quickly and minimize mis-coordination cost
in the presence of large agents’ biases changes: to save on coordination costs, the
organization needs to be centralized.
How do these models relate to the organizational structure of multinational en-
terprises? In the analysis of centralization inside multinational firms, I consider that
the global headquarters are the Principal and the foreign affiliate is the Agent. The
literature surveyed teaches us that different variables need to be examined simulta-
neously. I review them below in the context of multinational firms. The first one is
related to the external environment of the firm:
(1) The volatility of the environment. In the context of multinationals, the focus
will be on the environmental uncertainty in the host countries.
The following three are related to internal firm factors:
(2) The degree of congruence between principal and agents’ objectives. This cap-
tures the agency cost for the organization related to agents’ biases and self-interest.
This might increase with foreign affiliates’ distance to headquarters. Congruence
can be reinforced by strategically hiring highly congruent or trustful agents as top
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managers in the foreign affiliate entity; for instance, putting in place a senior man-
agement team mainly composed of expatriates, as these may have more similar
objectives to those of headquarters’ managers.
(3) Whether the principal is informed or not. This will vary depending on the ac-
cumulated knowledge of the headquarters on the host environment. When a multi-
national has extensive (in terms of number of countries of operations) and intensive
(in terms of number of years in operation) knowledge of the host country, the head-
quarters (Principal)’s degree of knowledge should be higher.
(4) The importance of coordination. For multinational firms, there is a trade-off
between scale economies through coordination of products or services across regions
and adaptation to local tastes. The potential for scale economies should increase
with the size of the group. Coordination advantages should be higher for larger
groups (in terms of assets or number of foreign affiliates).
(5) The type of information that the agent acquires (hard vs. soft) and the way
it is processed internally. This will depend on the type of industry considered, as
some are more information-intensive, and the general availability of information in
the host environment.
The organizational choice will depend on both types of factors, as illustrated
in Figure 1 in Appendix A. The environmental factors will determine the structure
of the relation between headquarters and foreign affiliates, in conjunction with the
internal factors of the multinational firm previously identified. As such, firms will
not respond uniformly to a specific environmental context, assuming that they strive
to find the best fit between their organizational structure and both the internal and
the external context (see also Roberts and Saloner, 2013, for a review of the literature
on performance, strategy and organization).
The next section formulates research hypotheses on the relation between these
factors and organizational structure.
3.3 Hypotheses development
3.3.1 Presentation of the research hypotheses
In this research centralization is defined as the degree of headquarters’ control over
processes. I will examine the relation between environmental distance between
home (global headquarters’ country) and host country (foreign affiliates’ country)
and centralization of processes inside the multinational. Environmental distance is
broadly defined and encompasses differences in institutional, economic and cultural
environment between the home and the host country. This concept of distance is
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distinct from geographic distance, although the two might be highly correlated. En-
vironmental distance between home and host countries may have opposite influences
on organizational structure, either pushing for more or for less centralization, essen-
tially illustrating the trade-off between local information and incentives. I identify
two main channels through which distance may influence organizational structure:
Channel 1: Environmental distance reduces headquarters’ knowledge about local
environment, raising the need for acquisition of local information or local adaptation.
A first channel through which environmental distance could influence organizational
structure is through raising the need for local adaptation. Higher environmental
distance may imply that headquarters have very little knowledge of the local host
environment. This may favor decentralization to increase local information acqui-
sition by the foreign affiliates (AT, 1997), leading to informed but biased decisions
(BGM, 1999). As such environmental distance may favor decentralization if the
difference in local tastes or way of doing business between the home and the host
country is important. However, if the principal is well informed, or in the particular
case of multinationals, if the headquarters have important experience operating in a
region, they may prefer to retain authority as they will have enough local knowledge
or experience to take decisions that are adapted to the host environment (AT, 1997,
Dessein, 2002). As such, I formulate the first hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1a Higher environmental distance decreases centralization if it de-
creases headquarters’ knowledge about the local environment.
Channel 2: Environmental distance raises foreign affiliates’ managers’ biases. A
second channel through which distance could influence organizational structure is
through congruence of objectives between global headquarters’ managers and foreign
affiliates’ managers. Higher environmental distance between home and host coun-
tries could result in lower congruence between headquarters and foreign affiliates’
managers’ objectives, if those managers come from very different cultures or operate
in dissimilar institutional environments. According to Aghion and Tirole (1997),
Dessein (2002), Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (1999), higher congruence, or lower
bias, between principal-agent facilitates decentralization by attenuating the risks
associated with loss of control, especially abuse of power. Furthermore, as Dessein
(2002) shows, decentralization performs better when the agent’s bias is small rel-
ative to environmental uncertainty. Environmental distance between headquarters
and foreign affiliates may thus influence organizational structure through its impact
on headquarters and foreign affiliates’ managers’ congruence of preferences or ob-
jectives. If distance increases agents’ biases, it would push for more centralization
at the top.
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Hypothesis 1b Higher environmental distance increases centralization if it in-
creases foreign affiliates’ managers’ biases.
Finally, the quality and availability of information on local projects has been
shown theoretically by Stein (2002) and Dessein (2002) to impact the organiza-
tional structure of the firm. This is associated with the degree of transparency and
information in an economy. According to Stein (2002), when information is soft
and cannot be credibly transmitted, a decentralized approach should perform bet-
ter. Empirically, Petersen and Rajan (2002) examine how the type of information
available on borrowers influences the organizational structure of the firm, and more
specifically the required distance between borrowers and lenders. They show that
the increase in physical distance between lenders and small businesses borrowers in
the 1990s was due to a higher availability of hard information on small businesses,
coupled with better computer and communication tools, which reduced the need to
be close to the information. Liberti (2004) and Liberti and Mian (2009) also found
that reliance on soft information was higher under decentralized than centralized
structures. As such, I formulate the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2 Higher reliance on soft information on local projects is associated
with lower centralization (i.e. higher decentralization).
Testing the hypotheses in the context of banking in sub-Saharan Africa.
The empirical setting chosen for this research is that of banking in sub-Saharan
Africa. As mentioned in the introduction, this context is particularly appropri-
ate to examine the impact of the information available on local projects and the
environmental distance between headquarters and their foreign affiliates on the or-
ganizational structure of multinationals. Firstly, the volatility of the environment
in sub-Saharan Africa will tend to be very high relative to the home country envi-
ronment of the multinational bank, not only due to general political uncertainty or
macro-economic volatility but also because of the generally weak governance envi-
ronment which increases the risk of idiosyncratic shocks to a firm’s profits. Secondly,
given that there are often no credit registries in sub-Saharan African economies and
that the availability of reliable audited accounts is limited, information on projects,
especially for SMEs, tend to be soft and bank managers need to rely on relationship
lending to assess them. As such, the high importance of information acquisition
in banking activities and the large institutional voids which characterize African
economies, coupled with significant macroeconomic uncertainty, should exacerbate
the asymmetry of information between headquarters’ managers and foreign affiliates’
managers, making the above predictions more salient.
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3.4 Data collection
3.4.1 Development of the questionnaire
The empirical testing of the two sets of hypotheses relies on bank survey data.
The development of the survey questionnaire was done in several steps. The ques-
tionnaire was first developed through literature review and theory development. It
was subsequently reviewed by academicians with specific experience in the topic
of multinational banking or in firm survey methodology. I then proceeded to the
pretesting of the questionnaire through face-to-face interviews with three managers
of a foreign affiliate of an emerging multinational bank in London to clarify the phe-
nomenon of interest and identify any relevant issue not addressed in the preliminary
questionnaire. An important feedback from this pilot was to ask more open-ended
questions in order to avoid respondent bias which sometimes arises with close-ended
questions. In addition, the wording of several questions was changed in order to
improve understanding, and to be more adapted to banking business terminology.
The questionnaire focuses on three aspects. The first part focuses on the interac-
tion between headquarters and foreign affiliates, the second part is related to bank
credit practices and the third part asks managers about their perception of the local
business environment. The questionnaire is presented in Appendix B.
3.4.2 Overview of the data collection and data quality
Sample size and scope. I conducted fieldwork in Kenya (October-November
2013), Tanzania (November-December 2013) and Ghana (March-April 2014) to col-
lect data through interviews with bank managers. The choice of these three countries
was motivated by the important number (and variety) of foreign banks operating
in these markets as shown in Figure 2 in Appendix A. The target population in-
cluded all the active commercial banks in these countries (target population of 97
banks in total), and I gathered data on 62 different banks in total during these
fieldworks (obtaining an average response rate of 64%). 27 banks were located in
Kenya, 19 in Tanzania and 16 in Ghana. To obtain interviews I directly contacted
the headquarters by phone or introduced myself in person, and presented a letter
of introduction from the London School of Economics and, in the case of Tanzania,
from the International Growth Centre8. In addition, I collected data from Uganda
8The International Growth Centre aims to promote growth through policy advices based on
research. It has programs in 14 countries. It is based at LSE and in partnership with Oxford Uni-
versity. During my fieldwork in Tanzania, I was based at the IGC offices in Dar es Salaam. On top
of a letter of introduction signed by IGC Tanzania’s head, Dr Pantaleo Kessy, I obtained logistical
help to organize the interviews. More information: http://www.theigc.org/countries/tanzania.
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(4 banks) and Zambia (2 banks) by calling the local headquarters in these coun-
tries to obtain the email of the persons in charge of the credit department and then
emailing the questionnaire. I also contacted the global headquarters of foreign banks
with affiliates in Africa to ask for their help to distribute the questionnaire to their
African subsidiaries. Through this channel I obtained 9 additional questionnaires
from foreign affiliates of global banks in Mali, Ivory Coast, Congo, Burkina Faso,
Cameroon, Senegal, Equatorial Guinea, Madagascar and Chad (see Figure 3 for a
graphical representation of the distribution of banks in the sample by host countries).
In total, I obtained a sample of 77 banks from 14 sub-Saharan African countries.
33 questionnaires were filled in by me during an interview, 36 questionnaires were
completed directly by the respondents and 8 questionnaires were completed by the
respondents and followed by a shorter interview. The interviews were conducted
in English and lasted 45 minutes on average, ranging from 90 minutes to 15 min-
utes (shorter interviews in the case of follow-up interview, after the respondents had
completed the questionnaire). The language of the questionnaire and/or interview
was English (89% of the sample) and French (11%).
The size of the sample is admittedly small. However this sample size needs
to be put into perspective. First, banking markets in developing countries, and
especially in Africa, tend to be relatively small in terms of number of banks operating
in a given market9, compared to more developed countries. As such, the target
population itself is relatively limited. Secondly, survey data on banking focusing
on banks’ practices and organization is commonly very scarce, with limited sample
size. For instance, Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Martínez Pería (2008) conducted
a World Bank survey on banks’ SME lending practices in 2008 which covered 91
banks from 45 countries around the world, but included only 15 sub-Saharan African
banks from 7 countries10. Another more recent survey of SME financing in four East
African countries11, conducted by the African Development Bank in 2012 (see Calice,
Chando and Sekioua, 2012) was based on interviews at 16 different banks. Apart
from the small target population, the small size of these samples is also related to
sectoral factors, in particular concerns about confidentiality in the banking industry.
Respondents’ characteristics. The respondents were mainly head or man-
ager of credit (retail, SMEs or corporates) (35%), followed by head of credit risk
or credit administration (26%) and CEO (14%). The rest of the respondents were
9Rarely more than 30 banks operate in a given sub-Saharan country; in addition, according
to Bureau Van Dijk’s BankScope database, in 2012 the average number of foreign banks in sub-
Saharan African countries was 7, ranging from 21 (Tanzania) to 1 (Comoros).
10Kenya, Malawi, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
11Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia.
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branch manager or relationship officer (9%), Chief Financial Officer (CFO) (1%),
Chief Operating Officer (COO) (1%) or general managers (13%). I aimed to obtain
information from the heads of credit, heads of risk, or their superiors (COO, CFO,
CEO). Sometimes these persons were not available or were not willing to speak to
me for confidentiality reasons, but recommended me to speak directly to a branch
manager or a relationship officer. While branch managers have less first-hand expe-
rience of the global operations and strategy of their group, they have very detailed
knowledge of loan monitoring and screening practices. However, for foreign affili-
ates, as a large part of the questionnaire concerns interactions between headquarters
and foreign affiliates, all the respondents occupied a higher position (Head of risk,
Head of credit, COO, CFO or CEO). On average the respondents had been in the
bank for 7.5 years at the time of the survey, with a minimum of 6 months and a
maximum of 42 years. Concerning the quality of the interviews, I gave scores rang-
ing from 1 (poor) to 5 (very good) regarding interviewee’s knowledge, patience and
willingness to reveal information. The average respective scores were 4.0 (knowl-
edge), 4.3 (patience) and 4.4 (willingness to reveal information). Overall, getting
the interviews was the most difficult part, but once an interview was scheduled, it
was seldom rescheduled or canceled and respondents were relatively open to share
information. I gave a survey information sheet to each of them, explaining the re-
search and ensuring confidentiality of the data. I committed to conceal the name of
the respondents or the bank, as well as any information that may help identify the
respondent or his bank.12
Construction of the database. The data were transferred to Stata for statis-
tical analysis. Using unique identifiers, banks in the survey dataset were matched
with the Bureau Van Dijk’s BankScope database, which provides additional bank
financial information. At the country level, indicators of governance from the World-
wide Governance Indicators dataset of the World Bank and GDP measures from the
IMF’s World Economic Outlook were used to construct measures of distance.
Non-response bias analysis. I conduct an analysis of non-response rate to
examine the possibility of sampling bias. To do so, I compare the means of several
key financial indicators of participant and non-participant banks (both domestic
and foreign) surveyed in Kenya, Ghana and Tanzania. I focus on banks located in
these three countries, which constitutes 81% of the sample, given that the number
of participant banks in the 11 other countries is very small (between one and four
respondent banks) and therefore not representative, while the survey covers 66% of
12Note that most of the respondents refused to have the interview taped, in which case I took
notes. Given the highly structured format of the interview, errors due to interviewer’s note-taking
are relatively low.
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the commercial banks in Kenya, 59% in Tanzania and 67% in Ghana. The results
are reported in Table 3 in Appendix A.13 They indicate that although participant
banks are on average larger by asset, with higher net income and higher capital ratio,
the differences are not significant at the 10% level. These results give confidence
that the data do not suffer from major sampling biases due to banks’ self-selection,
at least concerning the bank population in the countries in which fieldwork has been
conducted. Of course, other biases related to the selection of countries for fieldwork
cannot be excluded, however, efforts have been made to obtain data on different
regions of Africa, and the sample includes all the largest banking groups present
in Africa, originating from France, the U.K., the U.S., India as well as from North
Africa and sub-Saharan Africa.
3.4.3 Empirical setting: sub-Saharan Africa
As mentioned previously, Africa is a particular environment, especially with respect
to institutional quality and transparency of information in banking markets. In
this section I shed more light on this environmental context by reviewing the main
characteristics of the banking markets in the three countries where fieldwork has
been conducted (Kenya, Tanzania and Ghana). Kenya is the dominant banking
center in East Africa with 43 commercial banks. Some local banks (Kenya Com-
mercial Bank, Equity bank) are growing larger than global multinationals such as
Barclays or Standard Chartered which were previously number one or two in terms
of assets14. These large domestic banks have expansion strategies in East Africa,
and more widely in the sub-continent having set up foreign affiliates in Uganda and
Tanzania, emulating the regional expansion of Nigerian banks such as United Bank
for Africa. With new models based on technology platforms with mobile phones and
agency banking, they are expanding fast and generating high profits. Tanzania is a
less sophisticated market than Kenya with a higher proportion of foreign banks (71%
of the commercial banks are foreign in Tanzania, against a third in Kenya). While
all the banks surveyed use the services of the credit reference bureaus in Kenya,
most of the banks surveyed in Tanzania were not using these bureaus as they were
licensed only a few months prior to the administration of the survey. Mobile banking
is also prevalent in Tanzania and most of the banks surveyed offered these services
13Note that the total number of banks presented in this table is lower than the target population
as a few of the banks surveyed are not included in the BankScope database.
14In 2012, the total assets of Standard Chartered in Kenya amounted to 195B Kshs, against 91B
Kshs in 2007. For Barclays these numbers were 185B Kshs in 2012 against 158B Kshs in 2007.
Kenya Commercial Bank recorded 304B Kshs of total assets in 2012 against 120B Kshs in 2007
while for Equity Bank these numbers were 216B Kshs in 2012 against 53B Kshs in 2007. Source:
Banking Survey 2013, Kenya Bankers Association (2013).
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to their customers.
Ghana, an English-speaking country located in West Africa and surrounded by
Francophone countries, represents with Nigeria the most dynamic banking market in
its region. Half of the banks operating in Ghana are foreign, with a large presence of
Nigerian banks (representing a third of foreign banks). Mobile banking technology
is less diffused in West Africa and only a few banks offer mobile banking services
in Ghana while most of them operate electronic banking services, mainly through
the Internet. There are two licensed credit reference bureaus and all the banks
are using them, as it is mandatory per the Bank of Ghana’s guidelines. While
Kenya and Tanzania have explicit deposit insurance protection system, Ghana has
not developed one yet, though it is scheduled to be in place at the end of 2014.
In terms of capital requirements, the three countries have considerably increased
their minimum core capital requirements over the last 5 years, which have now
reached USD 12mns (KSH 1 bn) for Kenya, USD 9 mns (TZS 15bns) for Tanzania
and USD 45mns (GHC120 mns) for Ghana. As a consequence, the markets are
more consolidated compared to the previous decade. Finally, concerning the use of
financial services and geographic outreach, Kenya leads in terms of deposit accounts,
while Tanzania has a better developed network of ATMs: there were 662.26 deposit
accounts with commercial banks per 1000 adults and 9.94 ATMs per 100,000 adults
in 2012 in Kenya, 186.71 and 14.57 respectively in 2012 in Tanzania, and 479.47
and 5.47 respectively in 2012 in Ghana (Source: IMF, Financial Access Survey).
Although these countries compare favorably with other, less financially developed
African countries, the use of financial services is still very low compared to other
developing countries15.
In terms of the business environment, these banks face similar structural chal-
lenges in all the 14 countries from which data has been gathered: slow pace of
the judiciary system impeding a quick recovery of collateral in case of default (for
instance, 84% of the respondents in Tanzania, 62% in Kenya and 37% in Ghana
considered that long processes in Court were an important or extreme obstacle to
their operations), lack of information regarding SMEs (including poor financial re-
porting, lack of identity documents, poor address system), lack of collateral, and
generally weak institutions, high informality and high credit risk. Over 80% of the
bank managers interviewed also considered that the business environment was very
competitive, especially in the corporate lending segment and in the deposit segment.
While access to information and intensity of competition seem to be major obsta-
15As an example, there were 1042 deposit accounts with commercial banks per 1000 adults in
India in 2012 and 934 in Peru.
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cles for banks, this is not the case of banking regulations and employment laws: the
large majority of bank managers surveyed considered that these regulations did not
constitute obstacles, or only minor obstacles to their activities16.
3.4.4 Characteristics of banks in the sample
Table 4 in Appendix A presents selected statistics on banks in the sample. Out of
the 77 banks surveyed, 36 are domestic banks, 14 are affiliates of regional African
multinational banks including North Africa but excluding South Africa (“African
MNB”), 19 are affiliates of global multinational banks (from France, U.S., Germany,
the U.K.) (“Global MNB”) and 8 are affiliates of multinational banks from other
emerging or developing countries (from India, Malaysia, South Africa) (“Emerging
MNB”). 61% of the banks (domestic or foreign) are multinationals. Concerning the
foreign affiliates, which form the sample of banks examined in this chapter, 38 were
organized as subsidiaries and only 3 as branches. In terms of entry mode, foreign
banks tend to favor greenfield entry. 64% of African MNB, 63% of Global MNB and
75% of Emerging MNB entered these markets through a greenfield operation. The
banks were 27 years old on average in 2014, the average incorporation date being
1987, but important variations exist between banks, depending on the country of
origin of the parent bank. The oldest group is constituted by the foreign affiliates
of the Global MNB (39 years old on average), followed by Emerging MNB (37 years
old) and domestic banks (24 years old). The foreign affiliates of regional African
MNB are the last entrants (8 years old), which is consistent with the fact that the
expansion of regional African MNB is a relatively recent phenomenon. In terms of
size as measured by the number of employees, domestic banks are the largest (1022
employees on average), followed by Global MNB (650 employees), Emerging MNB
(243 employees) and regional African MNB (233 employees). The ranking remains
the same in terms of bank branches in the country of operation, with on average 40
branches for domestic banks, 26 branches for Global MNB, 13 branches for regional
African MNB and 10 branches for Emerging MNB.
Box 1: Two cases of the organization of multinational banks in sub-Saharan Africa
Group G (“Global”) is a large global multinational banking group. Group A (“African”) is
a regional African multinational banking group. They both have operations in several countries
across Africa. These two groups represent relatively typical cases of the organization and mode of
1662% of the banks considered that the banking regulations were not or were only a minor
obstacle to their business operations and 79% of respondents considered that employment laws
were not or were only a minor obstacle to their business operations.
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operation in Africa of global banks and regional African banks, respectively. The qualitative data
was collected during interviews (1-hour long on average) with two CEOs of two foreign subsidiaries
of Group G and two heads of credit of two foreign subsidiaries of Group A. The two subsidiaries
are located in Kenya and Tanzania.
Overall organizational architecture
The organizational architecture at Group G could be described as one of concentric hierarchic
circles. At the bottom of the hierarchy lies the country entity, one level up are the clusters (for
instance the East Africa cluster, with headquarters in Kenya, or the West Africa cluster, with
headquarters in Senegal), then the regional divisions (for instance Africa with headquarters in
South Africa) and finally the macro regional division (Africa being integrated in the Europe -
Middle East - Africa “EMEA” macro-regional division).
Group A has subsidiaries across Africa both in francophone and English-speaking countries, but
does not have such a formal hierarchical structure. Subsidiaries in English-speaking countries tend
to cooperate more predominantly with subsidiaries in English-speaking countries, and similarly
for francophone countries, and for East Africa, the Kenyan subsidiary constitutes the “point of
reference” for the other East African subsidiaries. Nevertheless, the East African subsidiaries of
Group A directly report to the global headquarters, while the East African subsidiaries of Group
G first report to the headquarters of their cluster in Kenya, or for the Kenyan subsidiary, to its
regional headquarters in South Africa.
Training and knowledge received from headquarters
Both respondents at Group G indicated that group support was very strong with regular
exchange of best practices between foreign affiliates. Most of the processing systems are centralized
and the respondents indicated that they leverage regional structures for administrative work. For
marketing, the campaigns are developed at the cluster and regional level. For more technical
aspects such as IT systems, Operational Risk Management and Credit Risk Management, systems
are developed centrally and adapted to local needs. For instance, the group has a global system of
financial reporting, which is then easily adapted to host countries’ regulations. The fact that they
leverage global platforms has a direct impact on revenues, as it decreases operating costs through
economies of scale.
Subsidiaries of Group A also receive some support from their group, with quarterly training
focusing on sales and risk. For instance, a marketing team is sent by the global headquarters
to provide training to the subsidiaries. Adverts and branding are also centralized, which has
sometimes led to misalignment with local context. Concerning IT and software, the subsidiaries’
Monitoring and Information Systems (MIS) are received from the headquarters. Group involvement
is also important regarding operational risk management, both respondents indicating that they
receive guidelines from the group. Concerning credit risk management, the headquarters monitor
their overall loan portfolio and send reports on a monthly basis to the subsidiaries.
Autonomy of subsidiaries
Generally speaking, the degree of decentralization of decision-making at Group G depends on
the type of banking products considered but the decision is often made in partnership between the
local entity and the different echelons up the hierarchy. Concerning credit approval, Group G does
not set limits for each entity, instead approval limits increase over time for each manager. One of
the particularities of Group G is that its subsidiaries do not set up credit committees to approve
loans. Instead, there are two credit officers working together in-country, with some loans requiring
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in-country Board approval. The hiring of senior managers is done in partnership with the cluster
but the country CEO has the final say. Concerning the introduction of new banking products, the
decision is also made in collaboration with the hierarchy.
On the contrary, at Group A, subsidiaries have local limits for loan approval, and for loans
above this limit the subsidiaries need to receive approval from the group. For decisions regarding
introduction of new banking products and local expansion (opening of new branches), these tend to
be made in partnership with the global headquarters, while for hiring of top managers or decisions
regarding the allocation of the portfolio of loans, decisions tend to be made mostly or exclusively
by the subsidiary.
Collaboration between subsidiaries
At Group G, collaboration between subsidiaries occurs to provide necessary facilities to the
clients, but foreign subsidiaries rarely partner to provide specific funding facilities. One of the
respondents noted that communication can be sometimes difficult with the regional headquarters,
due to disagreement over business decisions, but that there are important interactions with other
cluster countries. In addition, some functions are primarily performed at the headquarters of the
cluster, such as human resources and legal functions.
The Tanzanian subsidiary of Group A indicated that they receive training from Kenya on a
regular basis, and that it indirectly comes from the global headquarters (the global headquarters
first train the managers at the Kenyan subsidiary who then train the managers in Tanzania).
Contrary to Group G where loan syndication between African subsidiaries is very limited, both the
Kenyan and the Tanzanian managers of the subsidiaries of Group A indicated that they regularly
partner with other affiliates of their banking group to offer loans to corporates, essentially sharing
facilities with other subsidiaries located in East Africa or in the fast-growing English-speaking West
African countries. The head of credit of the Tanzanian subsidiary indicated that they often partner
with Kenya given the Tanzania’s regulatory reserve limit. When a loan is above the regulatory
local limit they obtain some additional funds from the Kenyan subsidiary to provide the facility.
Management of people
Group G relies heavily on local skills as most of the top management team in the two sub-
sidiaries surveyed is composed of local managers, although the CEOs are expatriates (one from
the home country, one from a third country). To a certain extent this local profile of Group G’s
top management (which is also observed in other global banks) is due to the fact that banks have
to demonstrate to the host country’s Central Bank that they could not find the appropriate skills
in the market, which, as a result, tends to favor local staff. The respondents interviewed also felt
that there were enough qualified local senior bankers to fulfill their need, which was not the case
in the past decades when there were many more expatriates among top managers. In addition,
expatriates package are expensive for banks. As a consequence, there is a general trend among
Group G to reduce the number of expatriates and rely on local workforce as much as possible.
The general human resources management at Group G is focused on cross-fertilization and regular
rotation of personnel, both across Africa and also across the different regions. They have specific
programs for senior managers which aim to identify talent and to expose these top managers to
different environments, rotating them across the group. As a consequence, expatriates are not
necessarily from the group home country, and some African managers are CEOs of subsidiaries in
African countries other than their home country.
The top management (COO, CFO, Head risk) in the foreign subsidiaries of Group A is also
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mainly local, but both subsidiaries have CEOs which come from a third African country (i.e.
neither home nor host country). While not having specific training programs for top management
such as the one at Group G, Group A nevertheless also favors rotation of top managers across
subsidiaries.
3.5 Empirical strategy
3.5.1 Econometric specification
I estimate the following two models to test empirically the first set of hypotheses
concerning the relation between environmental distance and centralization, and the
second hypothesis concerning the relation between information on local projects and
centralization17:
CENTRALIZATIONigc = αDISTANCEigc + β1Xi + β2Yg + δZc + γc + igc
(3.1)
CENTRALIZATIONigc = αSOFT INFOi + β1Xi + β2Yg + δZc + γc + igc
(3.2)
CENTRALIZATIONigc is the dependent variable, an indicator of centralization
of processes for the foreign affiliate i of a multinational group g located in country
c. In equation (3.1) DISTANCEigc is a measure of environmental distance between
the foreign affiliates’ country and the home (parent group) country. I examine three
alternative measures of distance: institutional distance, economic distance and cul-
tural distance. In equation (3.2), SOFT INFOi is a vector of variables indicating the
degree to which foreign affiliates rely on soft information to evaluate local projects
(screen borrowers). Xi represents a vector of foreign affiliate-level controls, Yg is
a vector of group-level controls and Zc is a vector of host country controls. I also
include a full set of host country dummies γc. igc is an error term. I relax the
assumption of identical and independent distribution of the errors and I cluster the
17I choose to examine the two independent variables of interest (Environmental Distance and
Soft Information) in separate regressions given the potentially high multicollinearity between them
and the fact that reliance on soft information is likely to be partly driven by institutional or
economic environment of the host country, and therefore be an outcome of distance. An additional
motivation for using two different equations is the fact that I lose degrees of freedom when including
both types of variables in the regressions, which restricts the number of controls I can include given
the small size of the sample.
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standard errors at the group level to allow for possible correlations between residuals
of foreign affiliates from a same multinational group. The residuals are correlated
across two observations (foreign affiliates) of a same group, but are assumed to be
independent across groups.
I expect α > 0 or α < 0 for the coefficient on the distance variable in equa-
tion (3.1) depending on the main channel at work. Theoretically, I identified two
channels through which distance could influence centralization. The first one was
through the impact of distance on headquarters’ knowledge of the local environ-
ment and the second one was through the impact of distance on foreign affiliates’
managers’ bias. After examining the relation between environmental distance and
centralization, I will examine separately these two potential channels by including
two “channel variables” (which are supposedly outcomes of institutional distance,
and therefore “bad control”) in the regression of centralization. I will first include an
indicator of headquarters’ knowledge of the local environment, which I expect to be
positively correlated with the centralization index. I will then include a proxy vari-
able for the degree of congruence between headquarters and foreign affiliates, which
I expect to be negatively correlated with the centralization index. In so doing, I fol-
low the methodology employed by Maccini and Yang (2009). More specifically, the
approach involves regressing the centralization index on the indicator of distance,
and then successively including as controls key variables representing managers’ bi-
ases and headquarters’ knowledge about the local environment. I then compare
results across specifications to gain insight on the intermediate channels that are
operative. If inclusion of a set of variables X leads to important changes in the
size of the coefficient on distance (decline in magnitude if the channel variable is
positively correlated with distance and centralization, or negatively correlated with
both and increase in magnitude if it is negatively correlated with distance or with
centralization) and substantial increases in the R-squared, this would suggest that
the variables in X represent an important channel towards centralization. However,
and as Maccini and Yang (2009) note, these results should only be taken as sugges-
tive given the potential concerns about omitted variables, data quality, and reverse
causality.
Finally, I expect α < 0 for the coefficient on soft information in equation (3.2),
higher reliance on soft information being associated with less centralization. I detail
in the next sub-section the construction of the indicator of centralization as well as
the different control variables employed in the regression analysis.
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3.5.2 Measuring Centralization
One approach to measuring centralization is to examine the organization charts of
firms, as a way to identify formal authority of structures. Using a database of job
descriptions of top managers, reporting relationships, and compensation structures
in over 300 large U.S. firms over a 13-year period, Rajan and Wulf (2006) document
a flattening of the senior management hierarchy. Acemoglu, et al. (2007) also use
formal measures of whether firms are organized into profit centers or cost/production
centers. Another, more direct, approach, adopted by Bloom, Sadun and Van Reenen
(2012), consists in focusing on real authority by directly asking plant managers about
where decisions are effectively made (at the plant or at the central headquarters)
regarding hiring, capital expenditure, marketing, and product innovations decisions.
The authors take the average across the four Z-scored measures and obtain an indi-
cator of decentralization (or equivalently, autonomy of the plant manager).
In this research I also focus on real autonomy of foreign affiliates vis-a-vis their
headquarters, but I differ slightly from Bloom, Sadun and Van Reenen (2012) by
focusing on centralization of processes, instead of centralization of decisions. More
specifically, I consider that an alternative to direct control by headquarters over
foreign affiliates’ decisions is for the headquarters to control operational processes
through which these decisions are made. For instance having software for loan
appraisal or monitoring that are created centrally by the headquarters and then
transferred to the foreign affiliates will ensure that the criteria by which loans are
appraised are set by the headquarters. Box 1 which provides an overview of the or-
ganization of multinationals and headquarters-foreign affiliates relationship through
two case studies of multinational banks operating in sub-Saharan Africa reveals the
importance of controlling operational processes in multinationals to ensure head-
quarters’ control over operations and decisions in foreign affiliates, and more gen-
erally, group’s operational continuity or homogeneity of practices across entities.
Compared to focusing on strategic decisions, this measure will put less emphasis on
a particular individual’s autonomy and more on the foreign affiliate, as an entity.
For instance, limits on loan approval authority may vary from one individual to the
other, while the use of a particular software will be uniformly imposed to all staff of
a foreign affiliate.18
18As mentioned in the introduction, the survey also asked managers about their authority over
strategic decisions such as introduction of new banking products, opening of local branches, hiring
of senior managers. However, the respondents often indicated that the decision was taken “in
collaboration with headquarters”, generally proposed by the foreign affiliates and then ratified by
the headquarters, which left little variation across banks in the data. As a consequence, focusing
on authority over strategic decisions did not allow me to clearly identify (de-)centralization of
authority.
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As such, the indicator Centralization of Processes focuses on control of op-
erational processes, directly asking foreign affiliates’ managers about their entity’s
autonomy from their headquarters concerning five key operational processes areas19.
The 5 areas of business operations covered are the following: Marketing knowhow,
IT and technological know-how, Operational Risk management techniques (Fraud
and corruption and process management), Credit Risk management techniques, and
Lending Technology. I convert managers’ answers regarding the 5 domains of head-
quarters’ influence into four scores, from 0 “none” to 3 “a lot”. I take the unweighted
average across all 5 areas or items as the primary measure of Centralization of Pro-
cesses (henceforth, COP index). A higher score indicates higher centralization. I
obtain a Cronbach’s alpha of .86 for the 5 items of centralization which indicates
high reliability and also suggests that the set of 5 items measures a single unidimen-
sional latent construct.20 Note that in this research I am only concerned with the
relation between global headquarters and foreign affiliates, which is distinct from
that between local headquarters in the host country and their local branches. The
survey instrument also collected this information, but in more than 90% of the or-
ganizations surveyed the decision related to loan approval, targets for credit growth
and risk management were centralized at the local headquarters level and performed
by a dedicated team. Anecdotal evidence, obtained through discussion with local
headquarters’ managers, has revealed the existence of large “agents’ biases”, leading
branches’ relationship managers to approve loans that were in fact “bad projects”21.
This has motivated, in part, banks’ decision to regroup all key loan functions at the
local headquarters, even for relatively small loans, with little or no autonomy left to
branches’ relationship managers.
Measurement Error and Quality control. Given that the dataset relies
on individual respondents to provide information, the data potentially suffer from
19The survey question is: “To what extent does your branch/subsidiary depend on the global or
regional headquarters for information and technical support in the following domains”.
20Cronbach’s alpha is an index of reliability associated with the variation accounted for by the
true score of the underlying construct, that is, the underlying variable that is being measured. It
is a measure of squared correlation between observed scores and true scores. The alpha may be
used to describe the reliability of factors extracted from dichotomous and/or multi-point formatted
questionnaires or scales (Santos, 1999). The alpha coefficient ranges in value from 0 to 1 and a
higher score indicates a higher reliability of the generated scale. Nunnaly (1978) has indicated 0.7
to be an acceptable reliability coefficient. Note that the Cronbach’s alpha has three underlying
assumptions. First, it is assumed that each item’s observed score is the result of adding the item’s
true score and an error. Second, the items should be Tau equivalent, in other words, all items
should carry equal loadings. Third, the mean of the measurement error should be zero. These
are often violated in practice, especially the second assumption, and as such, the alpha should be
considered as a lower bound to the reliability (Cronbach, 1951).
21Often due to collusion between relationship managers and prospective borrowers, e.g. “lending
to your friends” type of behavior.
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several types of measurement error which are likely to increase the standard errors
when centralization is used as a dependent variable, resulting in less precise esti-
mates. Bloom et al. (2007, 2012) evaluated measurement error in their management
and decentralization measures by performing repeated interviews on a sub-sample of
firms, contacting different managers in the firm, typically at different plants, using
different interviewers, and examining the degree of correlation between the measures
obtained from two interviews in a same firm. However, the nature of the present
research setting and the necessity to interview senior managers (by opposition to
middle managers in the Bloom et al. surveys), reduce significantly the possibility
to do repeat interviews given the limited availability of these top managers. That
said, I can check whether the centralization measure is internally consistent with
other information from the survey which should be positively and significantly cor-
related with the centralization measure such as frequency of communication with
headquarters and frequency of training received from headquarters. Table 5 presents
univariate regressions with the Centralization of Process measure (COP, unstandard-
ized) as a regressor and with frequency of communication with headquarters22 and
frequency of training received from headquarters23 as dependent variables. When
an organization is centralized, the frequency of communication should be higher be-
tween the different entities (Dessein and Santos, 2006), as well as the frequency of
training received from the headquarters. The results show positive and significant
correlation between these indicators, which suggest that the COP index is internally
consistent with other information contained in the survey which are more straight-
forward to obtain and less subject to respondents’ bias. These results suggest that
the centralization measure (COP index) is not only picking up noise.
3.5.3 Measuring Environmental Distance
I use three alternative indicators of environmental distance, which will be exam-
ined in separate regressions24. The benchmark measure of distance is Institutional
Distance, which captures the difference between foreign affiliates and headquarters
(HQ) countries in the quality of their institutions. In the management literature,
Khanna and Palepu (2006) have noted that some multinational firms, from devel-
oping or emerging countries, will be better able to deal with “institutional voids” or
22This corresponds to Question 4. How often do you communicate with your counterparts and
bosses in the global headquarters via email or phone?
23This corresponds to Question 5. How often do you receive training from the global headquar-
ters?
24Given the high correlation between these indicators, as well as the small sample, which limits
the number of explanatory variables, I choose to examine these three indicators of environmental
distance in separate regressions.
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environments where specialized intermediaries are absent, and regulatory or contract
institutions are weak. However, for a multinational orginitating from a developed
country, with higher “institutional distance” between its home and its host country,
such environment might require higher adaptation to local needs, therefore favoring
a decentralized organization so that foreign affiliates’ managers acquire relevant lo-
cal information (“information channel”). At the same time, if managers from the
foreign affiliate’s host country have very different ways of doing business than those
of the home country, in particular due to the very different institutional environment
in which they operate, congruence of preferences or objectives between headquar-
ters and foreign affiliates may be low, in which case the headquarters may prefer to
retain control (“bias channel”).
Institutional distance is measured as the difference between the unweighted av-
erage of five World Governance Indicators (World Bank) (Political Stability and
Absence of Violence, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law,
Control of Corruption) in a foreign affiliate’s home country and its host country.
The second measure of distance is Economic Distance. It essentially captures the
difference in demand between host and home countries (considering non-homothetic
preferences for goods of different quality between a developing and a developed
country), as well as the differences in the macroeconomic environment. Higher eco-
nomic distance may imply that the headquarters are relatively uninformed about
the preferences of the local population in the countries where the foreign affiliates
are located, and that the need to acquire high quality local information requires
transferring more authority to their foreign affiliates. This variable suffers from
one disadvantage compared to the benchmark measure (Institutional Distance): al-
though Economic Distance may adequately capture the need for adaptation to local
tastes, it may not capture well environmental differences in terms of local culture or
way of doing businesses, which may increase agents’ biases and which is one of the
identified channels through which distance may influence centralization.
Economic Distance is measured as the difference in GDP in PPP per capita (’000
international dollar) between a foreign affiliates’ home country and its host country.
The third measure of distance is Cultural Distance. It captures cultural differ-
ences between host and home countries such as preferences for hierarchy, competition
or individualism. In the theoretical management literature, Rosenzweig and Singh
(1991) argue that the higher the cultural distance between the headquarters and
the foreign affiliate, the higher the reliance on formal mechanisms of control. In
the empirical literature, cultural factors such as bilateral trust between host and
home countries have also been found to be positively associated with decentraliza-
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tion (Bloom, Sadun and Van Reenen, 2012)25. Compared to Institutional Distance
this measure suffers from two disadvantages. The first is theoretical, as this measure,
which focuses on cultural values, does not adequately capture the need for adap-
tation to local tastes, while it may adequately capture potential foreign affiliates’
managers’ biases related to cultural differences between home and host countries.
The second disadvantage is empirical, as comparable information on cultural values
is missing for a few African countries in the sample.
Cultural distance between home and host countries is measured following Kogut
and Singh (1988) methodology using the six Hofstede cultural dimensions (Power
Distance, Individualism, Masculinity, Uncertainty Avoidance, Pragmatism, Indul-
gence)26. More specifically, I build the following composite index:
Cultural Distancegc =
6∑
n=1
{(Ing − Inc)2/Vn}/6 (3.3)
Ing is the index for the nth cultural dimension in the home country of the foreign
affiliate’s group g and Inc corresponds to the index for the nth cultural dimension
in the foreign affiliate’s i host country c. Vn is the variance of the index for the nth
cultural dimension. The Hofstede cultural survey does not cover a certain number
of African countries in the sample. I replace the missing values in a given country
by the values for the cultural dimensions in a neighboring country, covered by the
Hosftede survey, with the same official language or same former colonizer (France or
U.K.), the assumption being that they will have relatively similar cultural values.27
As such, I take the cultural values of Burkina Faso for Ivory Coast, Togo and Mali,
which are not covered by the survey. I take the cultural values of Tanzania for
Uganda. Finally, I take the cultural values of Libya for Chad. For a few countries
in the sample not covered by the Hofstede survey (Madagascar, Equatorial Guinea,
Cameroon, and Congo) there was no country from which values could reliably be
taken and the Hofstede index is reported as missing, resulting in a loss of four
observations.
25Note that their measure of decentralization is between the local headquarters and the plant
manager.
26See Hofstede (2010) and the Hofstede Center’s website (http://geert-hofstede.com/index.
php).
27I test the robustness of the results to the exclusion of these replaced values in the empirical
section.
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3.5.4 Reliance on soft information
Given that the use of soft information is difficult to measure, as it plays a role
along the whole loan allocation process, I employ a series of variables which provide
an indication of the extent to which a banks’ screening and monitoring processes
rely on “soft information’. First, I use indicators of the loan portfolio allocation.
A larger exposure to SMEs should indicate higher reliance on soft information,
especially in Africa where information on SMEs is scarce or relatively unreliable
(see Box 2), while a larger exposure to large corporates should lower managers’ need
to rely on soft information. Second, I use indicators of the mode of acquisition of
the information, in particular through the use of personal network, which provides
soft, qualitative, information. Third, I use indicators of the way banks process
the information (reliance on credit scoring, as transformation into a credit score
hardens the information). Given the small sample size, and therefore the limited
degrees of freedom, I analyze separately the case of SMEs’ and corporate loans’
screening processes. Therefore, in the empirical analysis, one set of regressions will
include share of loans allocated to SMEs, use of personal network for acquisition of
information on SMEs and credit score for SMEs, while the other set of regressions
will include these variables for corporate loans. An overview of surveyed banks’
screening and monitoring practices, with a focus on their acquisition and use of
information related to potential borrowers is presented in Box 2.
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Box 2: Use of Soft and Hard information in bank lending
How do banks screen and monitor borrowers? What type of information do they use? This
box gives an overview of banks’ lending practices using qualitative and quantitative information
from the survey.
Composition of banks’ loan portfolio
On average loans to large corporates represent 46% of total loans, followed by loans to SMEs
(30%), loans to the retail sector (20%), to microfinance (3%) and others (cooperatives, etc.) (1%).
However, the composition of the portfolio varies depending on the country of origin of the bank.
Indeed, foreign banks are more heavily exposed to the corporate segment than domestic banks
(over 50%, against 38% for domestic banks, see Table A). In fact, some global banks only finance
corporate and institutional clients. This is in line with the academic literature (Detragiache,
Tressel, and Gupta, 2008; Gormley, 2007) which has pointed to a segmentation of the market in
developing countries, with foreign banks mainly financing the top firms. However, the results also
indicate that regional African banks have around a third of their portfolio allocated to SMEs, which
is similar in proportions to domestic banks’ portfolio. For Global MNB and Emerging MNB, SMEs
represent a smaller portion of their portfolio, at around 20% of total loans. However the means
differences in the share of loan portfolio allocated to SMEs between Global MNB and regional
African MNB, and between Global MNB and Emerging MNB are not significant at the 5% level.
Furthermore, both domestic banks and Global MNB have around a quarter of their loan portfolio
allocated to the retail segment. Overall, this suggests that, although the portfolio of domestic
banks is less concentrated on the corporate segment than that of foreign banks, foreign banks,
and in particular regional African MNB and Global MNB, are also actively involved in both SME
financing and retail financing.
Table A: Portfolio allocation (% of total loans) by group of banks
Note: The number in parenthesis for each group of banks is the number of banks in the sample with non-missing
information on portfolio allocation.
Domestic Regional African Global Emerging
banks (33) MNB (14) MNB (12) MNB (19)
Microfinance 3 2 4 0
SME 34 31 19 20
Corporates 38 53 51 60
Retail 23 13 24 6
Other 2 2 2 5
Constraints faced by banks in SME lending: lack of information
According to the managers interviewed, the major constraints faced by their banks in ex-
panding their portfolio of SME loans are the lack of management capacity, or reputation of the
business owner (mentioned by 35% of the respondents), the lack of reliable information (34% of
the respondents) and the lack of collateral (31% of the respondents). Counterparty risk and lack
of sufficient branch network are also important challenges for banks. Other constraints mentioned
are administrative delays in obtaining appropriate documentation (especially with the ministries
of land) and, in the case of Tanzania, Ivory Coast and Mali, the lack of fully operational Credit
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Reference Bureaus. Higher exposure to SMEs thus imply higher difficulties to accurately screen
and monitor borrowers, and therefore higher reliance on “soft” information.
Banks’ credit management: A centralized organization for credit functions
How do banks manage credit risk in countries with low information and a deficient judiciary
system? One of the first elements is that they tend to operate a very centralized organization
of credit functions. Indeed, only the gathering of information and identification of clients and
monitoring is devolved to branches. Very rarely do branches have the mandate to approve loans.
More than 87% of the banks have centralized SME loan appraisal functions at the local headquar-
ters, as well as the recovery functions. For corporates, only 1% of the banks in the sample grant
some autonomy to branches to approve loans, while for a third of foreign banks, final approval
for corporate loans is done higher up the hierarchy, above the local headquarters echelon, being
either executed at the regional or global headquarters. Concerning loan recovery, banks tend to
have dedicated teams at the headquarters, working in tandem with the local branch managers in
charge of following-up on the clients’ repayments.
Assessing borrowers’ “character” in a low information environment
What sources of information on borrowers do bank managers use? Credit reference bureaus
(CRBs) are regularly used by banks in Kenya, Ghana, Zambia and Uganda. In Tanzania, two
CRBs have been licensed recently but very few banks were using them at the time of the survey.
The other countries in the sample, all francophone, do not yet have CRBs. When CRBs are
in place, all the banks are using them, as it is generally made mandatory by the Central Bank.
CRBs were often lauded by the bank managers, but they also often indicated that they faced
challenges related to wrong information in database, or incomplete information. Some respondents
also mentioned problems with reporting, and general understanding of the system at initiation.
Table B: Sources of information on loan applicants
Percentage of respondents indicating that they use a particular source of information on loan applicants, by group
of banks. Number of banks with non-missing data in parenthesis for each group.
Domestic Regional African Global Emerging
banks (35) MNB (13) MNB (16) MNB (7)
Small and Medium Enterprises
Other Banks (informal) 80 92 69 67
Personal Network 60 69 69 83
Parent Bank . 17 13 0
Corporates
Other Banks (informal) 82 92 50 63
Personal Network 64 71 72 75
Parent Bank . 54 71 38
Apart from CRBs, another source of information on prospective borrowers consists of the other
banks operating in the same market and with which potential borrowers had a previous banking
relationship. Information on loan applicants from other banks can either be obtained informally
or formally. Information is obtained informally when a bank manager has contacts in a bank in
which a potential borrower has or used to have an account. However, some of the respondents
have pointed out that such information may be biased or not trustworthy. Information can also
be obtained formally, when a bank manager asks another bank with which a prospective borrower
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has or had a banking relationship to provide certified bank account statements. Bank managers
also use their personal network to obtain information on borrowers. Foreign banks may also
rely on information from their parent group, when one of their clients has a pre-existing banking
relationship with the group.
Once information is gathered by bank managers (generally relationship managers at the branch
level), documents are assessed by credit and risk managers, generally at the local headquarters.
Screening and loan appraisal rest on analysis of customers’ banks’ statements to identify a cus-
tomer’s “character” (through analyzing how a customer manages his money) coupled with indica-
tors such as the age of the business or the managerial capacity of the owners, and regular on-site
visits. For SMEs, “character” of the customer was the most important factor in loan appraisal
for 71% of the banks interviewed. In this market segment, relationship lending is often the norm,
with intense follow-up, weekly communication via phone, and regular on-site visits. Banks tend
to require collateral for SME term loans, but they rely more on information from bank account
statements to make a judgment, partly because collaterals are extremely difficult to recover in case
of default. For corporates, business plans and sector of activity, along with financials, were the
most often cited criteria in loan appraisal.
Table C: Use of credit scores by group of banks and type of customers
Note: Percentage of banks within each group using credit scores. Number of banks surveyed in parenthesis for each
group.
Domestic Regional African Global Emerging
banks (36) MNB (14) MNB (19) MNB (8)
SME 40 77 23 86
Corporates 42 64 21 88
Personal loans 39 57 42 63
The use of credit scoring is relatively diffused, and it might be even more prevalent when
positive information sharing from CRBs is established. Generally, information contained in credit
scores include financial information, information on management (experience and reputation of
business owners), and on the business (age of the business, sector). Credit scores are slightly more
often attributed to SME loans (47% of the respondents indicated that their bank use credit scores
for SME loans) than to personal (consumer) loans (45%) and large corporates (45%). Interestingly,
Global MNB tend to use less credit scoring methods than other foreign banks and domestic banks,
as shown in Table C. The means differences in the use of credit scores for SMEs between Global
MNB and the other two groups of foreign banks are significant at the 5% level, while there is
no significant means difference between regional African MNB and Emerging MNB as the latter
group also frequently uses credit scoring for SMEs. This may reflect the fact that Global MNB are
slightly less exposed to the SME sector, and more to large corporates, for which appraisal decisions
are less easily reduced to a score and is more often based on good judgment.
SME Loan monitoring practices of banks
Finally, loans are generally monitored directly at the branch level. For 87% of the banks,
relationship managers are in contact via phone, email or in person with the borrowers at least once
a month, and for 26% of them, contact is made on a weekly basis. Respondents were asked to rank
by their level of importance four SME loan monitoring practices used by the branch managers in
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their banks. I then created a “soft monitoring” variable which is a dummy equal to 1 if the main
SME loan monitoring mechanism is via bank manager on-site visit to SME or visit to the branch
by SMEs, and 0 if bank managers primarily monitor SME loans through repayment frequency or
examination of cash flows.
Table D: Use of “soft monitoring” for SME loans
Note: Percentage of banks within each group using “soft monitoring” practices. Number of banks with non-missing
data in parenthesis for each group.
Domestic Regional African Global Emerging
banks (34) MNB (13) MNB (17) MNB (7)
Soft Monitoring 18 15 24 0
It is interesting to note that Global MNB rely slightly more on “soft monitoring” for SME
loans than other groups of banks. However, t-test to compare means of Global MNB with the other
groups indicated that differences between groups in the use of “soft monitoring” were not significant
at the 5% level. Again, these small differences may reflect the fact that Global MNB are slightly
less exposed to the SME sector. Generally speaking, financing SMEs requires good monitoring and
information systems, which depends on the operational capacity of the bank. Banks which have
been successul in lending to SMEs, such as the Kenyan Equity Bank have invested significantly in
their operating software, which may also explain the differences in sophistication with regards to
lending methods between regional African MNB and Global MNB.
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3.5.5 Control variables
The main control variables are the proxies for the two channels through which dis-
tance can influence centralization (“information” channel and “bias channel”), as
previously identified . Given that they are assumed to be outcome of distance (i.e.
“bad controls” for distance), they will only be included to test empirically the valid-
ity of the channels. The other controls have been shown theoretically or empirically
to influence centralization.
Headquarters’s knowledge of the local environment (Channel 1 for distance): To
measure how well the global headquarters (Principal) are informed I use the num-
ber of subsidiaries of the parent bank located in sub-Saharan Africa. This measures
the extensiveness of the group’s knowledge or degree of information it possesses on
the host environment. According to the theoretical literature surveyed (AT, 1997,
Dessein, 2002), I expect a positive correlation between headquarters’ knowledge of
the local environment and centralization. I also include the age of the foreign affil-
iate, which provides an indication of a group’s intensity of experience in a specific
country.
Foreign affiliates’ managers’ biases (Channel 2 for distance): A more expatriate
composition of the top management may reduce headquarters’ need to control pro-
cesses if it implies higher congruence between headquarters’ and foreign affiliates’
objectives. I thus control for the composition of the top management in the for-
eign affiliate, and whether top managers (CEO, CFO, COO and head of credit risk)
are expatriates (from the group’s home country or from a third country) or local
nationals. In so doing, I make the assumption that expatriates top managers are
more likely to have preferences and objectives that are more congruent with those
of the headquarters’ managers, than affiliates’ managers who are local nationals.
I also assume that the bias issues between headquarters and foreign affiliates re-
side at the top, that is, between the top managers of the foreign affiliates and the
headquarters managers, and not with middle or lower rank managers of the for-
eign affiliates, who execute orders from their top management team. To control for
the composition of the top management I use two alternative measures. The first
one reflects the importance of strategically placing an expatriate CEO at the top,
and distinguishes between an expatriate CEO from the home country (i.e. country
where the global headquarters of the banking group are located) and an expatriate
CEO from a third country (i.e. from a country that is neither the home nor the
host country)28. The second one reflects the overall expatriate composition of the
28Placing an expatriate CEO from a third country is relatively common in large banking groups
(see Box 1).
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top management (nationality of the CEO, but also of the COO, CFO and head
of credit/risk). According to the theoretical literature reviewed (AT, 1997, BGM,
1999, Dessein, 2002), I should expect a negative correlation between the proportion
of expatriates in the top management and centralization, assuming that expatriates
have more congruent objectives with headquarters’ managers than local managers
of foreign affiliates, leading to more decentralization. In addition, the skills of an
expatriate CEO are likely to be more adapted to the firm’s operations and routines,
which might reinforce the decentralization decision: in the empirical literature, Car-
oli and Van Reenen (2001) have shown that skills have been associated with more
decentralization, through the ability to take on more responsibility.
Other firm controls:
At the foreign affiliate level: I include the size of the foreign affiliate, a large firm
being more likely to be decentralized (Penrose, 1959). In addition, I have used so
far the word “foreign affiliate” as a general term for different types of foreign or-
ganizations. However, in the banking sector the legal organization of the foreign
affiliate, as a branch or as a subsidiary may impact its relation with its headquar-
ters (Fiechter et al., 2011). The branch is a key part of the parent bank and acts
as a legal and functional part of the parent’s headquarters, while the subsidiary
is a separate legal entity from the parent bank with its own capital and is under
the regulation of the host country (Casu, Girardone and Molyneux, 2006). As a
consequence, a subsidiary tends to be a more decentralized organization, compared
to a branch. A dummy taking the value of 1 if the foreign affiliate is a subsidiary
and 0 if it is a branch is included. I expect the coefficient on this variable to have
a negative sign. A last firm control is the mode of entry of the banking group in
the host country, using a dummy for entry by acquisition, versus greenfield entry.
Acquisitions may increase the need to control the acquired subsidiary, by central-
izing operational processes and transfering strategic decision-making to the global
headquarters of the acquiring group.
At the group level: In some estimations of equation (3.2) I include parent group’s
size (total asset) to capture the importance of coordination and potential for scale
economies inside a group, which should favor centralization (Dessein and Santos,
2006; Alonso et al., 2008). I also include the dummies for the categories of banks
Global MNB and Emerging MNB (the excluding dummy being African MNB), to
control for coordination needs and for the fact that country of origin may influence
both operational practices and organizational practices.
Environmental controls: Finally, I control for environmental factors. Theoretically,
Doz and Prahalad (1984) have suggested that diversity among national market struc-
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tures will contribute towards more national responsiveness. More recently, Bloom,
Sadun and Van Reenen (2012) and Acemoglu et al. (2007) have found empirically a
significant and positive association of competition and decentralization. As such, I
will control for the degree of competition in the host country, using the Herfindhal-
Hirschman index of concentration (HHI). I lag the HHI by one year compared to the
survey year as an attempt to prevent reverse causality. I also control for regional
African zones (East Africa vs. West Africa), as they may differ in terms of culture,
economic development or institutions. In some specifications I also further con-
trol for host countries’ characteristics by using a full set of host country dummies.
Finally, in equation (3.2), examining the relation between local information and cen-
tralization, I control for the presence of Credit Reference Bureaus, which indicates
the overall availability of hard information on borrowers in the host economy.
More detailed definitions of the variables used and their sources is presented in
Table 2 in Appendix A.
3.5.6 Descriptive statistics and graphical analysis
Summary statistics of the indicator of centralization for the three types of foreign
affiliates considered (affiliates of Global MNB, Regional African MNB and Emerging
MNB) are presented in Table 6 in Appendix A. The centralization of processes (COP
index) ranges from 0 to 3. The results indicate that processes are more centralized
within Global MNB than within African MNB and within Emerging MNB. T-test
to compare means of the COP index between Global MNB and Emerging MNB and
between Global MNB and African MNB revealed that the difference was significant
at the 5% level. However, there was no significant difference in the mean of the
COP index between African MNB and Emerging MNB. Figure 4 represents the 5
components of the centralization of process (COP) index by categories of banks.
Overall, banks tend to be more dependent on their group for IT systems, with
scores between 2 (some) and 3 (a lot), while they are much less reliant on their
group for marketing. I now turn to the empirical analysis of the determinants of
centralization.
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3.6 Empirical results
3.6.1 Principal Component analysis
Given that the two indicators are constructed as averages of different variables, I
first proceed to a Principal Component analysis (PCA)29. The goal of this analysis
is twofold. First, it aims to explore the relation between the items that compose
the index of centralization; second it aims to assess whether the index actually
captures several different aspects of the relation between headquarters and foreign
affiliates, which should be further dis-aggregated into different sub-indices. Indeed,
the index of centralization may not be strictly unidimensional and the variables used
to construct it may measure more than a single latent trait or construct.
The correlation table (see Table 7 in Appendix A) shows that the variables are all
positively correlated with relatively high correlations (most are above 0.50) between
the 5 items of the centralization of process index. I standardize the different variables
that compose the centralization of process index to facilitate the interpretation of
the magnitudes, and I proceed to the analysis of the principal components. As
shown in Table 8, the first component has an eigenvalue much greater than the
cutoff of 1.0 and reproduces 65% of the variance in the 5 items, while the second
component has an eigenvalue of only 0.8, below the cutoff value. Table 9 shows
the factor loadings of the first and second components. The factor loadings are the
parameters relating the original variables to the principal components. For the first
component the loadings are all positive and have all approximately the same size
(factor loadings of around 0.70-0.93), expressing that all the 5 items are important.
In other words, this component expresses an organization in which the 5 business
operations items are important aspect of the relation between headquarters and
foreign affiliates. The second component is dominated by IT systems, while the
loading for marketing is large and negative. This second component thus represents
the contrast between foreign affiliates’ technical dependence on their headquarters
and marketing or brand control by the headquarters. Given the low eigenvalue of
this second component, and therefore its lower explanatory power, I decide to keep
only the first component which contains most of the variance.
I create the measure of centralization of processes using the factor loadings of
29The Principal Component analysis estimates linear combinations of the underlying variables
that explain the highest possible proportion of the remaining variance. The first component is esti-
mated to explain the highest possible proportion of the total variance, while the second component
explains the highest proportion of the remaining variance, not explained by the first component,
etc.
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the first component as follows:
CENTPROCESS = 0.701Marketing+ 0.702 IT+ 0.926Operisk
+ 0.894CreditRisk + 0.774LendingTech (3.4)
Note that each item of the index is standardized into a Z-score, so that the orders
of magnitude of the effects of each variable are comparable.
3.6.2 Regression analysis
I empirically examine the first set of hypotheses (1a and 1b) concerning the relation
between environmental distance and centralization. I use three alternative measures
of distance: Institutional Distance (Table 12), Economic Distance (Table 13) and
Cultural Distance (Table 14). Summary statistics of key explanatory variables and
of the dependent variable CENTPROCESS are presented in Table 10. Before turn-
ing to the results I examine the correlation matrix presented in Table 11. A first
observation is that the measures of institutional and economic distance are highly
correlated (correlation coefficient of 0.89), suggesting that they capture the same
underlying phenomenon. The correlations between cultural distance and institu-
tional and economic distance are also high, but of a lower magnitude (correlations
of 0.56 and 0.69 respectively). The matrix of correlation suggests potential multi-
collinearity issues between the indicators of distance and three variables: the size of
the parent group, the Global MNB dummy and the regional African MNB dummy
with correlations close to or above 0.70. By construction, the environmental dis-
tance variables are highly and positively correlated with the Global MNB dummy,
given that the home country of these multinationals is a developed country, while
their host countries are developing countries, which translates into important en-
vironmental differences. Adding dummies for the category of banks (Global MNB,
Emerging MNB, Regional African MNB) as well as the size of the parent group
would control for coordination needs or the potential for scale economies inside a
group, which has been found theoretically to influence centralization (Dessein and
Santos, 2006, Alonso et al. 2008). However, given the potential for multicollinear-
ity between these variables and the regressor of interest, I will not include them in
the main regressions. I will deal with the potential relation between centralization,
institutional distance and coordination needs in the robustness section.
In Table 12 I regress centralization of processes (using CENTPROCESS, the
first component) on the benchmark measure, Institutional Distance. The baseline
result in column (1) shows a positive and significant correlation between Institu-
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tional Distance and Centralization. This result is robust to the inclusion of firm
and host country controls as specified in column (2). Furthermore, the size of the
coefficient on the distance variable increases from 0.756 to 0.858 once these con-
trols are included, while the R-squared increases from 0.263 to 0.342, indicating
the existence of omitted variable bias with the first specification. These first results
provide preliminary evidence of a positive and significant association of Institutional
Distance with centralization. In column (3) I investigate the “information channel”
by controlling for the degree of headquarters’ experience in sub-Saharan African,
proxied by the number of subsidiaries of the group in the region. The only differ-
ence between the specification in model 2 and model 3 is thus the addition of this
experience variable. The coefficient on parent group’s experience in sub-Saharan
Africa enters significantly into the regression, and with the expected positive sign:
when the parent bank (the “Principal”) is informed, centralization is favoured. The
R-squared increases by almost 50%, from 0.342 to 0.498 indicating a better fit of
the model. The size of the coefficient on the distance measure also increases (from
0.858 to 0.899), due to a negative correlation between distance and parent bank’s
local experience. This suggests the presence of an information channel. However,
the fact that the coefficient on distance remains significant at the 5% level after
the inclusion of the parent bank’s experience variable indicates that the effect of
institutional distance on centralization is not only through parent bank’s experi-
ence. The two models reported in columns (4) and (5) explore the “bias channel”,
including the two dummy variables CEO (expatriate from the home country and
expatriate from a third country) and the percentage of top managers who are expa-
triates. The results in columns (4) and (5) indicate that the effects of these three
human capital variables on the coefficient of distance and on the R-squared are very
small. In addition, the coefficients on these three variables are not significant, and
one variable (the CEO is an expatriate from the group’s home country) does not
have the expected negative sign. As such, I find little evidence that the effect of
distance on centralization operates through foreign affiliate managers’ bias, at least
when proxied by the nationality of the top management.
Finally, in column (6) I include all the control variables (excluding the percentage
of expatriates in top management, due to multicollinearity). I also include a full set
of host country dummies to address the concern that there might still be many
omitted unobserved country-level factors generating a spurious positive correlation
between distance and centralization. The coefficient on the distance variable is
significant and increases to 0.934 (from 0.756 in the baseline regression) and the R-
squared increases to 0.750 (from 0.263 in the baseline regression). The coefficient on
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parent group’s experience in sub-Saharan Africa increases and remains significant
at the 5% level. The coefficient on home expatriate CEO is negative and non-
significant, while the coefficient on third country expatriate CEO is negative and
turns significant at the 5% level. This result may suggest that headquarters perceive
expatriate CEOs from a third country to be less biased than home country expatriate
CEOs, and are therefore more willing to transfer authority to the foreign affiliate.
However, this may also capture the fact that African MNB (a dummy which is not
included in the model due to the multicollinearity issues mentioned above), are both
more decentralized and have a higher proportion of their CEO who are from third
countries (57% of the CEOs) than Global MNB (32%) and Emerging MNB (29%).
In terms of magnitude, the variable Institutional Distance has the largest impact.
Indeed, a one standard deviation increase in Institutional Distance is associated with
a 0.63 standard deviation increase in centralization, while a one standard deviation
increase in group’s experience in Africa is associated with a 0.57 standard deviation
increase in centralization in model 6.
The results in Table 13, examining the relation between Economic Distance and
Centralization of Processes are very consistent with those obtained in Table 12 using
Institutional Distance. I estimate the same six different specifications as those in
Table 12. The coefficient on Economic Distance is positive and significant at the 5%
level in all specifications. The magnitudes of the coefficients of Economic Distance
are very similar across specifications, from 0.043 to 0.048. In model 6, a one standard
deviation in Economic Distance is associated with a 0.45 standard deviation increase
in centralization. The results also indicate that parent group’s experience in sub-
Saharan Africa is positively and significantly associated with centralization, while
the human capital variables (expatriate CEO and expatriate top management) do
not enter significantly into the regressions.
Finally, turning to Table 14 which examines the relation between Cultural Dis-
tance and centralization of processes, the results also indicate a positive association
between Cultural Distance and centralization. However, the results are less robust,
as the size of the coefficient varies importantly between specifications (from 0.457 to
0.825) as well as their significance. The coefficient on the Cultural Distance variable
is neither significant in the baseline regression (column (1)) nor in the regression
with added firm and host country controls (column (2)). It turns significant once
the experience of the parent group in sub-Saharan Africa is included as a control.
The sample size is smaller (33 observations, against 38 for the two precedent panels)
given that the measure of cultural distance is missing for several African countries
in the sample. Given that I replaced the missing cultural values of five of the host
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or home countries in the sample, for which cultural values from the Hofstede sur-
vey were not available, by the values of neighboring countries, I test the robustness
of these results to the exclusion of these five host or home countries with missing
cultural values. As such, in column (7), I re-estimate the model of column (6) only
on the sub-sample of banks for which cultural values of their host and home coun-
tries are available in the Hofstede survey (i.e. excluding the replaced values). The
main result of a negative association between cultural distance and centralization
of processes remains significant at the 5% level, with a similar magnitude (0.83 in
column (6) vs. 0.80 in column (7)). However the sample size is reduced by a third
(24 observations in the sub-sample) and the significance of other control variables,
notably parent group’s experience in Africa, falls below the 5% level.
Finally, concerning the control variables, most of them have the expected signs,
but only a few enter significantly into the regressions. The subsidiary dummy is
negatively correlated with centralization, which is consistent with the fact that sub-
sidiaries are a more independent form of organization than branches, with their
own capital. We also note that higher market concentration (HHI lagged) is associ-
ated with higher centralization, which echoes Acemoglu et al. (2007) and Bloom et
al. (2012) results of a positive and significant association between competition and
decentralization.
To sum up, this first set of results indicates the existence of a positive and
significant association between environmental distance and centralization. While I
find evidence of an information channel (measured by parent group’s experience in
sub-Saharan Africa), consistent with Hypothesis 1a, I find little evidence of a bias
channel (measured by expatriate composition of top management), and therefore
little support for Hypothesis 1b.
I now turn to the results concerning the relation between the use of soft infor-
mation and centralization. Hypothesis 2 predicts a negative association between the
use of soft (qualitative) information on local projects and centralization. Table 15
presents the cross-correlations of variables and Table 16 reports the regression re-
sults. The sample sizes are smaller than in the previous estimations for two reasons:
the first one is that some of the banks surveyed did not disclose their allocation of
loans by business segments, the second one is that some banks do not offer loans to
one of these two business segments.
As explained in section 3.5, I analyze separately the case of SMEs’ and corpo-
rate loans’ screening processes. First, examining column (1), which concerns SME
loans, we note that the percentage of SME loans in the portfolio is negatively and
significantly associated with centralization. To the extent that higher exposure to
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SMEs imply higher reliance on soft information in sub-Saharan Africa, given the
lack of reliable financial and basic personal information on borrowers in the region
(see Box 2), this result supports Hypothesis 2. However, this result is not robust to
the inclusion of further firm controls (both at the foreign affiliate and group level).
The coefficient on the dummy indicating whether bank managers use information
from personal network for SME loans is significant at the 5% level and robust to the
addition of bank and host country controls. Given that information from personal
networks tends to be of a qualitative nature, and employs branch managers’ discre-
tion and inputs, this result is consistent with Hypothesis 2 according to which higher
reliance on soft information favors a decentralized organization. In column (3) I re-
place the firm controls by two bank category dummies: Global MNB and Emerging
MNB (the omitted category being regional African MNB), as country of origin might
influence both corporate loan practices and organizational practices30. Contrary to
the regressions with the measures of distance, the inclusion of the two dummies is
permitted here by the low correlation they have with the information variables (see
the correlation matrix, Table 15). The coefficient on the dummy indicating use of
information from personal networks conserves the same negative sign and remains
significant at the 5% level. The coefficient on credit score is negative in the three
models, which is contrary to the theoretical literature reviewed (Stein, 2002), but
it is only significant at the 10% level in model 1 and not robust to the inclusion of
additional controls. In fact, the relation between credit scores and centralization is
controversial. While theoretically, Stein (2002) argues that hard information (such
as credit scores) favors centralization, empirically Paravisini and Schoar (2013) find
a positive association between credit scores and decentralization. Indeed, the au-
thors suggest that credit scores may “increase the number and difficulty of tasks
that can be delegated to lower level loan officers by making them easier to monitor
and incentivize” (2013:6).
Columns (4), (5) and (6) in Table 16 focus on screening and monitoring of
corporate loans. The results indicate that a higher share of corporate loans in the
total loan portfolio is associated with higher centralization of processes, however the
coefficient only turns significant at the 5% level when additional host country and
firm controls are included. Similarly to the results related to screening of SMEs,
I find that the use of information from personal networks for corporate loans is
negatively and significantly associated with centralization. This result is also robust
to additional host country and firm controls. I further control for group of banks,
30Given the small sample size of 33 observations, I exclude the other firm controls in model 3,
however I keep them in model 6 concerning corporate loans as the sample size is larger, with 38
observations.
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adding the Global MNB and Emerging MNB dummies (regional African MNB being
the excluded group dummy) in column (6). The sign of the coefficients on the use of
information from personal network and on the share of corporate loans in the total
loan portfolio are unchanged and they both remain significant at the 5% level.
Overall the examination of the relation between centralization of processes and
use of soft information in loan allocation practices supports Hypothesis 2, and the
results are particularly robust for the variable indicating managers’ use of (soft)
information from their personal network. I find significant and positive associations
between indicators of managers’ reliance on soft information in loan allocation and
centralization. In terms of magnitudes, reliance on personal network for information
on SMEs is associated with a 1.28 (-2.283/1.780) to 1.35 (-2.403/1.780) standard
deviation decrease in centralization (depending on the specification) while reliance
on personal network for information on large corporates is associated with a 1.17
(-2.077/1.780) to 1.21 (-2.176/1.780) standard deviation decrease in centralization.
This suggests that the potential effect on organizational structure of using soft in-
formation to screen borrowers is large.
3.6.3 Robustness checks
First robustness test: Measure of centralization. I first test the robustness
of the results to the construction of the indicator of Centralization of Processes.
I re-estimate the model in column (6) in Table 12, 13 and 14 (model with host
and firm controls and with regional and country dummies) using the unweighted
average of the scores on the 5 business operations (the COP index). The results are
reported in Table 17. They are consistent with those obtained in Table 12, 13 and 14,
namely a positive and significant correlation between the three indicators of distance
and the measure of centralization. Using the COP index, the results indicate that
a one standard deviation increase in Institutional Distance is associated with a
0.65 standard deviation increase in the predicted COP index, and a 0.45 and 0.63
standard deviation increase in the COP index for a one standard deviation increase
in, respectively, the Economic Distance and the Cultural Distance measures. These
magnitudes are very close to the ones obtained in column (6) in Table 12, 13 and
14, using the first component as the dependent variable, which were 0.63, 0.45
and 0.62 for the beta coefficients of Institutional, Economic and Cultural Distance,
respectively.
At this stage it is important to clarify the interpretation of these results. The
evidence shows that the measures of distance are positively and significantly associ-
ated with the index of centralization of processes, after controlling for a set of bank
192
and host country characteristics. It does not mean that higher distance “causes”
centralization. One potential source of endogeneity is the possibility that an omitted
bank variable is both correlated with the distance measure and the centralization
index. Given the low sample size and the fact that the data is cross-sectional and
is not a panel we cannot employ firm fixed effects to control for time-invariant bank
effects. I address such concerns in the second robustness test.
Second robustness test: distance and omitted variables. The second robust-
ness test concerns the distance measures, and addresses the concern that they might
be correlated with the error term. While concerns of reverse causality (centralization
influencing distance) are mild given that distance is a relatively exogenous variable31,
potential for omitted variable biases, especially at the group level, should be fur-
ther examined. The measure of distance so far was between global headquarters
and foreign affiliates. However, certain groups of banks, especially Global MNB,
might be highly centralized due to high potential for scale economies and need for
coordination across the groups’ entities, and, by construction, are institutionally,
economically, and potentially even culturally distant from their African affiliates
given that their headquarters are based in developed countries. Due to the high cor-
relation between the bank group dummies Global MNB, African MNB, Emerging
MNB and the three measures of distance, and the impossibility of using firm fixed
effects in the cross-section to control for time-invariant bank omitted variables, I
examine an alternative way of measuring distance, which would partially eliminate
the bias due to the potential correlation between distance from home country and an
omitted parent group variable. More specifically, to test the robustness of the results
I investigate whether the association between distance and centralization remains
significant when the organization has set up an intermediate regional headquarters
in sub-Saharan Africa and the environmental distance measured is the one between
this regional headquarters to which the foreign affiliate directly reports and the host
country. Theoretically, and as mentioned above, higher institutional and economic
asymmetry between host and home countries raise the need to increase environmen-
tal adaptiveness (Dessein and Santos, 2006). As such, it may push organizations
to have intermediary centers of control, with a regional headquarters. Indeed, as
Melumad, Mookherjee and Reichelstein (1992) show, creating an intermediary re-
sponsibility center, between the principal and the agent, or three-tier hierarchy, can
improve flexibility over the two-tier arrangement when communication is limited32.
31Unless, for instance, the location of foreign direct investment is driven by the degree of cen-
tralization of a multinational, which is relatively unlikely.
32The intermediary agent 1 can use the exact information about his own environment when
allocating the production tasks between agent 2, his subordinate, and himself. In contrast, in a
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This three-tier hierarchy should increase adaptiveness, while breaking the span of
control, especially when the organization is large33 with important geographic dis-
persion. In practice, it is quite common for large multinational banks to break down
their organization into regional areas (see Box 1). In the sample of foreign banks,
16% of the banks (32% of Global MNB) have set up intermediary headquarters in
sub-Saharan Africa, more specifically in South Africa and in Kenya.
I examine the relation between institutional, economic and cultural distance be-
tween the country in which the direct (regional or global) headquarters is located and
the foreign affiliate’s host country on centralization of processes. To fix ideas, Figure
5 represents two examples of multinational banks’ organization and their associated
distance measure: one in which the “direct headquarters” is an intermediate regional
headquarters, and one in which there is no such intermediary level. For organization
A, the foreign affiliates’ managers directly report to the global headquarters, and
the distance is measured between home and host countries, whereas for organization
B the foreign affiliates’ managers first report to the regional headquarters, and the
distance is measured between the country of the regional headquarters and the host
country.
The results are reported in Table 18. The host country and firm controls are
the same as in Tables 12, 13 and 14, and I also add a dummy which equals one
when the foreign affiliate directly reports to an intermediate headquarters. The re-
sults confirm the finding of a positive and significant association between distance
and centralization. In terms of magnitudes, a one standard deviation increase in
institutional distance with the direct headquarters is associated with a 0.57 stan-
dard deviation increase in the predicted centralization of processes once controls are
included (column (2)). The respective beta coefficients for economic distance and
cultural distance are 0.50 (column (4)) and 0.24 (column (6)). The magnitudes of
the effect are very close to the ones observed for institutional distance and economic
distance with global headquarters in tables 12 and 13. However, the effect is much
smaller when cultural distance with direct HQ is used, compared to cultural dis-
tance with global headquarters (Table 14), which might be due to a relative cultural
homogeneity between African countries.
Third robustness test: Coordination needs: omitted variable or out-
come variable?
centralized mechanism, the principal has to base those decisions on limited information reports of
agents 1 and 2. There is still a control loss for the principal, but the authors show that it does
not necessarily imply a loss of performance, as long as the principal can monitor some financial
performance measure, such as cost or profit (Melumad et al., 1992).
33For instance, Stein (1997) points to the limits of headquarters’ monitoring efforts when the
number of projects it oversees is too large.
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Finally, given the potential importance of coordinating activities between entities of
a multinational, I conduct a third robustness test to further examine the relation
between group’s coordination needs and centralization. In particular, if coordination
needs are both related to distance and centralization, then omitting this variable in
the regression of centralization on distance will result in biases. The theoretical lit-
erature (Dessein and Santos, 2006, Alonso et al., 2008) has shown the existence of an
inverted-U shaped relation between coordination needs and gains of centralization
relative to decentralization. However, the interaction between distance and coordi-
nation needs is not straightforward, and it is also possible that coordination needs
are an outcome of distance rather than the contrary34. This robustness test will
shed more light on the relation between centralization, coordination and distance,
and how controlling for coordination needs affects the relation between distance and
centralization.
I use two different types of proxies to control for coordination needs at the
group level. The first ones are the two dummies Global MNB and Emerging MNB
(Regional African MNB being the omitted dummy), as these two groups of banks,
and especially Global MNB, should have higher coordination needs or potential for
scale economies given that they are large groups operating over several continents.
Furthermore, I also proxy for group’s coordination needs using the size (log of total
assets) of the parent group, as coordination needs should rise with the size of the
group. Given that the correlation between Global MNB dummy and Economic
Distance is almost 1.00 (0.95), and that the sample size using the Cultural Distance
index declines to 33 observations, I only conduct this third robustness test using
the benchmark measure of distance, that is, Institutional Distance. As expected,
the results reported in Table 19 (column (2)) show that the Global MNB dummy is
positively associated with centralization, however, the coefficient is not significant.
The size of the parent group (column (3)), as a proxy for coordination needs, enters
positively and significantly into the regression, which is consistent with expectations.
The results reported in column (4) show that Institutional Distance is robust to the
inclusion of proxies for coordination needs, while the size of the coefficient on the
distance variable more than doubles once these controls are included. In column
(5), both types of control variables are included in the regression as well as the
34Higher environmental distance could produce uncertainty which increases the cost of mis-
coordination between entities of a multinational, and therefore increases the need for coordination.
To the extent that environmental distance increases environmental uncertainty, and therefore in-
creases the need for adaptiveness, it will increase the benefits of communication, that is, central-
ization. This will be so in order to avoid mis-coordination costs, or mis-adaptation costs, if the
agents who observe the local information choose not to be responsive to improve coordination (see
Dessein and Santos, 2006; Bolton and Dewatripont, 2011).
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information and bias channel variables. Unsurprisingly, coefficient estimates on all
the control variables become smaller in magnitude and generally see declines in their
levels of statistical significance. The coefficient on Institutional Distance increases
slightly and remains significant at the 1% level. Overall, these robustness tests
suggest that distance is significantly associated with centralization, beyond effects
related to headquarters’ local knowledge, managers’ biases and coordination needs.
3.7 Discussion
3.7.1 Interpretation of the results
The results have shown the existence of positive and significant correlations between
environmental distance and centralization of processes, which are robust to a series
of controls. Furthermore, the magnitudes of the coefficients on distance suggest that
the statistical associations documented in Table 12, 13 and 14 are economically as
well as statistically significant. The R-squared are also high. The baseline models
including only the Institutional or the Economic Distance variable and a constant
reproduced over 20% of the variance. Hypothesis 1a posited that distance influences
centralization through the information channel, that is through decreasing headquar-
ters’ knowledge of the local environment, or raising the need for local information.
The results indicate that the information channel is important, as shown by the
significant association between the parent group’s experience in sub-Saharan Africa
(as measured by the number of subsidiaries in the region) and centralization. This
supports Hypothesis 1a and is consistent with the theoretical literature surveyed in
this chapter and in particular Aghion and Tirole (1997). However, the coefficient
on distance remains significant even after including the experience variable, suggest-
ing that the effect of distance on centralization is not only through the information
channel. Hypothesis 1b posited that distance influences centralization through its
effect on congruence between global headquarters’ managers and foreign affiliates’
managers’ objectives. Although I find negative correlations between centralization
and expatriates in top management, consistent with the hypothesis that expatriates
top managers have more congruent objectives with their headquarters compared to
local national CEOs, thereby reducing the need for headquarters to control foreign
affiliates’ operations, the results are not significant at conventional levels. This sug-
gests that human capital at the top management level in foreign affiliates does not
influence, or at least, is not significantly associated, with organizational structure.
Overall, these results suggest that multinationals adapt their organization to
the environmental context, and that they favor a centralized organization when the
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environmental distance is higher, in other words, when the host country is much
less developed economically and institutionally, or very different culturally, beyond
reasons purely related to headquarters’ level of information on the host country
or characteristics of the human capital at the foreign affiliate level. In particular,
even when the size of the parent group and its international exposure are controlled
for, which indicate higher coordination needs pushing for more centralization, more
distant foreign affiliates are still found to be more centralized.
Three related interpretations of these results, non exhaustive and non exclusive,
are possible. The first one is based on the “parenting advantages” literature (Goold,
Campbell and Alexander, 1998; Goold and Campbell, 2002), which emphasizes the
influence that the parent has on its businesses or affiliates leading to better per-
formance than they would otherwise achieve as independent entities (see Goold et
al., 1998). Following this line of research one could interpret the positive relation
between environmental distance and centralization as an indication that foreign
affiliates in developing countries require more support from their parent for their
operations, thereby pushing for more centralization of processes at the headquarters
level. This parenting factor would play a role in explaining centralization beyond
coordination needs at the group level and support needs at the affiliate level related
to the size of the subsidiary, which is controlled for in the estimations.
Another interpretation is that incentive issues related to the host environment
are at play, beyond principal-agent issues at the foreign affiliate level. In particular,
countries with “bad” contracting institutions will suffer more from the “hold-up
problem” as defined by Williamson (1985)35 and it will be more difficult for firms
to operate in this environment, especially when the products are contract-intensive.
As banking activities rely heavily on contracts, when the quality of contracting
institutions in the host country is significantly lower than in the home country,
multinationals may favor a more centralized organization to avoid relying on costly
relationship-specific investments by the foreign affiliate (for instance contracting
locally to develop IT systems) in its host country.
Finally, as mentioned in the robustness section, distance could also capture gen-
eral volatility or environment uncertainty. To the extent that economic, cultural and
institutional distance translate into higher environmental uncertainty, the finding
that higher distance is associated with more centralization is in line with the the-
oretical literature which has examined the triple trade-off coordination-adaptation-
specialization (Dessein and Santos, 2006; Alonso et al., 2008). Indeed, when co-
35See Nunn and Trefler, 2014, for a review of papers on domestic institutions as a source of
comparative advantage.
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ordination needs within the organization become important - which is likely to be
the case for large multinationals - environmental uncertainty should lead to cen-
tralization at the top of the hierarchy, to reduce mis-coordination costs. In such
case, local information is transmitted vertically up the hierarchy and the principal
(headquarters) take the decision. In particular, macroeconomic uncertainty, both
in terms of economic cycle but also in terms of weak institutional framework might
lead the headquarters to favor an organization where control is kept at the top.
The results suggest that institutional weakness and economic uncertainty in the
host environment per se may actually be more potent factors than the information
and bias channel in explaining centralization.
Hypothesis 2 suggested that the use of soft information locally was associated
with lower centralization (higher decentralization). Empirical findings lend support
to this hypothesis, especially with respect to managers’ use of information from their
personal network, which is negatively and significantly associated with centraliza-
tion, both with respect to SMEs and corporate loans’ screening, and is robust to the
inclusion of firm and host country controls. This is consistent with theoretical find-
ings (Stein, 2002) as well as with empirical findings by Petersen and Rajan (2002),
Liberti (2004) and Liberti and Mian (2009). Although the analysis aimed at finding
robust correlations, rather than identifying causal effects, it is worth mentioning
that there is potential reverse causality between the use of soft information and cen-
tralization. In this scenario, organizational structure would determine which type
of information (hard or soft) is primarily used by relationship managers or credit
officers. For instance individuals who receive more authority would rely relatively
more on soft information compared to individuals in more centralized organizations
given the difficulty to communicate soft information up the hierarchy. It is indeed
what Stein (2002) suggests, although the direction of the causality is not clear, as
banks relying more ex-ante on soft information would prefer to decentralize (use
of soft information causes decentralization), and at the same time decentralization
increases managers’ incentives to acquire soft information as they have authority
over how capital is allocated in their own unit (decentralization causes use of soft
information). Empirically, research by Liberti (2004) and Liberti and Mian (2009)
have shown how greater hierarchical or geographical distance between the informa-
tion collecting agent and the loan approving officer (or lesser authority delegated
to the agent) leads to less reliance on subjective information and more on objec-
tive information. In the context of multinational groups, and the relation between
foreign affiliates and their headquarters, one could argue that headquarters decide
on the optimal degree of transfer of authority to foreign affiliates only after having
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observed how much hard versus soft information is produced in a given host coun-
try environment.36 Furthermore, it is likely that multinationals first make strategic
decisions such as loan portfolio allocation and use of credit scoring before deciding
on an organizational structure for the foreign affiliate. As such given the nature of
the variables I use as proxies for reliance on soft information, it is probable that
the potential causal effect goes from reliance on soft information to centralization
than the reverse. However, once an organizational structure is set, higher trans-
fer of autonomy to the foreign affiliates (lower centralization) should lead to higher
managerial incentives and efforts to acquire soft information.
3.7.2 Implications of the research
Overall, the results have shown that:
(1) Availability of information, both in terms of experience of the headquarters
and quality and quantity of local information, is significantly and robustly associated
with centralization.
The implication for empirical research of this finding is that more care needs to be
taken to integrate this information variable, as it is often absent in studies in the field
of international business and strategy focusing on headquarters-subsidiaries relations
(Gupta and Govindarajan, 2000, Luo, 2003, Nell and Ambos, 2013). Indeed, while
this literature examines knowledge flows inside the firm it does not take into account
the availability of information in the host environment (external to the firm), which
may influence the quality and intensity of these internal knowledge flows.
(2) The local environment and more specifically the environmental distance be-
tween home and host countries is a potent factor shaping organizational structure.
In particular, an interesting finding is that multinationals adopt a centralized or-
ganization when the local host environment is very different from the home environ-
ment, even after controlling for coordination needs, while a coordination/adaptation
trade-off would suggest that a decentralized organization should be favored by the
headquarters in order to adapt to (very different) local conditions. In other words,
this research suggests that centralization can be optimal, even when adaptation is
important. One implication for research of this finding is that the theoretical models
of transfer of authority reviewed in the previous section should pay more attention
to the role of environmental uncertainty on transfer of authority, as they have been
mainly preoccupied with incentive considerations and principal-agent issues, while
36If this is the case, it would also imply that the amount of authority transferred to foreign
affiliates depends on the environmental conditions of their host countries, and therefore that some
foreign affiliates are delegated more authority than others.
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this research suggests that local environment plays a role in the decision to centralize,
beyond scale economies and agency issues.
In terms of managerial implications, the results suggest that organizational align-
ment is needed between use of information and autonomy given to foreign affiliates.
This implies that managers should take into account the conditions in their external
host environment, and in particular the quantity and quality of information available
locally, when designing an organizational structure for their foreign affiliates.
Finally, in terms of policy implications, these results may suggest, once more,
the important need to reinforce local institutions and to increase transparency and
availability of information locally, via the development of credit reference bureaus.
If institutional distance is reduced and organizations become more decentralized,
this may have positive effects for host banking markets. Indeed, foreign affiliates,
depending less on their headquarters for organizational processes, may be better
able to adapt their products or services to local needs, to incorporate more rapidly
new information and to develop innovations based on the local context. This is
particularly important in the banking sector in sub-Saharan Africa given the large
unbanked population and the lack of specific banking products offered to lower-
income individuals, especially by foreign banks.
3.7.3 Limitations
Small sample size and external validity. The first type of limitation of this
study is related to the small number of observations, which limits the number of
controls that can be included and the extent to which one can conduct econometric
analyses. In addition, and as mentioned previously, the small sample size raises
questions about the external validity of the research. Sub-Saharan Africa was cho-
sen given that it constitutes an extreme case where the asymmetry of demand and
environmental conditions are likely to be more acute, therefore exacerbating the
potential influence of the environment on the organizational structure. However,
this raises the question of whether these results are generalizable to other regions
of the world. If the results are mainly related to the degree of institutional or eco-
nomic development of Africa, and the quantity and quality of information available
in these markets, the relation between centralization, environmental distance and
information should also be observed in other settings. However, if the results are
mainly related to specific African factors which are partly captured by the mea-
sures of institutional, economic and cultural environment then the external validity
may be limited. In this case, further research incorporating additional data collec-
tion would be welcome to examine whether the relation between centralization and
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environmental distance holds in non-African contexts.
Quality of proxies. The second type of limitation is related to the use of
proxies, in particular to measure managers’ biases. First, the fact that there is
little evidence of potential managers’ biases at the foreign affiliates’ level being
associated with the strength of headquarters’ control might be reassuring as far as
organizational efficiency is concerned. However, it is not clear whether this is due to
the non-existence of such biases, to the fact that they are not concentrated at the
foreign affiliates’ senior management level, therefore not captured by the variables
used, or even whether this is due to headquarters’ blindness towards the potential
existence of such biases. In addition, the fact that the measure of centralization
focuses on dependence over headquarters for operational processes, rather than on
decentralization of key decisions, may make identification of the relation between
decentralization of authority and individual (managers) specific characteristics more
difficult. Indeed, given that risk management procedures or software for lending,
for instance, are imposed in a uniform fashion across or within group affiliates,
whereas delegation of authority on specific decisions may depend more strongly on
the individuals who are managing the foreign affiliate. Finally, there are potential
reverse causality between the composition of the top management and centralization,
which are more severe than between centralization and parent group’s experience in
Africa (the “information channel”). Indeed, it is possible that the composition of the
top management is driven by ex-ante organizational preferences for centralization.
In this case, organizations would first decide on the degree of authority to transfer to
foreign affiliates, and then choose to place less biased (i.e. expatriates) top managers.
That said, the potential for reverse causality is less acute for the variable capturing
the expatriate composition of top management than for the CEO dummies, as in
the majority of the cases decisions regarding top managers recruitment were mainly
made at the foreign affiliate level37 , and therefore less likely to be determined by
headquarters’ ex-ante preferences for centralization.
Potential measurement errors. Furthermore, this research may suffer from
potential measurement error in the dependent variable and in some regressors of
interest. Concerning the first one, if the measurement error is “classical”, that is,
the dependent variable is measured with random errors, this simply reduces pre-
cision of the estimates and results in higher standard errors but does not lead to
bias. If measurement error concerns the measure of distance, or the variables indi-
cating reliance on soft information, then the regression coefficient of the variables
37For 70% of the foreign bank affiliates surveyed, hiring decisions concerning senior managers
such as CFO, COO or heads of credit or risk, were mostly taken by the foreign affiliates’ top
management team.
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of interest should be biased towards zero (“attenuation bias”, Angrist and Pischke,
2009). If this is the case, it would mean that the significance and magnitude of the
effects observed are conservative estimates. A more serious concern is if measure-
ment error is non-classical, that is, measurement error is correlated with the true
variables. It could be the case, for instance, if managers at Global MNB system-
atically under or over-reported the extent of their dependence on their group for
business operations which are components of the centralization of process. If it was
the case, identification could be done through the existence of an auxiliary dataset
containing correctly measured observations (Chen, Han and Tamer, 2005)38, or the
use of instrumental variable techniques for discrete or continuous regressors (see Hu
and Schennach, 2008, for the latter approach and a review of previous methods).
However, the existence of such auxiliary dataset or of good instruments is more the
exception than the rule. With these limitations in mind, the fact that the control
variables have the expected sign and that the results are broadly consistent with the
theoretical and empirical literature should provide reassurance about the quality of
the measure of centralization.
3.8 Conclusion
Using detailed data from a survey on commercial banks in fourteen sub-Saharan
African countries, this research has examined how centralization of processes at
the headquarters level inside multinational banks was influenced by environmen-
tal distance between headquarters and foreign affiliates and by the nature of the
information on projects available in the host country. The geographic context of
sub-Saharan Africa and that of banking were particularly appropriate settings to
examine this issue, exacerbating the potential manifestation of the information and
bias channel. I found evidence of a positive and significant association between the
measures of environmental distance and centralization. The results have suggested
that one of the channels through which distance influences centralization is the de-
gree of information the parent group has on the host environment. However, distance
was still a significant regressor even after controlling for this channel, suggesting that
there are also other operative pathways through which distance influences centraliza-
tion. Another significant result of this research is the negative association between
38To solve the identification problem, Chen, Han and Tamer (2005) require the existence of an
auxiliary data-set that contains information about the conditional distribution of the true variables
given the mis-measured variables. Their main assumption requires that the conditional distribution
of the true variables given the mis-measured variables is the same in the primary and auxiliary
data.
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reliance on qualitative, “soft”, information and centralization, consistent both with
the theoretical and empirical literature reviewed. The results have thus provided
evidence of robust and significant correlations between organizational structure (de-
gree of centralization) and firm factors (acquisition and processing of information
inside banks) as well as environmental factors (institutional, cultural and economic
environment). As such, a multinational will try to optimally adapt its organizational
structure to a series of internal and external factors, to obtain the best performance
in a specific setting.
The analysis in this chapter can be extended in several directions. Given that
one of the limitation of this work is the small sample size and the difficulty to control
for foreign affiliates or parent group fixed effects, a further avenue for research would
be to obtain more data at the group level, in order to make intra-group comparisons
to examine the relation between local environment and centralization, thus avoiding
omitted variables issues at the banking group level.
Furthermore, this research has relied on proxies to examine the relation between
managers’ biases at the subsidiary level and centralization. As such, another avenue
for research would be to examine more in detail the potential existence of biases and
mis-alignment of interests between headquarters and subsidiaries. Such work could
be conducted via in-depth qualitative interviews or case studies examining the rela-
tion between top managers of several foreign affiliates of a multinational enterprise
and their superiors at the global headquarters to examine the potential existence of
agency issues and their impact on organizational structure. Some work has already
been done in that direction in the international management literature, such as
Birkinshaw, Holm, Thilenius and Arvidsson (2000) research on the consequences of
perception gaps on the headquarters-subsidiaries relationship, specifically in terms
of headquarters’ control and subsidiaries’ cooperation. However, more work should
be done to understand how these perception gaps and biases vary over time and
across different environments, and to what extent they depend on the human capi-
tal (both in terms of nationality and experience) of managers in charge of the foreign
subsidiaries. Finally, another avenue for research would be to examine more closely
the link between organizational structure, environment and firm performance, to ex-
amine whether mis-alignment between organizational structure and environmental
circumstances leads to lower performance. Given that for many banks in the sample
income statement information is not available, it was not possible to analyze the
relation between organizational structure and bank performance. However, recent
empirical research (Thomas, 2011) suggests that organizational structure affects
product market outcomes and firm performance. In particular, Thomas (2011) has
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shown that in decentralized organizations local foreign subsidiaries are manufactur-
ing too many products, and that increasing standardization (reducing the number
of products manufactured in each country of operation) would reduce total costs
and increase firm-level profits. Further empirical research based on firm data with
variation both in organizational structure and host environment would be needed to
better understand the relation between organizational form and performance, and
how it is mediated by local conditions.
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Table 3: Analysis of non-response bias - Means comparison of participant vs. non-
participant banks
This table presents an analysis of non-response bias, using T-test to compare the means of several key
financials of participant and non-participant commercial banks in the survey in Tanzania, Kenya and
Ghana. Financials are from the BankScope database, for the last year available. NS: Non Significant.
Financials Participant Non-Participant Difference in Means
Mean Obs. Mean Obs T-test
ALL BANKS
Total Assets (millions USD) 710 48 536 28 0.88NS
Net Income (thous. USD) 20415 48 15077 28 0.67NS
Net Interest Margin (%) 7.9 47 8.3 27 -0.54NS
Total Capital Ratio (%) 24.0 36 23.7 16 0.05NS
Number of employees 406 20 458 11 -0.26NS
FOREIGN BANKS
Total Assets (millions USD) 577 24 447 17 0.70NS
Net Income (thous. USD) 14154 24 15541 17 -0.17NS
Net Interest Margin (%) 7.7 23 9.2 16 -1.04NS
Total Capital Ratio (%) 26.4 22 20.5 12 0.73NS
Number of employees 274 13 532 9 -1.32NS
Table 4: Selected statistics of the sample of banks
This table presents selected statistics of banks in the sample, grouped in three categories: Domestic
banks, and foreign affiliates of African MNB, Global MNB and Emerging MNB. The statistics are
group averages, unless stated otherwise (frequencies and percentages).
Domestic African Global Emerging All
banks MNB MNB MNB Banks
Frequencies (nb of banks in the sample) 36 14 19 8 77
Age (years since incorporation, avg) 24 8 39 37 27
Total assets (millions USD, avg) 751 237 660 694 633
Number of employees (avg) 1022 233 650 243 705
Number of branches (avg) 40 13 26 10 29
Entry mode greenfield (%) . 64 63 75 63
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Table 5: Assessing internal consistency
This table presents the results of univariate regression analysis with centralization of process (Central-
ization of Process (COP), unstandardized) as a regressor. Variable definitions are provided in Table 2
in the Appendix. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and adjusted for clustering at the
banking group level with values in parenthesis reported beneath. *, ** and *** indicate statistical
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
VARIABLES Frequency Frequency
communication with HQ training from HQ
(1) (2)
Centralization of Process 0.703** 0.925**
(0.303) (0.350)
Observations 38 32
R-squared 0.153 0.201
Number of clusters 18 15
Table 6: Centralization of processes: Descriptive statistics
Note: The measure is calculated as an unweighted average of the 5 business operations items (unstan-
dardized).
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min max
Centralization of Processes
African MNB 13 1.74 .88 .20 3.00
Global MNB 18 2.33 .47 1.00 3.00
Emerging MNB 7 1.69 .50 1.00 2.40
All banks 38 2.01 .70 .20 3.00
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Table 7: Cross-correlation table - Centralization of Processes (Obs=38)
Variables Marketing IT systems Operational Credit risk Lending
risk techniques management technology
Marketing 1.00
IT systems 0.23 1.00
Operational risk mgt 0.66 0.58 1.00
Credit risk mgt 0.52 0.60 0.80 1.00
Lending technology 0.43 0.44 0.63 0.61 1.00
Table 8: Principal components/correlation
This table presents the principal component analysis of the 5 business operations items of the central-
ization of processes variable (standardized). 38 observations, 5 components (unrotated).
Component Eigenvalue Difference Proportion (%) Cumulative (%)
Component 1 3.239 2.456 0.648 0.648
Component 2 0.782 0.273 0.157 0.804
Component 3 0.509 0.209 0.102 0.906
Component 4 0.301 0.132 0.060 0.966
Component 5 0.169 . 0.034 1.000
Table 9: Factor Loadings of the first and second component
Factor loading
First Comp. Second Comp.
Marketing 0.701 -0.632
IT systems 0.702 0.605
Operational risk management 0.926 -0.089
Credit risk management 0.894 0.087
Lending technology 0.774 0.029
213
Table 10: Summary statistics of key variables
This table presents summary statistics of key variables by group of banks: foreign affiliates of African
MNB, Global MNB and Emerging MNB. The statistics are group averages, unless stated otherwise
(frequencies and percentages).
African MNB Global MNB Emerging MNB All banks
Obs Mean Obs Mean Obs Mean Obs Mean
CENTPROCESS 13 -0.71 18 0.84 7 -0.85 38 -0.68
Institutional Distance 14 -0.58 19 1.92 8 0.29 41 0.75
Economic Distance 14 1.18 19 35.56 8 6.16 41 18.09
Cultural Distance 14 1.00 14 3.29 8 1.61 36 2.03
Parent experience in SSA 14 12.14 19 10.79 8 10.38 41 11.17
CEO is expat from home country 14 29% 19 47% 7 57% 40 43%
CEO is expat from third country 14 57% 19 32% 7 29% 40 40%
Expats in top management 14 38% 19 43% 7 54% 40 43%
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Table 17: Robustness Test 1: Using the COP index
This table presents the results of OLS regression of centralization of processes using the unweighted
average of the scores on the 5 business operations (COP index). Variable definitions are provided
in Table 2 in the Appendix. All regressions include firm controls (CEO is home country expat,
CEO is host country expat, firm’s age, size, subsidiary dummy, entry by acquisition, parent group’s
experience in SSA) and host country controls (HHI lagged and two regional dummies, East Africa and
West Africa). In addition, all regressions include a full set of host country dummies. Standard errors
are robust to heteroskedasticity and adjusted for clustering at the banking group level (18 clusters)
with values in parenthesis reported beneath. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%,
5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3)
Institutional Distance 0.369***
(0.102)
Economic Distance 0.018***
(0.004)
Cultural Distance 0.327***
(0.079)
Observations 38 38 33
Adjusted R-squared 0.446 0.414 0.514
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Figure 1: Organizational fitness
Environmental
factors:
Environmental
uncertainty (+;
inverted-U shape)
Organizational
strategy:
Centralization
Internal firm factors:
Agents’ bias (+)
Principal’s knowledge (+)
Coordination needs
(+; inverted-U shape)
Soft information (-)
Figure 2: Foreign Subsidiaries in sub-Saharan Africa
Source: Central banks’ websites
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Figure 3: Distribution of banks by host countries
Source: Bank Survey data
Figure 4: Components of COP index by categories of banks (unweighted)
Source: Bank Survey data
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Foreign Affiliates –Survey Questionnaire 
 
The goal of this study is to better understand conditions for banking activities in sub-
Saharan Africa and to compare these conditions with other countries that have been 
assessed through the same survey. The best way to obtain this data is to talk directly 
with bank managers. In that perspective, we are contacting managers of banks in sub-
Saharan Africa to ask about their perception of the business environment and several 
credit risk management aspects. Results from this study will provide important 
feedback to the banking community and policy makers and your opinion will be highly 
valued. Your answers should reflect only your perception and experience of banking in 
your country.        
 
Answering the questionnaire should only take 15 minutes. Your responses are 
voluntary and you may skip any questions you do not wish to answer. The data will be 
used for statistical analysis only and your personal details will remain strictly 
confidential. Your answers will never be associated with your name, mailing address or 
organization.  For public dissemination of the survey results, the data will be 
aggregated so individual banks responses cannot be identified. 
 
Once completed, please return this questionnaire by email to Ms Adeline Pelletier: 
a.g.pelletier@lse.ac.uk. If you have any question, please feel free to contact her. 
 
Alternatively, you can fill in the questionnaire online. To take the survey, please copy 
and paste the URL below into your internet browser 
https://lse.qualtrics.com/SE/?SID=SV_9t92eB31D39wF0h 
 
 
PART I: GENERAL INFORMATION 
 
Question 1. Please indicate below the name of the bank for which you are currently 
working:  
 
 
Question 2. Please indicate below your current position in this bank: 
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Question 3a. What is the organisational form of your bank in this country? 
 Representative Office 
 Branch 
 Subsidiary 
 
Question 3b. What was the mode of entry of your bank in this country? 
 Greenfield (the structure and facilities of the bank were entirely set up by the 
parent) 
 Joint Venture with a local partner 
 Acquisition of an existing local bank 
 
 
Question 3c. Please indicate the nationality of the following managers working in your 
branch/subsidiary: 
 Local national Home country 
expatriate 
Third country 
expatriate 
n.a. (position 
doesn't exist) 
Managing 
Director/CEO of 
the 
branch/subsidiary 
        
Head of finance 
(CFO) 
        
Head operation 
(COO) 
        
Head of credit 
risk/management 
        
 
 
 
 
PART II: KNOWLEDGE FLOWS 
 
Question 4. How often do you communicate with your counterparts and bosses in the 
global headquarters via email or phone? 
 Daily 
 2-3 Times a Week 
 Once a Week 
 2-3 Times a Month 
 Once a Month 
 Less than Once a Month 
 Never 
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Question 5. How often do you receive training from the global headquarters? 
 Once a month or more 
 Between once or twice every quarter 
 Between once or twice every 6 months 
 Once a year 
 Less than once a year 
 Never 
 
Question 6. To what extent does your branch/subsidiary depend on the global 
headquarters for information and technical support in the following domains?  
 A Lot Some Little None Not 
Available 
Marketing 
know-how 
          
IT and 
technological 
know-how 
          
Operational 
Risk 
management 
techniques 
(Fraud and 
corruption, 
process 
management) 
          
Credit Risk 
management 
techniques 
          
Lending 
Technology 
          
Other domain, 
specify below: 
          
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Question 7. Do you receive or provide training to a sister foreign affiliate?   
 
Note: Here a "sister foreign affiliate" refers to another affiliate of the group located in a foreign 
country which is not the country of origin of the group. For instance, the group you are working 
for is British, with global head office located in London, your branch/subsidiary is located in 
Ghana, and you receive technical assistance from another branch/subsidiary located in Kenya, 
or in India. This other foreign branch/subsidiary is what is referred to here as a "sister foreign 
affiliate". 
 
 Yes No not available 
Provide training to a 
sister foreign 
affiliate 
      
Receive training 
from a sister foreign 
affiliate 
      
 
 
Question 8. If Yes, please specify the location of the sister foreign affiliate from which 
you receive or provide training?  You may refer to several sister foreign affiliates: 
 
 Receive training from the 
following affiliates 
Provide training to the 
following affiliates 
 
Location of the sister 
foreign affiliates 
Location of the sister 
foreign affiliates 
Country 1   
Country 2   
Country 3   
 
 
Question 9. How often do you communicate with your counterparts in the sister foreign 
affiliate with which you have the most interaction? 
 Daily 
 2-3 Times a Week 
 Once a Week 
 2-3 Times a Month 
 Once a Month 
 Less than Once a Month 
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Question 10. Now, considering the sister foreign affiliate from which you receive more 
knowledge, skills or training: To what extent does your organisation depend on that 
sister foreign affiliate for information and technical support in the following domains:  
 A Lot Some Little None Not 
Available 
(don't 
receive skills 
from sister 
foreign 
affiliate) 
Marketing know-
how 
          
IT and 
technological 
know-how 
          
Operational Risk 
management 
techniques 
(Fraud and 
corruption and 
process 
management) 
          
Credit Risk 
management 
techniques 
          
Lending 
Technology 
          
Other, specify 
below: 
          
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PART III: ORGANISATION QUESTIONS 
 
Question 11. What is the influence of the headquarters (HQ) to which your 
organisation directly reports (i.e. either regional headquarter or global headquarter) on 
the following decisions: 
 Decision 
made 
exclusively 
by HQ 
Decision 
made 
mostly 
by HQ 
Decision-
making is 
about equal 
Decision 
made mostly 
by your 
branch/ 
subsidiary 
Decision made 
exclusively by 
your 
branch/subsidi
ary 
n.a. 
Hiring of senior 
managers (level just 
below CEO; ex: 
COO, CIO, Head of 
Legal, Head of 
Compliance) 
            
Introduction of a 
new banking 
products 
            
Local expansion 
(opening of new 
branches) 
            
Portfolio allocation             
Operational Risk 
management 
            
Asset-Liability 
management 
            
Capital management             
Other, specify 
below: 
            
 
 
PART IV: FINANCIAL RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE HEADQUARTERS AND 
THE FOREIGN AFFILIATE 
 
Question 12. Did your parent bank provide you at least once with internal capital 
(loans, deposits, liquidity) over the last two financial years? 
 Yes 
 No 
 
Question 13. Did your parent bank provide you at least once with equity capital over 
the last two financial years?   
 Yes 
 No 
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Question 14. Why did your parent bank provided you with funding? Please tick all that 
apply: 
 
 to help us bridge unexpected negative shock to our deposit base  
 to help us bridge shortfalls in wholesale funding 
 to help us meet credit growth targets  
 to help us take advantage of new lending opportunities 
 Other: please specify below: 
__________________________________________________________________
____ 
 
 
 
Question 15. Has your branch/subsidiary provided your parent bank at least once with 
internal capital (loans, deposits, liquidity) or remitted dividends to your parent bank over 
the last 2 financial years?   
 Yes 
 No 
 
Question 16a. Do you sometimes partner with other foreign affiliates of your banking 
group or with your parent bank to offer loans to corporates? 
 Never 
 Rarely 
 Sometimes 
 Often 
 Most of the time 
 
Question 16b. If over the last 12 months you have partnered with other affiliates of your 
banking group to offer loans to corporates, please indicate below the location (name of 
the country) of these affiliates: 
Countries: 
_________________________________________________________________ 
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PART V: BANK FUNDING 
 
Question 17. Please indicate below from which sources your bank obtain funding 
(liabilities): 
 Customer deposits 
 Domestic wholesale market 
 Short-term interbank borrowing 
 International wholesale funding (bonds and loans) 
 Parent bank funding 
 Other, specify below: ____________________ 
 
Question 18. How easy is it for your bank to obtain domestic funding? 
 
 Very 
Easy 
Easy Somewhat 
Easy 
Neutral Somewhat 
Difficult 
Difficult Very 
Difficult 
Interbank 
borrowing 
              
Local 
customer 
deposits 
              
 
 
Question 19. If your access to domestic funding (interbank or deposits) is difficult, could 
you please explain why?  
 
 
 
PART VI: PORTFOLIO PROFILE, LOAN APPLICATION AND APPROVAL 
 
Question 20a. Could you give an indication of the percentage of your loan portfolio 
attributed to the following categories: Note: you may provide an estimate 
______ Micro-finance 
______ Small and Medium Enterprises 
______ Large corporates 
______ Retail customers (mortgage, consumer lending, etc.) 
______ Other, specify below: 
 
Question 20b. Please could you provide your bank’s definition of Small and Medium 
Enterprises (SMEs) below (e.g. in terms of maximum turnover, or number of 
employees, or loan size, etc.): 
 
 
Question 21. Could you explain briefly the reasons behind the composition of your loan 
portfolio? 
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Question 22. What are the three (3) main industrial sectors to which you provide loans 
or credit?  
 Agriculture, forestry and fishing 
 Public utilities 
 Extractive industries 
 Manufacturing 
 Transport and communication 
 Construction, Real Estate 
 Finance, insurance 
 Trade 
 Social and education 
 Other, Please specify below: ____________________ 
 
Question 23. Could you explain briefly the main reasons behind this particular sectoral 
allocation of your loan portfolio? 
 
 
 
Question 24. What are your views on the Small and Medium Enterprises segment 
(opportunities, constraints)?  Do you actively engage with this segment (Why/Why 
not)? 
 
 
 
 
Question 25. Origination of loans. How do you identify potential SME clients? Please 
indicate below which of the possible ways of identifying SME clients you most typically 
use: 
 Rely on existing deposit clients 
 Use information from existing firm databases (credit reference bureaus, etc.) 
 Attract clients with bank credit 
 Focus on attracting SMEs that are clients/suppliers of your existing clients 
 Other, please indicate below: ____________________ 
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Question 26. Do loan officers (or branch managers) in your organisation use internal 
credit scores (credit scoring models developed by your bank) in any aspect of 
extending credit or loans? 
 For small and medium 
business loans 
For large corporates For personal loans 
 Yes No 
Don't 
know/n.a. 
Yes No 
Don't 
know/n.a. 
Yes No 
Don't 
know/n.a. 
Credit 
scores 
calculated 
for the 
business 
or owner 
                  
 
 
Question 27. If you use credit scores for SMEs, could you indicate briefly the main 
elements that you take into account in the computation of the score? 
 
 
 
 
Question 28. Do prospective SME borrowers typically need to provide the following to 
apply for a term loan or for asset financing with your bank? 
 SME term loan SME asset financing 
 Yes No 
not 
available 
Yes No 
not 
available 
Bank 
account 
statements 
            
Collateral 
or security 
            
Audited 
accounts 
            
 
Question 29a. Would you extend a loan to a SME with no collateral or security? 
 Yes 
 No 
 n.a. (product not offered by your bank) 
 
Question 29b. If Yes, how would you ensure that the SME has the ability to repay? 
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Question 30. Loan approval   
What are the three (3) most important factors for deciding whether to approve a loan:   
 For small and medium 
business loans 
For large corporates 
Characteristics of the 
borrower 
    
Credit score     
Financial assessment of the 
business 
    
Quality of collateral 
(personal assets pledged 
by entrepreneur) 
    
Sector of activity     
Previous relationship with 
business owner 
    
Business plan     
Other, specify below:     
 
 
Question 31. How long does it take, on average, to reach a decision on a loan 
application? 
 1 or 2 days A week or 
less 
A month or 
less 
Between 1 
and 2 
months 
Over 2 
months 
For personal 
loans 
          
For small 
and medium 
business 
loans 
          
For large 
corporates 
          
 
 
Question 32. Approval rate of loan applications: Please could you provide an estimate 
below of the approval rate for the following categories: On average, the percentage of 
total loan applications that are approved is: 
______ For personal loans 
______ For small and medium business loans 
______ For large corporates 
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Question 33. What are the most frequent reasons for rejecting loans applications from 
SMEs? 
 
 
 
Question 34. What do you, as a senior manager, perceive as the main constraints on 
your bank's ability to expand the volume of SME loans in this country? 
 
 
 
 
Question 35. What do you, as a senior manager, perceive as the main constraints on 
your bank's ability to expand the volume of large corporate loans in this country? 
 
 
 
Question 36. How do the loan officers (or branch managers) in your bank obtain 
information on loans applicants (other than from the loan applicant him/herself)? 
 For small and medium 
business loans 
For loans to large corporates 
 Yes No 
Don't 
know/n.a. 
Yes No 
Don't 
know/n.a. 
Through private 
credit reference 
bureaus 
            
Through public 
credit registries 
            
Through 
informal 
relations with 
other banks 
            
Personal 
network 
            
The parent 
bank or the 
Group in 
general 
            
 
 
Question 37. If you did not use a credit bureau over the last 12 months, what were the 
main reasons? 
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Question 38a. Have you faced any challenges with using information from credit 
reference bureaus? 
 Yes 
 No 
 n.a. (do not use credit reference bureau) 
 
Question 38b. If you answered Yes to the previous question (Q38a), could you please 
elaborate below: 
 
 
 
Question 39a. The following refers to the organisation of loan approval and credit risk 
management at your bank. Please indicate at which organisational level the following 
functions are most often performed:     
Note:   
 Local branch is a branch of your bank in the country of operations   
 Local head office (HO) is the headoffice of your bank in the country of operations   
 Regional headquarter (HQ) is an headquarter responsible for a world's region (for 
instance, Europe, Middle East, Africa)   
 Global headquarter (HQ) is the headquarter of the banking group 
 
 Credit risk management Final approval for loans is typically done 
 
Local 
branch 
Local 
HO 
Regional 
HQ 
Global 
HQ 
Local 
branch 
Local HO 
Regional 
HQ 
Global 
HQ 
For SME 
loans 
                
For large 
corporates 
loans 
                
 
 
Question 39b. The following refers to the organisation of loan approval and credit risk 
management at your bank. Please indicate at which organisational level the following 
functions are most often performed:   
 Determination of targets for credit growth Loan recovery 
 
Local 
branch 
Local HQ 
Regional 
HQ 
Global 
HQ 
Local 
branch 
Local HO 
Regional 
HQ 
Global 
HQ 
For SME 
loans 
                
For large 
corporates 
loans 
                
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Question 40. Could you explain briefly what happens in your bank when a loan is non-
performing?  
 
Question 41. Monitoring of loans. Concerning the monitoring of SME loans, could you 
indicate which ones are the most important practices used by the loan officers (or 
branch managers) in your bank? 
Rank from 1 to 4 (with 1 being the most important) the importance of the following 
possible ways of monitoring SME loans:(Please skip this question if you do not offer 
SMEs products) 
______ Repayment frequency 
______ Deterioration of cash flows 
______ Regular visits to SMEs 
______ Regular visits from SMEs 
______ Other, specify below: 
 
 
Questions 42. How often on average do loan officers in your bank have contacts with 
SME clients (phone, letter, visits), once the loan has been approved? (Please consider 
a typical loan to an SME, this question does not refer to the cases of non-performing 
SME loans). 
 Daily 
 2-3 Times a Week 
 Once a Week 
 2-3 Times a Month 
 Once a Month 
 Less than Once a Month 
 Never 
 Not available 
 
 
Question 43. Syndicated loans with other banks in your country of operations 
(A loan offered by a group of lenders who work together to provide funds for a single 
borrower)   
How often does your bank participate in syndicated loans? 
 Often 
 Sometimes 
 Rarely 
 Never 
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Question 44. How difficult is it for your bank to find bank partners to syndicate a loan? 
 Very Difficult 
 Difficult 
 Somewhat Difficult 
 Neutral 
 Somewhat Easy 
 Easy 
 Very Easy 
 
 
PART VI: BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT 
 
Question 45. What do you think might constrain improving the performance of 
operations in your bank? Looking at the few options below, could you tell me if these 
constitute an obstacle? 
 Extreme 
obstacle 
Important 
obstacle 
Moderate 
obstacle 
Minor 
obstacle 
Not an 
obstacle at 
all 
Hiring 
managers 
with the right 
skills 
          
Employment 
laws 
          
Banking 
regulations 
          
The Court 
system 
          
Any other? 
Please, 
specify 
below: 
          
 
 
Question 46.  Mobile Banking   
What is in your view the impact of the increase of mobile phone banking for your 
business? How are you responding to that? 
 
 
 
Question 47. What are, in your view, the main challenges that your company is facing 
in this country? 
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Question 48. How many direct local competitors do you have in the commercial 
banking segment?  Out of the total number of banks in your country, indicate the 
number of banks which are directly competing with the types of product you are 
offering: 
 No competitors 
 Less than five competitors 
 Five or more competitors 
 
Question 49. In your view, what is the intensity of the local competition in the banking 
segments in which you operate? 
 None Light Moderate Strong Intense Not 
Available 
Deposit 
market 
            
Micro-finance 
lending 
            
Small and 
Medium 
Enterprises 
lending 
            
Large 
corporates 
lending 
            
Other, please 
specify below: 
 
            
 
 
PART VIII: INFORMATION ON THE ORGANISATION 
 
Question 50. How many people are working in total in your bank?  
Please indicate an estimate of the total number of people working for your company in 
this particular country (includes local headquarters and local branches): 
 
 
Question 51. Manager's personal information.  
Please could you indicate below for how long you have been working for this bank 
(number of years or months)?   
 
 
Question 52. Is there any further area that we have not touched on upon which you 
may wish to comment? 
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Tick YES if you would you like a copy of the survey results’ report when it is written: 
 Yes 
 
THANK YOU      
Thank you very much for having taken the time to complete this questionnaire. The 
information on your perceptions is a very important input for the evaluation of 
conditions in the banking environment in sub-Saharan Africa, as well as the formulation 
of policy advice. 
 
Conclusion
This chapter will summarize how this research has extended theoretical and empir-
ical knowledge in the field of international business, corporate strategy and multi-
national banking. First, this chapter will present an overview of findings made by
this dissertation, linking them back to the original research questions posed in the
introduction. Next, the contributions made by this dissertation will be discussed in
the context of the relevant empirical and theoretical literature. Specific implications
for academic research practice and policy implications relating to these questions
will be discussed. Finally, further avenues of research either extending the disserta-
tion or presenting another facet of the issue of multinational banking in developing
countries will be presented.
This thesis has set out to explore the corporate and organizational strategies, as
well as the performance of foreign multinational banks in developing countries by
recognizing and emphasizing the heterogeneity of foreign banks operating in these
countries. It aimed to explore three related sets of questions, within the context
of banking in sub-Saharan Africa. The first set of questions concerned the nature
and exploitation of multinational banks’ capabilities. The second set of questions
concerned the corporate strategies and performance of banks in host African mar-
kets. Finally the third set of questions asked about the internal organization of these
banks, how they are determined by environmental factors, and how they could pro-
vide sources of competitive advantages for foreign affiliates of multinational banks.
This dissertation has proceeded to examine banks’ capabilities and organiza-
tion in two ways. First, indirectly, by examining the differences in performance
between different groups of foreign affiliates. Second, directly, by exploring the in-
ternal capital allocation strategies and the organizational strategies, with respect to
centralization of processes, of these multinationals. In so doing it has provided a
supply-side analysis of banking markets in sub-Saharan Africa. This research was
motivated theoretically by the absence of a theoretical framework which would help
analyze the impact of heterogeneity in foreign firms’ capabilities on competition and
245
firm performance in a given market. Empirically, the research motivation stemmed
from the lack of comparative analysis of North-South vs. South-South FDI in simi-
lar host countries as well as the lack of empirical knowledge on the internal capital
allocation and internal organization of multinational firms with foreign affiliates in
developing countries, especially in the service sector. Such empirical analysis has
required the use of large financial databases combined with a collection of primary
data on banks’ internal organization and lending operations.
Main findings
The main empirical findings are the following:
1. Lower performance of regional African banks’ affiliates (South-South FDI) rel-
ative to those of global banks (North-South FDI) in sub-Saharan Africa, mainly
driven by higher cost of capital.
The foreign affiliates of regional African MNB are under-performing (in terms
of Return on Equity) relative to those of Global MNB in sub-Saharan Africa.
This finding is robust to a set of host country controls, time and host coun-
try fixed effects, as well as controls for entry and exit of banks. The results
indicate that this lower performance is not primarily due to higher levels of
non-performing loans or worse top-line performance (interest revenues), but
is related to a higher cost of funding. Essentially, regional African MNB are
more reliant on the more-expensive time deposits than global MNB, which
have a larger current deposit base. Investigating the existence of market seg-
mentation, I do not find significant differences in terms of maturity of the
portfolio, customer profile or sectoral allocation. However, the presence of
banks in specific sub-Saharan African countries tend to be statistically signifi-
cantly associated with several country determinants among which GDP growth
and banking regulations. Regional African MNB tend to be more present (in
terms of market shares) in countries with with weaker banking regulations,
while Global MNB favor countries with higher GDP growth. This suggests
that African MNB tend to internationalize at the periphery, in countries with
weaker competition.
2. No clear institutional voids’ advantage for multinational firms from developing
countries operating in other developing countries
Indeed, the results of the first chapter also show that regional African MNB are
not better able to operate in weaker institutional environments than Global
MNB. One of the lessons learnt during this academic journey is that there is
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no institutional voids’ (operating) advantage per se, or if there is, it cannot be
sustained for a long time.
3. High financial integration of global banks’ foreign affiliates to their group.
Focusing on internal capital markets practices of foreign banks towards their
affiliates in South Africa, the results of the second chapter indicate that Global
MNB tend to be more financially integrated to their group than Emerging
MNB1.
4. While higher financial integration implies more support from the parent bank
when foreign affiliates are financially fragile (i.e. when the solvency ratio
declines), this also implies supporting “group effort” when other affiliates are
facing capital crunches, by sending capital back to the group.
This has implications both for the strength of foreign affiliates and for the
host market. First, parent groups support their affiliates when their solvency
ratio declines, thereby strengthening host markets’ banking stability. Second,
increases in internal funding tend to be transmitted to the local market via
increases in the supply of domestic credit by these banks. However, when a
part of the group is exposed to a funding shock, other foreign affiliates may be
required to help by increasing their net lending to their group, in other words
by remitting capital back to the group. This may be at the expense of the
local supply of credit.
5. Higher centralization of operational processes inside Global MNB compared to
regional African MNB and Emerging MNB. Using fieldwork data on the inter-
nal organization of foreign banks, I examined the centralization inside multi-
nationals and more specifically the dependence of sub-Saharan African foreign
affiliates on their headquarters for operational processes such as risk manage-
ment and lending technology. I find that Global MNB adopt more centralized
organizations than African MNB and Emerging MNB. The difference between
Global MNB and these two groups in the mean of the index of centralization
of processes was found to be significant at the 5% level. However, there is no
significant difference in the means of the centralization index between African
MNB and Emerging MNB. This result is related to two other key findings:
6. Positive and robust association between environmental distance and central-
ization.
I find evidence of a positive and significant association between institutional,
economic and cultural distance and centralization of processes. In other words,
1Note that there are unfortunately no regional African banks in this sample, the reason simply
being that African MNB have not established branches or subsidiaries as yet in South Africa.
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the larger the difference between the home and the host country environment,
the more the organization is centralized. Another significant result is the ro-
bust and positive association between headquarters’ experience in sub-Saharan
Africa (as measured by the number of subsidiaries owned by the parent group
in the African region) and centralization. When parent banks have acquired
sufficient local knowledge on the host country environment, the organization is
centralized and global headquarters retain control over operational processes.
7. Negative and robust association between the use of soft information on borrow-
ers and centralization. The empirical results also indicate that higher reliance
on qualitative or soft information is negatively and significantly associated with
centralization, consistent with the theoretical literature in corporate finance
(Stein, 2002).
By comparing different groups of foreign firms, this research has highlighted
the alignment between foreign multinationals’ capabilities, their location strategies,
their customer or market segment strategies, as well as their internal organization.
In particular, global banks, which have higher productive capabilities and a wider
international exposure, perform better than regional African banks in Africa (Chap-
ter 1) and are also organized differently (Chapter 3). Moreover, this organizational
set-up, measured in the research by the degree of centralization of operational pro-
cesses by the global headquarters, varies depending on the host country environ-
ment, and the institutional distance between host and home countries. In so doing,
this research provides a bridge between the organizational economics literature and
the strategy literature, as both fields have evolved separately without paying much
attention to each other (Roberts and Saloner, 2013). Only very recently research
has been developed to examine these two aspects jointly, with the assumption that
firm performance is determined by three broad factors: its external environment,
the strategy it adopts to deal with this environment and the organization it sets
up to implement this strategy (Roberts and Saloner, 2013). This research provides
an empirical examination at the industry level of how these different elements are
integrated, starting from the standpoint of the resources and capabilities of firm,
that is, considering that the initial source of observed differences between firms lie
in their unequal possession of inputs. In particular, the research has identified two
advantages of being part of a global group, embedded in the internal resources and
internal organization of the group, with direct impacts on foreign affiliates’ perfor-
mance. The first one is the possibility to rely on internal capital in cases of funding
shock (Chapter 2). The second one is the ability to rely on operational platforms
created centrally by the headquarters and deployed across the group (Chapter 3).
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Foreign affiliates of Global MNB are more financially integrated to their group and
they depend more on their headquarters for operational processes relative to Emerg-
ing MNB and African MNB. The fact that foreign affiliates of Global MNB have
a relatively significant share of their liabilities composed of group loan or deposit
(Chapter 2) could also explain their comparatively lower ratio of interest expenses
to interest bearing liabilities (Chapter 1), to the extent that internal capital tend to
be provided to affiliates at low cost. In addition, the finding that Global MNB rely
more on group support (Chapter 3) than African MNB for operational processes
could explain the low cost income ratio observed in Chapter 1, through group-level
scale economies in operational platforms. The result that differences in performance
are tightly linked with group membership, rather than primarily driven by the struc-
ture of the market, is strengthened by the lack of evidence of market segmentation
in the lending market, and the finding that the differences between Global MNB and
African MNB in the quality of their loan portfolio and in their ability to generate
interest income are not significant.
Overall, this research has not find any strong empirical evidence that capabili-
ties conferred by experience in similar markets (“institutional voids advantage”, or
similarity of the composition of the demand) led to sustainable competitive advan-
tages. The question of the value (in Barney’s 1991 sense)2 of this “institutional
voids advantage” can therefore be posed, with theoretical implications that will be
examined further below.
Finally, the finding that foreign affiliates of Emerging MNB (from South Africa or
other emerging markets outside of Africa), while relying less on groups’ operational
platforms and internal funding than foreign affiliates of Global MNB, do not record
significantly lower financial performance (both in terms of ROE and in terms of cost
income ratio) may suggest that although being potentially less stronger groups in
terms of productive capabilities or size of their balance sheet these banks are able to
catch up with Global MNB within the African context. While the rationale to in-
clude South African groups with other emerging groups (generally from South Asia
and South East Asia) was motivated by their similar degree of international experi-
ence and level of development of their home country, fieldwork research has revealed
that they have in fact rather different strategies within African host markets. While
emerging groups from South Asia (especially India) tend to have a niche (Asian)
clientèle, and operate in a relatively decentralized fashion, the mode of operation
of South African groups is more similar to that of Global MNB, with strong group
2“Resources are valuable when the enable a firm to conceive of or implement strategies that
improve its efficiency and effectiveness” (Barney, 1991:).
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integration, a large business scope, targeting retail, SME and corporate segments,
and important brand development and marketing in host African countries. While
performance of Asian banking groups may be related to their niche strategy, it is less
the case for South African groups. It is thus possible that for South African groups,
“institutional voids advantages” create enough value so as to compensate for lower
levels of vertical capabilities, while for other African groups, vertical capabilities are
too low to be compensated by higher horizontal capabilities, and as a consequence
the performance of these African latecomers is significantly lower.
This begs an additional question: how can we explain the co-existence of Global
MNB, African MNB and Emerging MNB and domestic banks in most sub-Saharan
African countries, if some groups of banks record much lower financial performance,
suggesting that they do not have the required capabilities to compete effectively?
Little evidence has been found empirically to suggest that these within-sector per-
formance differences are related to initial firms’ initial uncertainty about their pro-
ductivity3, as performance differences are still significant in a 5-year balanced panel
(Chapter 1), or that they are due to the existence of strategic groups or market
segmentation (Chapter 1). While attempts to answer this question have been made
in Chapter 1, evidence form the three chapters, and especially from fieldwork inter-
views with key stakeholders of the banking sector in Africa has provided additional
perspective. The first part of the answer, suggested in Chapter 1, lies in the existence
of geographic self-selection according to which some groups of banks will be more
present in specific countries, depending on their capabilities. Furthermore, the fact
that no African MNB is present in South Africa (Chapter 2) is also telling about the
obstacles that this group of banks faces in expanding to the more advanced, emerg-
ing economies. In other words, there is a range of countries into which African
MNB are not able to expand (the most developed African countries) due to high
barriers to entry or high degree of competition, while there is a range of countries
in which Global MNB opt out or are much less present (least developed countries
with low GDP growth) due to the limited opportunities offered by these markets.
The second part of the answer is related to the fact that by focusing on differences
in performance, one might forget that on average, over the 10-year study period,
all groups of banks recorded ROE well above the break-even point (see summary
statistics in Chapter 1). Despite the fact that a very large majority of the man-
agers surveyed considered that competition, especially in the corporate segment,
3In fact, according to Melitz (2003), while firm heterogeneity among domestic firms can be
explained by this initial uncertainty this is not the case for firms expanding abroad, as they
are assumed to make the decision to operate abroad after they have gained knowledge of their
productivity.
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was intense (Chapter 3), most if not all banks in the countries where fieldwork was
conducted, which are among the most developed and competitive banking markets
in the region, reported positive net profits, with high interest margins. This suggests
that it is the lack of maturity of the market itself which allows groups with different
levels of capabilities to co-exist, survive, and thrive. Understanding further how
African MNB could catch up with Global MNB when operating in the same host
markets, through, for instance, knowledge spill-overs would offer fascinating avenues
for future research which will be further discussed below.
Key contributions
The object of the research (multinational enterprises) as well as its sectoral and
geographic context (banking in Africa) and the theoretical framework used (essen-
tially the strategy literature on firms’ capabilities) imply that this dissertation has
relevance for three separate fields of research. The first one is the literature on
international business and strategy, which has been particularly interested in the
emergence of multinational firms from developing and emerging countries (Khanna
and Palepu, 2006, 2010; Cuervo-Cazurra and Genc, 2008; Aulakh, 2007; Bonaglia et
al., 2007). The second one is the literature on foreign banking in developing coun-
tries, which has focused on the impact of developed foreign banks on SME financing
and on the determinants of developing country banks’ entry into other developing
countries (The World Bank, 2006; Van Horen, 2007; Petrou, 2007). The third one is
the empirical literature on firms’ internal organization, and more specifically their
degree of centralization (Acemoglu et al., 2007, Bloom, Sadun and Van Reenen,
2012) and their internal capital markets (Stein, 2002; Morgan et al., 2004). This
work has made several, mostly empirical, contributions to these three fields of re-
search, which are detailed below. While the key contributions of this PhD lie in
its empirical analysis, often relying on new databases, I will start by outlining the
theoretical contribution that this dissertation has brought.
Theoretical contributions. To examine banks from different countries of ori-
gin and with different degrees of internationalization, and as such, with different
sets of capabilities, this dissertation has proposed a simple framework in which to
compare the strategies and performance of banks with heterogeneous capabilities
in foreign host markets. This framework was motivated by the lack of appropri-
ate models or theories on which one could rely to examine the co-existence of firms
from developing and developed countries into third host countries. The international
business literature in the tradition of the O.L.I. paradigm of Dunning (1977, 1980)
has highlighted that firms engaged in foreign activities need to have unique advan-
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tages (ownership advantages) to be able to compete with firms in foreign markets.
Furthermore, these advantages need to be considered in relative terms: the compet-
itive advantages of the investing firms need to be superior to those of other firms,
and particularly those domiciled in the country in which they are seeking to make
their investments. The literature in international economics, following Melitz (2003)
has also emphasized the fact that firms are heterogeneous with respect to their pro-
ductivity, and that only the most productive firms were engaged in foreign direct
investment. While the ownership advantages of Dunning, based on industrial orga-
nization theories, explain why the affiliates of foreign firms can compete successfully
with domestic firms in supplying the host markets and the Melitz model (2003)
can explain the heterogeneity in international activity among firms from a same
home country, none of these literatures help explain the sustainable heterogeneity
in capabilities and performance of foreign affiliates in a same industry and coun-
try as observed in African banking markets. The theoretical contribution of this
research was to propose a simple theoretical framework which could help explain
the co-existence of North-South and South-South FDI as observed in sub-Saharan
Africa, and formulate predictions on the international performance of different cat-
egories of firms. I built on the capability literature and recent advances led by
Sutton (2012) in the industrial economics literature which has integrated both the
international economics on quality and trade and the management concept of capa-
bilities to propose two types of capabilities which could explain the co-existence of
firms with different set of capabilities. The first type of capability identified (and
labeled “vertical capability”) was related to productivity advantages. The second
type of capability identified (and labeled “horizontal capability”) drew on the no-
tion of “institutional voids advantage”, provided by the international business and
strategy literature (Khanna and Palepu, 2006, 2010) and on the related one of sim-
ilarity of the composition of demand, from the international economics literature
(Linder, 1961, Fajgelbaum et al., 2011). These two concepts illustrate a simple
trade-off between adaptation cost and productivity advantages in developing coun-
tries which help explain the empirical patterns observed in the context of banking
in sub-Saharan Africa, but could also be useful to analyze international expansion
of firms from developing countries in other sectors and geographic areas.
Empirical contributions. As suggested, most of this thesis has provided em-
pirical evidence on the phenomenon of banking in sub-Saharan Africa. At the mo-
ment, and despite the fact that the banking sector in Africa is growing fast and
innovating rapidly, scholarship has remained very limited on this particular topic.
Furthermore, the fieldwork data collection has tried to adopt a macro view by going
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beyond the specificities of a single host country, to bring together a regional view of
banking markets, which was required by the regional perspective that banks adopt
themselves in the organization of their international operations. While identifying
causal effect in econometrics with a panel of country is often difficult, the anal-
ysis has suggested several very robust correlations and in so doing has evidenced
empirical patterns which should motivate further research.
First, it has provided a very detailed empirical analysis of the drivers of perfor-
mance in banking, conducting a comparative analysis of three groups of foreign banks
from countries with different levels of development, while most of the literature on
multinational banking has examined foreign banks as a single group (Clarke, Cull,
Martinez Peria and Sanchez, 2005; Detragiache, Tressel and Gupta, 2008; Gormley,
2007). In so doing, it has shown that foreign banks constitute a relatively hetero-
geneous group, with differences in terms of locational strategies, as well as different
asset-liability mixes leading to sustainable differences in performance. These dif-
ferent strategies will have implications for policy-making which are detailed further
below.
Second, using an unexploited database recording internal capital in the balance
sheet of foreign banks located in South Africa, this research has contributed to the
literature on the benefits of internal capital markets by relying on direct internal
transactions. It has examined internal lending in an international setting, exam-
ining affiliates of companies from different countries of origin, while most of the
literature has focused on internal capital markets inside groups from a single coun-
try of origin (Gopalan et al., 2007; Cetorelli and Goldberg, 2012). Furthermore, this
research has examined the internal fund channel for bank credit, instead of relying
on comparisons between credit growth of foreign affiliates of multinational banks
and of domestic banks to infer internal capital market practices as has traditionally
be done in the literature (Popov and Udell, 2012). Finally, it has also contributed
to the international strategy literature, examining an alternative channel (internal
capital) through which headquarters may support their foreign affiliates, distinct
from headquarters’ knowledge transfers to their subsidiaries.
Third, this research has drawn on new data collected through a survey of banks
in Africa to examine internal organizational aspects of multinational firms. In so
doing, it has contributed both to the organizational economics literature and the
strategy and international business literature on headquarters-subsidiaries relations.
The organizational economics literature has tended to focus on transfer of authority
inside firms, examining the relation between plant managers and central headquar-
ters or between plant managers and workers located in the same region, but not
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bringing the analysis to the higher level of global headquarters-foreign affiliates rela-
tion. The international strategy or business literature has focused more on networks
and knowledge flows within multinationals (Ghoshal and Bartlett, 1990; Gupta and
Govindarajan, 2000; Monteiro, Arvidsson and Birkinshaw, 2008), “parenting ad-
vantages” or headquarters’ value added to their subsidiaries (Goold, Campbell and
Alexander, 1998, Goold and Campbell, 2002), as well as subsidiaries’ contribution to
the firm-specific advantages of the MNC (Birkinshaw and Morrison, 1995; Birkin-
shaw, Hood and Jonsson, 1998) without properly including agency and incentive
aspects. However, as mentioned in Chapter 3, this separation of domains between
organizational economics and organizational theorists in strategy is problematic,
as both environmental changes and incentive structures shape organizational struc-
ture (Kaplan and Henderson, 2005). Furthermore, the nature of the data collected
contributes greatly to our understanding of banks’ mode of operations and organi-
zations in Africa, as well as bank managers’ perception of the business environment.
This effort to collect data is important given the scarcity of information on the
topic, with only a limited number of empirical studies (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and
Martínez Pería, 2008; Calice, Chando and Sekioua, 2012), despite the existence of
a strong relation between financial growth and development (see Levine, 1997, for a
discussion).
Theoretical implications
The first theoretical implication of this research is the need to define more clearly
“institutional voids advantages” and to identify the channels through which they
may affect firm performance as this research has found little evidence that these ad-
vantages were competitive and sustainable. A resource must enable firms to deploy
a strategy that creates value (Barney, 1991). The fact that (potential) institutional
voids advantages do not translate into performance advantages for African MNB
could be either because they do not create enough value to compensate for pro-
ductivity weaknesses, or because Global MNB which did not initially possess such
advantages have had enough time to build them before the African late-movers have
expanded into these particular host markets. While it is true, as Cuervo-Cazurra
and Genc (2008) show, that multinationals from developing countries tend to be
more present than developed multinationals in countries with low GDP per capita,
this does not necessarily mean that it is because they have a competitive institu-
tional voids advantage to do so. It might just be because, as argued in Chapter
1, they have a lower outside option and therefore lower opportunity cost with re-
gards to foreign developing markets, and because they do not have the necessary
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capabilities to compete in more developed markets.
If institutional voids advantages, or, similarly, advantages provided by the simi-
larity of the composition of the demand between home and host countries, are not
sustainable, then do developing multinationals possess any superior advantage at
all compared to developed multinationals? And in fact do firms need ownership ad-
vantages or superior productivity to expand abroad? In the international business
literature, an asset-augmenting perspective has been proposed to explain the rise
of multinationals from emerging or developing countries, according to which firms
engage in FDI to enhance their competitiveness by acquiring knowledge or resources
abroad, rather than to exploit their existing advantages (Makino, Lau, Chung-Ming
and Yeh, 2002; Child and Rodrigues, 2005; Mathews, 2002). However, this does
not mean that these multinationals do not have or need sustainable advantage to
guarantee the success of their internationalization (Dunning, 2006). In fact, the
majority of African banking multinationals are from the most developed regional
countries, such as Nigeria, which is the home of large banking groups fostered by
the important increases in capital requirements over the last few years leading to
market consolidation. Other African banking groups are supported by strong re-
gional organizations, such as Ecobank Group, from Togo which was initiated and
promoted by the Federation of West African Chambers of Commerce and Industry,
with the support of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).
Furthermore, if foreign activities were essentially impulsed by asset-seeking strate-
gies in the banking sector in sub-Saharan Africa, one would expect to see regional
African banks entering significantly more through acquisition than through green-
field compared to global banks, but this is not the case (Chapter 3). In fact, if
the co-existence of foreign firms with different levels of capabilities in a same host
country cannot only be explained by the possession of capabilities providing sustain-
able advantages, the theoretical implication of this research is that one may have
to go back to a market structure explanation: while the differences in performance
between foreign firms are explained by their capabilities, the fact that these differ-
ences are sustainable (i.e. no large intra-sectoral inter-firms reallocation towards
the more productive firms, à la Melitz (2003)) without finding strong evidence of
market segmentation or strategic groups, may be explained by the structure of the
market: the lack of strong competition between banks both on prices and on quan-
tity especially in the SME segment allows less-performing banks to remain active.
This is conform to what Bloom and Van Reenen (2007) observed in their analysis of
the productivity of manufacturing firms around the world, namely that in countries
with low competition the dispersion of firms’ productivity tends to be higher.
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The second message of this thesis is that there is no foreign “representative firm”
per se, but a variety of foreign firms, with different strategies based on a varied set
of capabilities. Theoretically, it implies that researchers need to incorporate foreign
firms’ heterogeneity in models of foreign banks’ entry, such as the ones developed by
Detragiache, Tressel and Gupta (2008), Gormley (2011), Dell’Ariccia and Marquez
(2004) and Sengupta (2007). The premises of these models is that the cost of
capital of foreign banks is lower than that of domestic banks, but that they face
informational disadvantages compared to local banks. This induces cream-skimming
of the best firms by foreign banks and may reduce funding to small firms if it impairs
domestic banks ability to cross-subsidize lending. However, while broadly true for
foreign affiliates of global banks, it does not capture well the strategies and expansion
of regional African banks. As a consequence, these models should try to integrate
two different levels of informational advantage and cost advantage for foreign banks,
as regional African banks are much closer operationally to domestic banks, especially
in terms of their ability to obtain information on SMEs and their cost of funding.
For instance, the Tanzanian foreign affiliate of large Kenyan bank may operate in
a manner that is more similar to that of a large domestic (multinational) bank in
Tanzania than to that of a subsidiary of a global bank. This matters as regional
African banks’ presence in some foreign markets is large enough to have an impact
on the overall local credit allocation.
Policy implications
The strategies of banks as well as their performance, especially in developing coun-
tries where capital markets tend to be underdeveloped, have implications for the
growth of the economy in general. The first policy implication concerns the hetero-
geneity of the impact of foreign banks on host country markets. Indeed, if a country
implements policies to encourage foreign banks’ entry, the impact of these policies
on local banking markets will depend on which groups of banks are entering this
market. Indeed, regression analysis of the market shares of Global MNB and of
African MNB by host country has shown that the presence of these two groups of
banks varies depending on country characteristics among which GDP growth and
and banking regulations such as minimum capital requirements. Furthermore, both
the primary and secondary data collected for this research have shown that foreign
affiliates of global banks tend to be less exposed to the SME segment, relative to
regional African banks. In other words, if a country primarily attracts regional
African banks into its economy, SMEs’ access to bank loans may increase relatively
more than if new foreign banks are mostly from developed countries. At the same
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time global banks benefit from a larger customers’ current deposit base and can rely
relatively more on group funding in case of capital crunches, which may reinforce
host markets’ financial stability. A related policy message is that the organizational
form of the foreign affiliates, either as a branch or as a subsidiary will also have an
impact on the stability of the banking sector and the local supply of credit through
the internal capital market channel (Chapter 2). Overall, although the impact of
foreign banks on host banking market is ambiguous and depends on a series of bank
factors, distinguishing between different groups of banks increases the precision of
policy recommendations.
Secondly, a clear message from the survey results and interviews conducted with
bank managers is the urgent need to reform the court system, along with the re-
duction of red tape at the ministries of land for land collateral registration, and the
implementation and further development of credit reference bureaus (CRBs). This
should have positive effects on lending. Improving the court system, and especially
reducing red-tape, on top of general positive effects on the business environment,
should facilitate banks’ lending to SMEs. Many banks mentioned that collateral
was not the first criteria that they considered when appraising loans. This is partly
related to the quality itself of available collaterals, but also to the fact that most of
the collaterals are difficult to recover in case of default due to long court procedures.
As a consequence, banks tend to require SMEs to build cash collateral (effectively
building up deposits) and also charge high interest rates on loans. Improving the
court system could create both a more strict repayment culture among SMEs and
lower interest rates charged by banks by increasing the potential recovery value of
collaterals. In addition, developing CRBs should increase the availability of informa-
tion in the market, reduce asymmetry of information, and, if positive information
is also included (i.e. information on borrowers who have repaid on time and are
therefore “good borrowers”), it should give more bargaining power to SMEs when
negotiating loans with banks. Both take time, although CRB initiatives are cur-
rently developed in many countries. Encouragingly, and as mentioned in Chapter 3,
banking regulations and employment laws do not seem to create obstacle for banks
which suggests that it is more a question of building up infrastructure and institu-
tions than a question of changing the regulations. Furthermore, the findings from
the bank survey also suggest that furthering specialized local skills, especially in risk
management, is another potential area for policy improvement. As many managers
mentioned the difficulty to retain skills due to competition between banks, or in
some countries the lack of local skills itself, improving human capital and banking
knowledge could not only strengthen the banking sector if it ensures that appropri-
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ate risk management systems are put in place, but also develop knowledge to further
financial innovation. In fact, banking innovation could be brought about in domes-
tic markets through knowledge spillovers from foreign banks, which constitutes a
further avenue of research which will be discussed below.
Thirdly, this thesis may also provide some suggestions for bank managers them-
selves. The research carried out in Chapter 1 has found that over a 10-year period
the main determinant of bank performance was the composition of the liability
mix while there were no significant quality differences in banks’ portfolio once host
country fixed effects were included. For African MNB, this suggests that a way to
improve their financial performance is to attract more customer deposits, for in-
stance by developing products that are more appealing to low-income customers.
This was the model successfully followed by Equity Bank, the largest bank by cus-
tomer number in Kenya, which started as a building society in 1984, developed into a
micro-finance institution and eventually becoming a commercial bank. Equity Bank
focuses on providing retail services to average Kenyans, creating retail products
which make it affordable and attractive for customers both to borrow money, but
also, and importantly, to deposit money. This endeavor to target geographic areas
and population which were neglected by traditional banks, coupled with a devel-
oped Universal Banking Software which provides efficient screening and monitoring
of retail and SME clients have helped the bank to generate strong performance. The
Equity Bank case is considered by many bankers and practitioners in Africa and the
West as a true “success story” (see Equity Bank Case Study, Stanford GSB, pre-
pared by Saloner and Coates, 2007). In other words, the implication of the empirical
findings of this thesis for bank managers, which, to a certain extent are illustrated in
Equity Bank’s story, could be that regional African banks should go more “local” by
reducing their concentration in the corporate segment and increasing their exposure
to the SME and retail segment. This movement is in fact already happening in the
most competitive African markets: in Kenya, some respondents of foreign affiliates
of regional African banks and of domestic banks mentioned that their bank was
disengaging from the corporate segment to reallocate their loan portfolio towards
the SME segment which offers higher returns than corporates, due to high compe-
tition at the top. However, and as evidenced by Equity Bank, to be successful this
strategy requires good monitoring and information systems, which depends on the
operational capacity of the bank and can be costly to implement for smaller banks.
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Limitations
The main limitation of this research concerns the quality and availability of the data,
especially in the third chapter, given the difficulty, both for logistical and confiden-
tiality reasons, to obtain primary data on banks’ organization and credit practices
in Africa. As such, the sample size of the survey is relatively small. This limitation
is shared by much of the academic research on sub-Saharan Africa, and is related to
the difficulty to conduct research in developing markets with limited infrastructure,
not only in terms of communications and transport but also governmental infras-
tructure, as developed statistical organizations such as offices of national statistics
are often lacking. Other limitations are common to all surveys which is that of
getting accurate, unbiased information, although the survey methodology employed
has tackled these issues directly.
The second limitation concerns the external validity of the research. As explained
in the first chapter, the choice of sub-Saharan Africa, apart from motivations specif-
ically related to the evolution of the banking sector over the last decade and the
internationalization of regional African banks, was justified by the fact that sub-
Saharan Africa constitutes an “extreme case study”, in which foreign banks’ specific
capabilities should manifest themselves more clearly. However, the extent to which
the research findings are generalizable to other developing regions is an open ques-
tion. Do global banks also outperform regional banks in Asia? Are the financial
and organizational links between headquarters and subsidiaries also determined by
the same factors when affiliates are located in Latin America rather than in sub-
Saharan Africa? The results should be valid in other developing countries if they
are mainly related to economic development factors, such as lack of information,
weak institutional environments, low level of demand. If they are primarily driven
by Africa-specific cultural factors, the question of external validity becomes more
acute.
The third limitation concerns the fact that this research has only focused on the
supply-side of banking markets, without examining demand-side elements beyond
general economic characteristics of the host country. Integrating the demand-side
to the equation would allow for a more comprehensive examination of the strategies
of multinational banks, as well as their impact on local host markets.
To overcome these limitations would require more time, and more capacity, both
financial and human, which is beyond the scope of this PhD project. However, these
limitations indicate the direction to go for further research on this topic.
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Future research
A first avenue of research, which is a direct extension of the present research, would
be to extend the geographic focus to other developing markets and to adopt a
group-level analysis. Employing empirical methods such as econometric “case stud-
ies” where variation in the data is not across firms but across entities of a same firm,
which is popular within “personnel economics” (for instance, Lazear, 2000), to ana-
lyze the relations between subsidiaries situated in different countries and regions of
the world and their parent bank would allow for a further examination of the extent
to which groups’ organizational form and internal allocation of resources between
subsidiaries are determined by environmental (host country) factors.
A second avenue of research, extending the third chapter and linking it back to
the first chapter would be to examine the link between performance and organiza-
tional form. It was unfortunately not possible to do so given the limitation of the
data at hand, but ideally, with time series data, one could examine the relation be-
tween organizational form and performance, and how this relation varies depending
on external, environmental, factors.
A third avenue of research would be to go one step further and examine the
impact of foreign banks on domestic markets by analyzing the knowledge spillovers
of these banks, which could also considerably further our understanding of the im-
pact of foreign banks on local banking markets. This research has found that global
banks tend to adopt centralized organizations, and that their foreign affiliates re-
ceive important operational and technical support from their group, suggesting a
significant concentration of banking knowledge within these foreign affiliates. Fur-
thermore, fieldwork data has also shown that a large majority of regional African
banks and emerging banks rely on technical methods of appraising SME loans such
as credit scores (around 80% of the emerging and regional African banks surveyed),
while less than half the domestic banks have adopted them. Given the relatively
high turnover of managers mentioned by respondents in the survey, especially in
Kenya, which could be an important channel of diffusion of managerial practices
and banking technology in a market, it would be interesting to examine the differ-
ential impact of foreign penetration of global, regional African and emerging banks
on knowledge spillovers and the adoption of banking innovations by domestic banks
with respect to lending, risk or banking products.
A natural fourth avenue of research would consist in examining the demand-side
of banking markets to further understand the implications of foreign banks’ presence
on host countries’ financial development. This research has found that global banks
can get better access to customers’ demand deposit than regional African banks.
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Why is it the case? Is it due to brand loyalty, trust, or ease of access to branches and
ATMs by the local population? Interviews with bank managers of regional African
banks have suggested that the lack of branch network is a contributing factor, but
by learning more about consumers’ preferences and their access to financial services
one may be able to shed more light on the dynamics of banking competition.
This thesis has shown the existence of robust correlations between banking reg-
ulations and the presence of different groups of banks (Chapter 1). This suggests
a last avenue for research with a more macro-economic perspective, consisting in
examining more closely banking regulations in sub-Saharan Africa and their role
in promoting access to finance and stability in the banking sector. Many African
countries are progressively increasing the capital requirements to operate in their
banking market. As a consequence, a movement of consolidation bringing higher
concentration has been observed in some markets (especially in Nigeria), which may
increase interest rates for borrowers if it entails lower competition; but could also
reduce lending interest rates if economies of scale and lower operational costs pre-
vail or if it leads to oligopolistic competition between a few large banks. Examining
how these regulatory changes affect different categories of banks and also to what
extent consumers benefit from the strengthening of banking regulations would be of
particular interest both for academic research and policy-makers.
Banking markets in sub-Saharan Africa have not yet reached maturity, even in
the most advanced economies. The banking environment of the region has evolved
considerably over the last 10 to 15 years with the regional expansion of African
banks, coupled with financial innovations and regulatory changes. As a result, bank-
ing markets have progressively become more competitive, but banks, even in the
most advanced banking markets such as Kenya or Nigeria, still enjoy large interest
margins and are very profitable. The extent to which they will generate benefits
to the local population, mainly through a reduction in interest rate spreads and an
increase in affordable banking products to the poorer groups will depend on the
competitive pressure to innovate and on judicious banking regulations. Competi-
tion will be strengthened by the foreign expansion of African banks and their further
market penetration which will continue due to their need to expand cross-border to
achieve economies of scales. This foreign penetration should provide incentives for
domestic banks to develop their capabilities, especially on the operational side of
their business, and in so doing, lower their operating costs. The recent and renewed
interest of investors in Africa, considered the “last frontier market”, has been partly
due to the decline of the rate of return of developed countries’ assets. However this
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is not enough to drive long-term sector growth: investors’ sentiment shifts quickly.
But, and this is the reassuring part, the boom in Africa’s banking is mainly due
to concrete opportunities and positive changes in the macroeconomic conditions at
home. This should eventually be to the financial benefit of all, for economic growth
in Africa.
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